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Abstract 
Our ability to look around our environment and to be able to “focus” on some 
specific information in the environment seems effortless. Underlying this illusion 
are many complex interactions that make up what we define as attention. The 
majority of work in the attention domain is focused on how we attend to 
information or how attention is shifted to other information. However, the goal 
of this body of work is to understand the other side of this coin, the dark side of 
attention. Specifically, the dark side of attention, defined here, encompasses all 
of the inhibitory processes that support selection. Across several experiments, I 
probe many of these processes and attempt to understand how they interact 
with one another. In Chapter 1, I reviewed some of the foundational research on 
attention and propose why understanding inhibitory processes is critical for 
understanding attention. In Chapter 2, I examined whether learning to ignore 
specific to-be-ignored information can help facilitate visual search. I 
demonstrate that learning to ignore information can result in a benefit that is 
modulated by participants’ time spent learning about the to-be ignored feature. 
In Chapter 3, I investigated whether early feature-based attention can be 
facilitated by suppression of distractor feature information when multiple 
distractor features are present in a display. Additionally, I also investigated 
whether the consistency of this information (i.e., learning to ignore) is what 
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facilitates inhibition driving early feature-based information. In Chapter 4, I 
investigated how attention is shaped by experiences, both lived and biologically 
driven. Specifically, I investigate the interplay of these two types of experiences, 
using food stimuli as a key example, to understand how experience influences 
the control of visual attention. In Chapter 5, I investigated one of the 
electroencephalographic markers that is utilized in many attention experiments 
and demonstrate that it has been misrepresented. It seems that the N2pc 
cannot reflect just an initial shift of attention, but rather reflects post-selection 
processing well beyond the initial shift of attention. In Chapter 6 I considered all 
of these findings in a larger framework for understanding the cognitive 
underpinnings of inhibitory processes.  
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Chapter 1: Attention 
Attention is inherently limited. Contrary to the feeling that we have a total grasp 
on all the comings and goings of the world around us, we can quickly feel that 
confidence fade the moment we try to text and drive (please don’t do this), or 
when we are watching a critical point in a movie and someone requires our 
attention across the room. Early research on these phenomena suggests that 
there is a limitation of attentional resources; mainly there is a limit to how much 
specific info we can select from the large swath of information in the present 
world (Cherry, 1953, Stewart, 1821; and for an updated review see Wood & 
Cowan, 1995). However, why is it the case that despite this limitation we feel like 
we have conscious access to all the present visual information in our 
environment? This is the central question cognitive scientists studying attention 
have considered over the latter half century. More specifically, cognitive 
scientists have queried: how do we select relevant information while we 
simultaneously filter out irrelevant information? 
 
The goal of the current research is to examine the role that ignoring plays in 
filtering out irrelevant information in our visual world. Furthermore, I aim to 
demonstrate that inhibitory processes play a much larger role in the selection of 
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information than previously credited. In order to set the stage for this topic, I will 
briefly review the relevant literature on attention. 
What is attention?  
Identifying and understanding the cognitive processes underlying attention are 
difficult. For example, even initially defining “attention” does not come as an 
easy task. You can try for yourself now: try to come up with a definition for 
attention that doesn’t rely on using the word “attention.” You might find that 
you use stand-in words like “filter” or “select.” More to the point, identifying 
what processes are involved in attention and whether there are several “types” 
of attentional processes are up for debate. The challenge here, as with all 
scientific inquiry, is to come up with a parsimonious theory defining the nature 
of attention, what influences the allocation of attentional resources, and what 
does it mean to “pay attention.” Below is an abbreviated history of the progress 
psychologists have made in defining the cognitive process of “attention.” 
 
While the definitional challenge above may seem trivial, psychologists have 
struggled with such a scenario for more than a century. In the early work on 
attention (e.g., James, 1890/1950), psychologists argued that to understand 
attention we only need to look within our own experience (e.g., our mental life) 
to understand the very nature of it. Along these subjective lines of exploration, 
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others tried to examine how this “attention” influences the perception of a 
stimulus. In particular, in the early days of attention research one hot debate 
questioned whether the allocation of attention to a stimulus modulated the 
“intensity” of that stimulus (Titchener, 1908). For example, introspective 
“experiments” from psychologists at this time investigated whether attending to 
some sounds over others made them sound louder, or whether attending to a 
red piece of paper made it appear more vibrant, colorful, and/or bright. 
Obviously, due to the nature of these thought experiments it was difficult to 
identify whether attention plays this kind of role in perception. Pashler (1998) 
and others suggest that these founding writers in psychology set the stage for 
how we investigate the nature of attention. 
 
Years later with significantly more insight and even more empirical evidence in 
hand, Pashler (1998) argues in his excellent book, The Psychology of Attention, 
that despite the feeling that we might have some innate understanding of the 
nature of attention, we in fact know nothing about it. This isn’t to say that our 
understanding of mental life is tricking us or is incorrect, rather the study of 
mental life doesn’t allow us an inside look into explanations into a number of 
phenomena. More specifically, the self-inquiry into the nature of attention 
doesn’t help us understand the underlying mechanisms and processes involved 
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in attention, but leaves us to use the word as a stand-in for any number of 
cognitive processes.  
 
One good example of an empirical inquiry into the nature of attention is the 
research dissociating attention from eye movements. Specifically, it would be a 
safe bet to argue that most early philosophers studying attention would refer to 
eye movements to an object and a shift of attention to that object as the same 
process. (Note: Helmholtz had provided some demonstrations that attention 
and eye movements could be separated in some circumstances (Von Helmholtz, 
1896).) However, influential work by Posner (1980) argued for covert shifts of 
attention independent of where the eyes were fixating. To support these claims, 
Posner conducted several orienting studies (Posner, 1980). Typically, the studies 
involved several common elements, for example to ensure that observers didn’t 
move their eyes, they monitored eye movements and only used trials that 
contained no movements. Observers were often presented with a cue prior the 
onset of a search display.  The cue could either be a fixation cross, which told 
participants that the relevant stimulus (e.g., a black square) was equally likely to 
appear on either side of the screen (left or right), or it could be an arrow 
pointing to the left or right. The arrow cue had an 80% chance of indicating the 
correct side (i.e., valid cue) and a 20% chance of indicating the incorrect side 
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(i.e., invalid cue). After the cue was presented, the stimulus would appear on the 
screen and observers made a response. Depending on the particular task, 
sometimes observers were told to press a single button as quickly as possible 
when the stimulus appeared, no matter the location (i.e., a simple RT, which was 
used to eliminate overt response preparations), however typically they would 
make a two alternative forced choice response to indicate the location of the 
stimulus (i.e., left or right). Results from these studies revealed that when the 
arrow cue was presented, reaction times were drastically different for valid cues 
compared to invalid cues. Specifically, they found that when observers were 
presented an invalid cue they were much slower at responding to the stimulus 
compared to the valid cue, suggesting that attention was brought to the cued 
location independent of the location the eyes were fixating. As Posner (1980) 
argues, evidence such as this flies directly in the face of our notions that we have 
a total grasp on the visual comings and goings of the world around us. 
Specifically, even though Posner’s task is quite simple, it presents findings 
suggesting that attention can only be in one location at a time. Furthermore, it 
also demonstrations how attention is limited in the other non-cued locations. 
This is very different from the feeling that we can consciously access any visual 
event that is in front of us. Rather, even within the information that is in our 
visual field there is only a small percentage that we can successful attend to.  
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Overall, by using empirical methodology, similar to what Posner did, we can 
probe the underlying processes involved in “attention” and, better yet, ask 
whether attention is made up of multiple cognitive functions, or is in itself a 
single cognitive process. 
 
How do our goals and information in the world interact to influence attention? 
Over the better part of a century, cognitive psychologists continued to take the 
approach laid out by researchers like Pashler (1998) and have operationalized 
cognitive phenomena that are related to the concept of attention. In the present 
stage of cognitive research on attention, most researchers would still argue for 
some form of what Pashler has laid out: probe cognitive processes through 
empirical exploration of various attention related phenomena and make 
connections between the phenomenological outcomes and some proposed 
unifying theory of attention. Specifically, many of the “unifying” theories 
describing the cognitive process of attention depend on a dichotomy of two 
attentional processes (see Figure 1.1 for visual example): bottom-up vs. top-
down attention (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen, Habekost, & 
Kyllingsbæk, 2005; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Theeuwes, 
1994, 2010; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994b; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 
1989; Wolfe & Gancarz, 1997; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2017; Wolfe, Reijnen, Van 
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Wert, & Kuzmova, 2009).  How do various attentional phenomena map onto the 
theoretical dichotomy? 
 
Bottom-up Attention 
Bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) attention has previously been defined as: 
“involving the involuntary, unavoidable capture of attention by a salient 
perceptual stimulus” (Yantis, 2013). Therefore, bottom-up attention is the 
capture of attention, or the focusing of attention, on a particular stimulus that is 
solely driven by information from the environment. Moreover, salient perceptual 
stimulus refers to stimuli that have a differential signal compared to other 
perceptual stimuli that are available. For example, depending on your current 
task, a single red square among green squares will often grab your attention just 
as will a tilted line among straight lines. In the definition above, it seems that 
saliency is the most important factor for influencing stimulus driven attention. 
There are two critical examples that provide evidence for circumstances of 
stimulus driven attention: pop out search and abrupt onsets.  
 
In the case of pop out search, experiments in this domain typically involve trials 
where a single target item differs from a homogenous set of non-target items. 
These salient target trials are compared to trials where the non-target items and 
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the target item are all heterogeneous (Note: not all pop out displays require 
homogenous non-target items, but many of them do involve homogenous non-
targets, e.g., Triesman & Gelade, 1980). Results typically show that observers 
are faster at finding the target when it is more salient than the non-target items. 
In some cases, saliency has been defined using color as a feature. For example, 
Treisman and Gelade (1980) found that when the target item differed enough 
from the non-target items (e.g. a pink “O” among green O’s), the search slopes 
were close to zero and independent of the display size. Thus, observers were 
able to quickly, and efficiently, find the target item. Researchers have defined 
instances when visual search for a target item is highly efficient as parallel search 
(Egeth, 1966; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). In the example above, efficient search 
occurs because  pink O is salient in relation to the homogenous green Os. Rapid 
attentional selection due to a salient feature has also been shown using other 
features like orientation and shape (Treisman & Souther, 1985), luminance 
(Nothdurft, 1993), and texture information (Julesz, 1981). The take-home from 
the examples above is that bottom-up attention is rapidly drawn to certain 
stimuli that are salient, in the absence of any previous knowledge in the 
mind/brain of the searcher.  In the referenced examples, the observers had no 
experience with any of the displays, yet when the display is shown, attention was 
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quickly oriented to the salient item in each display and thus attention was 
guided by the stimulus information.  
 
Another example of when behavior is guided by bottom-up factors is the case of 
abrupt onsets. What is interesting about abrupt onsets is that despite the high 
similarity of non-target items and target items (e.g. black letters), by modulating 
the spatiotemporal qualities of a subset of the display items, we can influence 
where attention is allocated. Specifically, Jonides and Yantis (1988) found that 
when observers were instructed to find a specific letter (e.g. the letter S), 
reaction times were significantly faster if the target letter appeared abruptly at a 
location where no letter had been before, while the other non-target letters 
were slowly revealed behind masking placeholders. In contrast, this can work in 
the opposite direction where reaction times are often slower when a distractor is 
the item that abruptly onsets (Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008), thus the 
abrupt onset guides attention to the distracting item. Therefore, it seems that 
although the objects in the paradigm mentioned above shared many features: 
shape (i.e. letters) and color, the spatial and temporal presentation of an item 
can influence where attention is guided.  
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Above I have described some cases where behavior can be influenced by 
information from the environment. These instances support the generalization 
that in most cases when items are salient compared to the background and 
other non-salient objects, typically attention is guided to these items quickly and 
efficiently. However, there have been alternative accounts suggesting that 
salient information does not always capture attention(Folk, Remington, & 
Johnston, 1992; Schreij et al., 2008). For example, work by Folk et al. (1992) 
suggests that this “bottom up” attentional capture only occurs when these 
salient items, even if they are distractors, are related and relevant to the 
attentional set the observer makes to find a target. For example, if a distractor is 
characterized by abrupt onsets, its presence only has a reaction time cost when 
the target is also characterized by abrupt onsets but not when the target is 
characterized by a different color. 
 
Top-down Attention 
Top-down (or goal-oriented) attention has previously been defined as: 
“deliberately paying attention to something in order to get information needed 
to achieve goals” (Yantis, 2013). However, there are circumstances where 
previous experience can influence attention and this might not be deemed as 
“deliberately paying attention”. Therefore, I suggest that top-down attention 
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might be defined as any instance where attention is guided as a function of 
information stored in the central nervous system (independent of whether that is 
deliberate or not). To support the previous statement, we should consider an 
example of implicit memory guiding attention. In a study by Fischler (1977), 
observers were asked if two letter strings were both words (i.e., a lexical decision 
task). On some trials the two words were unrelated (Head-Tree) and on some 
trials the words were related (Cat-Dog). Results demonstrated that even though 
observers were not explicitly instructed to attend to the relationship between 
the two words, they were faster on trials where the words were associated 
compared to trials where there we not related. This suggests that even though 
observers received no instructions indicating that they attend to the relationship 
of the words nor did they deliberately attend to this relationship, the known 
semantic relationship that is stored in long-term memory implicitly guided 
attention (Note: this might be more of a response bias or priming issue, but in 
both of those cases it would still be an example of “top-down” guidance in that 
previously learned information influenced current behaviors). Therefore, it seems 
that information that resides in memory can influence behavior, independent of 
whether it was deliberate or not. However, how does guidance influence 
behavior when we actively try to attend to specific information? 
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An example of when behavior is deliberately guided by top-down attention is 
when observers try to attend to current goal information. This is a case that we 
are probably the most familiar with, for example when we search our house for 
our car keys; we usually have a representation of what our car keys look like that 
guides our attention. In the laboratory, a number of studies have been done 
looking at the effects of goal-oriented attention on visual search (for reviews see 
Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Theeuwes, 2010). Specifically, a study by Wolfe et al. 
(1989) demonstrated circumstances where attention is guided by a deliberate 
goal set. Observers were asked to search for specific “triple conjunction 
objects” among various distractors. These objects were conjunctions of three 
features, e.g. the target might be a big (size), white (color), vertical (orientation) 
line, and distractors shared two of the features with the target. As the authors 
demonstrate, parallel processes guide attention to each of the simple features 
and search slopes are more efficient compared to searches that only involved 
simple conjunctions (e.g. searching for a red O among green Os and red Xs). 
These results suggest that when observers have a specific top-down goal, they 
are able to orient attention to the desired target and, at least in this case, this 
results in more efficient search.  
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However, it is not always the case that the generalizations made above hold in 
all circumstances.  
 
But do we even need Bottom-up attention? 
One very interesting idea put forth in recent work by Benoni (2018) suggests 
that while top-down and bottom-up attention is a parsimonious theory, evidence 
supporting Bottom-up attention, such as singleton capture experiments, could 
actually be explained by processes in top-down attention. Specifically, Benoni 
utilized a capture paradigm where 70% of the time observers could predict the 
location of a salient singleton distractor, and 30% of the time it was in an 
unexpected location. Results revealed a capture like effect on both the 
predicted and unpredicted trials. However, on the 30% of unpredicted trials 
observers were “captured” by the location of the expected singleton and not 
the actual singleton itself. Benoni (2018) argues that much of the work 
supporting cases of bottom-up driven attention (i.e., attentional capture by 
salient items) could actually by produced by top-down effects like these. 
Specifically, previous work in this domain has found support for bottom-up 
attention typically in tasks where there is a salient singleton, like the task above, 
that captures attention even though it is irrelevant to the observer’s current 
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example, recent work by Anderson, Laurent, and Yantis (2011) [also see: 
(Anderson, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Anderson et al., 2016; Anderson, Laurent, & 
Yantis, 2013, 2014; Anderson & Yantis, 2012, 2013)] has argued that the bottom-
up vs. top-down dichotomy is not enough. Specifically, they offer up a new 
trichotomy as a replacement with the following types of attentional guidance: 
stimulus-driven (i.e., bottom-up), goal-driven (i.e. top-down), and history-driven. 
Anderson et al. (2011) argue that their results could not be explained by the old 
dichotomy. Specifically, in their study they had two parts: a training phase and a 
test phase. In the training phase (see panel A in Figure 2) observers were told to 
search for targets that were either red or green, and to report the orientation of 
the line segment inside once they found one. A correct response for a red target 
would reward participants with, on average, a high-value reward ($0.05 80% of 
the time and $0.01 20% of the time), while finding a green target would reward 
participants with, on average, a low-value reward ($0.01 80% of the time and 
$0.05 20% of the time). Once participants completed 1,008 training trials, they 
started the test phase. In the test phase (see panel B in Figure 1.2), participants 
were informed that they would no longer be rewarded for any of their responses 
and color didn’t matter for this task. Rather, the only goal the observers had was 
to look for an oddball shape (e.g., a single diamond among circles, or a single 
circle among diamonds). Once they located the singleton shape, they were 
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asked to report the orientation of the tilted line inside of that item. On a subset 
of trials in the test phase, one of the distractors was the color of the previous 
high-reward color (e.g., red) or the previous low-reward distractor (e.g., green).  
Results revealed that in the test phase, even when particpants were no longer 
rewarded, the reaction times were longer when a previously rewarded distractor  
was presented (either high or low) compared to when no previously rewarded 
distractor color was presented. Finally, while they found a monotonic trend as 
reward increased (distraction increased in this order: high-value distractor > low-
value distractor > non-rewarded neutral distractor), there were no significant 
differences for the amount of distraction when a previously high or low reward 
distractor was presented.  
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authors argue that the only alternative is that value-driven attentional capture is 
a third unqiue mechanism that guides search.  
As more findings like the one detailed above have emerged, there has been a 
recent surge in the field of visual  attenton to reform the old dichotomy of top-
down and bottom up attention. One seminal paper on this topic put forth a 
formalized trichotomy that attempts to explain the interactions of value-driven 
attentional capture with the older dichotomy. Specifically, Awh, Belopolsky, and 
Theeuwes (2012), argue for three distinct mechanims in attentional guidance 
that feed into an “integrated priority map” (see Figure 1.3). They have a 
bottom-up/stimulus-driven mechanism that they call Physical Salience. They also 
include a mechanism called Current Goals, which emcompasses the typical top-
down/goal-driven attentional guidance results. Finally, they have a new third 
mechanism called Selection History, which encompasses a variety of findings 
from value-driven attentional capture and other forms of past selection that 
influence attention. For example, while selection history does include the value 
effects described before, it also includes other forms of selction history like inter-
trial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2007, 
2011). Specifically, inter-trial priming describes a class of attentional effects 
where an item that was attended on a previous trial will influence attention on 
the current trial. For example, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) found that if 
    
	 20 
observers searched for the same feature two or more trials in a row (e.g., look 
for the red circle) then repeated search for the same feature would speed search 
on subsequent trials. Awh et al. (2012) argue that these effects can neither be 
described as bottom-up because they interact not only with the stimulus 
information but also with what the observer remembered/learned from the 
previuos trial. Additionally, the authors argue that they cannot be top-down 
because they are not the “current goal” of the observer. Due to this conundrum, 
Awh et al. (2012) argue the only plausible explaination is that there is a third 
mechanism guiding attention.  
 
No-chotomies needed? 
While it could easily appear that the solution to the old dichotomy explaining 
attentional guidance is to expand our definitions of distinct attentional 
mechanisms, other recent work has argued for the opposite. In the paper 
entitled “There is no such thing as attention” Anderson (2011) (not to be 
confused with Anderson mentioned above for the value driven attentional 
capture work) argued that psychologists’ obsession with dichotomies have lead 
us down a road best not taken. Specifically, Anderson suggests that the current 
framework of attention is riddled with problems that have slowed the progress 
of attentional research, specifically suggesting that the insistence on 
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dichotomies create a framing problem. Due to this poor framing, psychologists 
attempt to “shoehorn” everything into “false dichotomies”, resulting in a 
simplistic theory that does not apply to many generalized situations.  While 
Anderson does argue against dichotomies such as preattentive vs. attentive 
processing or endogenous vs. exogenous cueing explicitly, he only hand-
wavingly dismisses the top-down vs. bottom-up dichotomy. It is not surprising 
that Anderson didn’t take on probably the biggest dichotomy in attention; this 
seems to be somewhat of a testament to how difficult it would be to argue that 
this dichotomy is definitively false. Although no one would argue that it has 
been proven true, some might argue that there is plenty of good evidence to 
buy into. Moreover, his “solution” to these psychological di/tri chotomies is to 
map biased competition theory (BCT) (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) onto 
Bayesian decision processes. However, the BCT that Desimone and Duncan 
(1995) put forth (which is detailed in the section on models below) is directly 
built on many assumptions about connections between top-down structures and 
bottom-up structures in the mind/brain. Specifically, top-down and bottom-up 
processes are inherently at odds with one another and drive the competition in 
many object interactions in the model. Furthermore, assuming that biased 
competition can be explained without top-down or bottom-up distinctions, we 
are still faced with an ever-growing model with degrees of freedom only bound 
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by researchers’ creativity (i.e., what sources influence attention, which and how 
many are in direct competition with one another, do any of the sources interact, 
if so how?). The reason psychologists like Newell (1973) argue for dichotomies, 
or “binary oppositions”, is not because it is the case that all aspects of the mind 
are broken up into this or that, rather it is because dichotomies provide an 
opportunity to compare psychological phenomenon, judge their similarity in 
process, implementation, or structure, and to draw generalizable conclusions 
about these attentional phenomenon. It is important to remember that we are in 
the business of predicting human behavior, so while dichotomies might not 
directly map onto the neuronal structure in the brain, they allow us an 
opportunity to plan a form of scholarly inquiry, e.g., is this phenomenon this or 
that? Overall, while Anderson (2011) provides a useful and critical review of 
psychology’s dichotomy laden landscape, it does not seem particularly useful 
when considering what drives attention.  
 
Why a dichotomy is enough 
The goal of a theory is to create the most parsimonious explanation for a set of 
results. Up to this point I have provided some empirical evidence for the top-
down vs. bottom-up distinction in visual attention. I described a recent review 
that, to say the least, was quite critical of that dichotomy (the paper is titled: 
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(2017). In their review, they provide a state of the field on what factors can guide 
attention. Their list includes five major factors: Bottom-up, Top-down, Scene-
guidance, Reward-driven guidance, and Selection History. While the other forms 
of guidance have been discussed above, it is important to define scene-
guidance. This form of guidance includes factors about a scene that can provide 
predictable information related to the location of certain items. For example, if 
you were looking for a bird you would generally look at the top of a scene (e.g., 
trees, sky, rooftops) rather than look to the ground (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & 
Rabinowitz, 1982). Wolfe and Horowitz (2017) do not attempt to provide a 
unifying theory to explain these results, rather they present the current evidence 
for these forms of guidance and suggest that: “modern theories of visual search 
need to incorporate all five factors and specify how these factors combine to 
shape search behavior.” However, considering all the evidence put forth thus 
far, if we define top-down and bottom-up guidance in the following way, we are 
able to incorporate all five factors in the old dichotomy: top-down attentional 
guidance relies on any information learned prior to the current attentional event 
and bottom-up attentional guidance relies on information derived from the 
attentional event. In this way we can still rely on the integrated priority map 
theory suggested by Awh et al. (2012), however now we can consider the 
“maps” that each of these sources of guidance would use. In Figure 1.4 I’ve 
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displayed a quick schematic of how top-down and bottom-up attentional 
information could be integrated while accounting for the results of “other” 
forms of attentional guidance. In the same way that previous theories of visual 
attention have described how saliency maps drive bottom-up guidance 
(Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Wolfe, 1994a; Wolfe et al., 1989; Wolfe 
& Gancarz, 1997), we could also imagine a similar “saliency map” that would 
drive top-down guidance. For example, if we consider a typical value-driven 
attentional capture experiment, we have several top-down signals at play. Awh 
et al. (2012) would argue that we have selection history and current goals at play 
when trying to ignore a distractor that shares the same features as a previously 
rewarded item, while trying to find an unrelated unique target item. 
Furthermore, Sha and Jiang (2016) would argue that selection history in this case 
could include not only value information but also could include the act of simply 
selecting that item repeatedly in a previous task (i.e., inter-trial effects). 
However, it is not the case that these tasks exist in a vacuum. The participant 
who is sitting in the testing room also has other goals in mind: what they might 
do later that day, long-term survival based goals (e.g., how would their 
performance on a trial change if they smelled smoke at the moment of onset), 
and academic goals (e.g., if this student is doing this for credit, would a current 
goal not include to finishing this task as quickly as possible), etc. Should we not 
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create additional boxes in the Awh et al. (2012) model that would account for 
these inputs? Where would the number of boxes end? The idea here is to not be 
facetious, but to present how complicated the issue becomes when we start to 
think about how we might define a priority map and discretize the inputs in a 
similar way to Awh et al. (2012). Rather the schematic in Figure 1.4 presents an 
alternative account where all previously learned information (explicit or implicit) 
is in direct competition in the top-down map and this top-down map is then 
integrated into a priority map with the bottom-up map, similar to the activation 
map in guided search (Wolfe, 1994a). This simple theory still accounts for the 
results from selection history studies, as well as stimulus-driven and goal-driven 
results, without the need of total restructuring. In fact, there appears to be no 
evidence presented by Awh et al. (2012) that would require that the brain has to 
be implementing attentional guidance similar to the competition set up in their 
trichotomy. Therefore, the more parsimonious theory would be to still define 
attentional guidance into these two broad inputs as that which was previously 
learned (i.e., top-down) and that which was derived from the attentional event 
(i.e., bottom-up). It is important to note, that an even more parsimonious model 
for attention would be to only have one continuum, like what is argued by 
Benoni (2018). Specifically,  Benoni’s results can be explained by a single 
continuum of top-down attention and “bottom-up” like effects are actually 
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explained by the attentional system tagging salient items (due to a top-down set 
to attend to those items). While it is difficult to prove whether the classic 
dichotomy or a single continuum is the right answer, much of the work in 
attention (and the models below) rely on explanations supported by the classic 
bottom-up vs. top-down dichotomy.  
 
Models of Attention: What and how do we select? 
Identifying the possible signals that could be considered for selection is just one 
part of understanding the cognitive process of attention. However, another key 
factor to consider is how the attentional system actually selects information. 
Specifically, past attentional models have asked: what can the attentional system 
select (e.g., features, objects, etc), how is attention deployed to that 
information, and how does the selection occur? Below is a brief review of a few 
prominent models of visual attention.  
 
When Selection Occurs 
Early Selection – Broadbent 
One of the earliest models of attentional processing was put forth by Broadbent 
(1958). In his model, he argued that when individuals are tasked with attending 
to a variety of information sources, that information is first put into a “buffer”, 
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and then the information is selected or attended to. This model would later be 
categorized as an “early selection model”, because information that is brought 
into the buffer isn’t already fully processed rather it only becomes processed 
after selection.  Support for his model was based on a variety of dichotic 
listening tasks (Broadbent, 1952; Cherry, 1953; Spieth, Curtis, & Webster, 1954). 
Typically, in these tasks the participant has two auditory sources of information, 
one in each ear. The participant is instructed to explicitly attend to one of the 
sources of information. For example, imagine that you hear a sequence of letters 
in your left ear simultaneous with a separate sequence of letters in your right 
ear. The participant is explicitly instructed to attend to the sequence in the right 
ear. Interestingly, when participants are asked to report the letters they heard, 
they will first report the attended sequence, then the unattended sequence. If 
they are forced to report them in the order they heard them (switching from left 
to right), then report performance severely drops due to having to switch 
between attention filters that are applied to the buffer. Broadbent took these 
results to suggest that all the items lived in the buffer, however the ability to 
accurately report the items depended on whether they were selected early.  
 
Late Selection – Deutsch & Deutsch 
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In a theoretical review, Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) set forth to provide 
evidence against early selection models of attention, by arguing that all 
information is completely processed as it comes into the information processing 
system (which is counter to the early selection model which argues that 
information must first be placed in a buffer) . This theory was put forth in direct 
opposition to early selection. Some of the evidence for late selection includes 
findings from Peters (1954), which demonstrated that if you vary the similarity of 
the two streams of information in a dichotic listening task, the results show that 
higher similarity produces more interference. This would suggest that the 
content of both the unattended and attended streams are processed and then 
the cued information in one stream is selected. Additional evidence from Gray 
and Wedderburn (1960) found that when you present two different streams of 
information, one in each ear, that could be combined to create a meaningful 
sequence (e.g., Left Ear: “Is”,  “this”, Right Ear: “Corbin's”, “Dissertation”, 
Combined: “Is this Corbin’s Dissertation”), even if participants are told to attend 
to one stream, they report the meaningful combination of the two. This also 
suggests that independent of where participants are cued, all of the information 
is processed for meaning. Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) argue that it cannot 
possibly be the case that there is early selection because if goal relevant 
information is to be selected, how does the system, in all cases, know which 
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incoming information is goal relevant without processing all information? It must 
be the case that on some level all possible information is processed and then 
that information which is most relevant to a current goal is subsequently 
selected.  
 
What Do We Select 
Feature Integration Theory – Treisman 
While the work detailed above considers how information is selected after it is 
perceived, it is also important to consider when we “attend to” information in 
the world, what exactly are we selecting? Specifically, in the dichotic listening 
tasks detailed above, is the word in each of those tasks selected or just is the 
channel (ear) prioritized? Or is it some combination of the features, or the 
individual features that make up those words? Treisman and Gelade (1980) 
proposed the Feature Integration Theory which argued for a twofold process of 
selection. First, features (e.g., color, brightness, orientation) are processed 
rapidly and in parallel (to draw connections to the dichotic listening literature 
above, this could be features like pitch or loudness). Second, direct attention is 
required to identify objects that are described by multiple features. It is through 
attention that the assortment of features is recognized and combined into an 
“object”. (Note: these findings bear resemblance to those of Egeth (1966), who 
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detailed the differences in Serial and Parallel processes.) Treisman and Gelade 
(1980) argue that in this case, attention is the “glue” that binds these seemingly 
unrelated features into an “object”. The key argument in this theory is that 
without attention, an assortment of features remains just that, and will not obtain 
object-hood status. Evidence supporting this theory comes from a variety of 
cognitive tasks, including visual search and texture segmentation. For example, 
in their first experiment Treisman and Gelade (1980) investigated how search 
performance is impacted when observers search for an object defined by one 
dimension compared to search for an object defined by the conjunction of two 
dimensions. This was a replication of an earlier study by Treisman, Sykes, and 
Gelade (1977). Specifically, they had observers search for two features 
simultaneously: the color blue or the shape/letter “S”. Critically, in the feature 
condition they could just search for either of the features alone to find the 
target, however in the conjunction condition they would need to search for the 
conjunction of two features (a green T). The authors found that even though 
observers were searching for an object in all cases, when they searched for an 
object defined by a single feature they performed the search in parallel and 
reaction times did not increase no matter how many other unrelated distractors 
were in the scene (even up to 30 items).  In contrast, when observers had to 
search for an object defined by two features, search times were significantly 
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longer and increased as a function of the visual set size. Critically, it is important 
to note that in both cases they were always searching for two features, the only 
difference is that in the conjunction task they needed to be bound within the 
same item. The authors argue that because focal attention is required to “bind” 
the multiple features into a single object, this search can only be completed by a 
serial process of identifying whether both features are presented in the item that 
is being attended. However, when there is only a single defining feature, this 
search does not require binding and therefore can be completed using a parallel 
search process.  
 
Parallel vs. Serial Search – Egeth, Virzi, Garbart 
While the findings from Treisman and Gelade (1980) present a convincing 
argument for Feature Integration Theory (they have several other experiments in 
their paper identifying situations which suggest that conjunctions of multiple 
features require focal attention), there persists one problem in their designs. 
Specifically, Egeth, Virzi, and Garbart (1984) point out that in the displays 
constructed by Treisman and Gelade (1980) for their conjunction search 
conditions, the number of distractors that share a single feature with the 
conjunction target (e.g., Target = Tgreen, Distractors = Sgreen Tpink) increase directly 
as a function of the visual set size. This is because they had an equal number of 
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both kinds of distractors that each share a single feature with the conjunction 
target. Therefore, is it the case, as Treisman and Gelade argue, that conjunction 
search always requires a random serial search through the display or could it be 
that observers do perform a parallel search first through the scene, to reject a 
subset of irrelevant stimuli (here pink Ts), and then have to subsequently 
randomly serially search through the distractors and target that share 1 similar 
feature? If the latter were the case, we would still see similar search times as 
what was found by Treisman and Gelade since the number of rejected items in 
their displays increased with visual set size in a linear fashion. The latter 
argument seems much more parsimonious: all searches use the same type of 
search processes, a parallel sweep through the display, then a serial search 
through a subset of items that share a feature(s) if that is required to determine 
the target item. Therefore, to test this Egeth et al. (1984) fashioned displays 
where they varied the number of distractors in a conjunction search that share a 
feature with the conjunction target. Specifically, they presented observers with a 
search task where they had to find a red O. The distractors in these displays 
were black Os and red Ns. Critically, in some search conditions they presented 
observers with situations where a subset was held constant (e.g., always 3 red 
letters) and they varied the number of the “unrelated distractors” (e.g., in a 
target present search for 15 items: the red O is the target, there are 2 other red 
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Ns and 12 black Os; in the target present search for 22 items: the red O is the 
target, there are 2 other red Ns and 19 black Os). If we first search by using a 
parallel process and then a serial process, then holding the red subset constant 
should allow observers to produce flat search times (i.e., a parallel search) for 
the red O no matter how large the visual set size is, since there would always be 
a subset of 3 items. However, if it is the case that conjunction search requires a 
random serial search process, as suggested by Treisman and Gelade, then when 
observers search for the conjunction item even when the subset is held constant, 
then we should see search RTs increase as a function of visual set size. 
Surprisingly, Egeth et al. (1984) found that when observers were presented with 
search displays where one feature subset was held constant, they could easily 
perform a parallel search first through the subset and then identify their 
conjunction target within the subset (i.e., a subsequent non-random serial 
search). This resulted in flat search slopes as a function of visual set size (i.e., it 
didn’t matter how large the visual set size was if the subset was held constant). 
Importantly, they found that when they kept the number of distractor items for 
each feature equal, search slopes were linearly increasing as a function of visual 
set size, similar to Treisman and Gelade (1980). These results suggest that 
search for a multidimensional item does not involve a subsequent random serial 
search after the massive parallel search. 
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Guided Search – Wolfe  
Taking inspiration from previous work on search for objects defined by single 
and multiple dimensions (Egeth, 1966; Egeth et al., 1984; Hoffman, 1979; 
Treisman & Souther, 1985; Treisman et al., 1977; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) 
Wolfe and colleagues (Wolfe, 1994a; Wolfe et al., 1989; Wolfe & Gancarz, 1997) 
argue visual search requires several parallel searches (one for each feature of a 
multidimensional item) that then feed information forward into a subsequent 
serial search for the multidimensional item. For example, they would argue that 
search for triple conjunctions (e.g., a large, green, triangle) should be faster than 
search for conjunctions formed of two features because there is more 
information fed forward from the three parallel searches, compared to the two 
parallel searches required for a two-dimensional conjunction item. This would be 
counter-intuitive to the arguments made in Feature Integration Theory (Treisman 
& Gelade, 1980), which suggest that all conjunction searches would result in a 
serial search through the visual display until the target conjunction item is focally 
attended or the search is terminated. The key difference between Guided 
Search and Feature Integration theory is clearly the power given to the parallel 
search stage, which is where the “Guided” in Guided Search comes from. To 
support this theory, they directly tested visual search for a triple conjunction 
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items  compared to an item defined by two features   (Wolfe et al., 1989). 
Importantly they varied the similarity of the shared distractor features such that 
some triple conjunction searches involved distractors that shared one feature 
and some involved distractors that shared two features (see Figure 1.5 for an 
example of a triple conjunction). Overall, while increasing the distractor similarity 
(from one shared feature to two shared features) does bring search slopes closer 
to the typical search slopes of two feature conjunction items, in both cases 
search for a triple conjunction (e.g., a big, red, rectangle) item is significantly 
more efficient than search for a conjunction item with two features (e.g., a red 
rectangle).  
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The guided search model has continued to be updated through the years 
(Wolfe, 1994a, 2001; Wolfe & Gancarz, 1997) to accommodate new findings in 
the visual attention literature. Critically, the newest version of Guided Search 
(4.0) includes a much more explicit framework including top-down commands 
for the activation of goal relevant features, which are then applied to a variety of 
weighted feature maps that are summed into a global activation map for the 
scene. In the activation map stage, attention is applied to items in decreasing 
amounts of activation (one could consider this a form a salience). Overall, this 
model has been updated to account for a variety of visual search phenomenon, 
with the main goal of the model focusing on understanding how humans search 
for a single target item.  
 
Biased Competition – Desimone and Duncan 
Desimone and Duncan (1995) Biased Competition theory argues that when we 
search for a target item, there is competition between all the objects in the 
scene. These items compete for attention (presumably after a massive parallel 
search across the scene), more specifically for representation and control. 
Competition in this theory is biased due to attentional processes related to both 
bottom-up and top-down guidance influencing the otherwise ambiguous 
competition. Specifically, information that is most physically salient will bias 
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attention, resulting in an increased amount of activity for that feature in the total 
competition of features . On the other hand, information that is currently goal-
relevant, which would arguably be held in working memory, will bias 
competition for those features/items (e.g., searching for a T amongst Ls will bias 
competition for T-like features). For example, Desimone and Duncan (1995) 
argue that typical findings where conjunction search (e.g., find the red rectangle) 
is slow, compared to more bottom-up driven instances like pop-out search for a 
single feature (e.g., find the red item), arise from the lack of a single bottom-up 
feature to drive the competition. Thus, if the features across items are more 
similar, then the competition is more ambiguous and difficult to determine a 
“winner”. However, in these situations competition for attention is still biased 
due to top-down control, more specifically through the use of “target 
templates” (Arita, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2012; Carlisle, Arita, Pardo, & 
Woodman, 2011; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001). 
Similar to the framework set out in Guided Search (Wolfe et al., 1989), the top-
down signals act upon the incoming bottom-up saliency map to bias 
competition for bottom-up information related to the goal-relevant content.  
 
One of the critical differences between the Guided Search model of attention 
and Biased Competition, is that Biased Competition Theory was informed by 
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how neurons resolve competition. For example, it has been shown that neurons 
in visual areas respond considerably more when salient items land in their 
receptive fields (Allman, Miezin, & McGuinness, 1985) and that novel features 
(i.e., unfamiliar stimuli or stimuli not currently held in working memory) will result 
in higher neural responses compared to familiar features  (Miller, Li, & 
Desimone, 1991). Additionally, prior work has shown that when monkeys were 
given specific top-down information about the location of a target item, neurons 
in V4 and IT both preferentially responded to the target item compared to a 
distractor item when they both landed in the receptive field (Moran & Desimone, 
1985). Critically, no attentional modulations in the neural response were found 
when one of the two possible locations for the target item was placed outside of 
the receptive field. This suggests that when there was no longer competition 
between the distractor and target, the top-down information no longer needed 
to bias the competition.  
 
Theory of Visual Attention – Bundesen 
Bundesen’s Theory of Visual Attention (TVA) and the neural implementation of 
this theory, the Neural Theory of Visual Attention (NTVA), present a 
mathematical framework for visual recognition of objects/features and how 
those items are selected (Bundesen, 1990, 1998; Bundesen et al., 2005; 
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Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbæk, 2011). Similar to the Biased Competition 
model, there is a competition, or in this case a “race”, for visual information in a 
given scene to be encoded into visual working memory. This process is a 
considered a race due to the limited nature of visual working memory, such that 
these objects rapidly compete for space prior to VSTM “filling up” or reaching 
capacity. The vehicle for how these object race toward VSTM is built on 
perceptual categorization: does element X belong to category y. This perceptual 
categorization is formalized as a race model, which can determine the rate at 
which each item/object would make it into VSTM. Sensory information, 
attentional biases, and subject biases for categories, are all weighted when 
considering the likelihood that element X belongs to any given category. Once 
the weights are determined, all elements in a given scene are considered in the 
rate equation. The idea here is that if you can calculate the rate that each item 
would enter VSTM, you would know which items would be more or less likely to 
“grab attention” first. Obviously, while this model appears to have many similar 
elements to the precious models described above (mainly Guided Search and 
the Biased Competition models), the one key advantage is the formalized 
mathematical structure.  
 
Models Summary 
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The frameworks put forth by the models above have primarily focused on when 
and how target/goal information is selected from the visual environment. 
Specifically, most of the architecture of these models are built to weigh 
dimensions to inform both serial and parallel searches for a target item. 
However, one interesting point to consider is how the inhibitory processes of 
attention interact with these target/goal processes. What is their role or 
contribution in these models? Can these models describe and predict the kinds 
of inhibitory attentional processes we’ve recently seen in the attention literature? 
 
The Darkside of Attention: The Role of Inhibition in Visual Search 
The majority of attention research to date has focused on how target and/or 
goal information is enhanced and, thus, selected. However, the act of enhancing 
target information also results in the system ignoring, or suppressing, other 
irrelevant information. What role does ignoring irrelevant information play in 
target selection? Does actively ignoring distracting information (e.g., a person 
loudly talking on the phone while you are working in an office) work? 
Specifically, does actively trying to suppress or ignore certain information end 
up making it harder because we are attending to it? Finally, do similar 
attentional mechanisms that support target selection also support inhibiting 
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non-target information? Below is a brief review of attentional research that 
focuses on inhibitory attentional mechanisms.   
 
When Inhibiting Distractors “helps” 
The ability to successfully suppress non-target information is critical in the ability 
to identify and locate target information in a timely manner. For example, when 
searching for a mug in the kitchen one might assume that if we are serially 
searching through a cabinet, we use information about the target to either 
accept or to reject items.  However, what is obvious in this example is that there 
are several ways we could accomplish this search. One is to create an attentional 
template that matches our knowledge about the mug, wherein we compare 
each serially searched item to that template. However, it also could be the case 
that we hold some template for rejection in mind where we know some features 
that the mug will not have (e.g., it won’t be totally flat like a plate). Do the 
attentional mechanisms in human vision support such a structure or do we only 
hold templates that match our goal information? 
 
When inhibiting distractors helps: Objects 
There is evidence in the literature that visual marking can allow for the efficient 
inhibition of distractors. Watson and Humphreys (1997) was one of the first 
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studies to demonstrate this effect. Specifically, they presented participants with 
a distractor preview phase prior to the presentation of the whole visual search 
trial. In the preview phase, they showed participants a subset of the distractors 
that would appear in the upcoming visual search trial. The authors found that 
when subjects were presented with this preview, they demonstrated search 
times to the entire display that reflected search times as if those previewed 
items were not in the display at all. The authors argued that participants were 
able to effectively “ignore” those previewed items and only had to search 
through the newly presented items.  
 
Additional work by Donk and Theeuwes (2001) argued that the search benefit 
shown in visual marking was due to the abrupt onset of the other items (which 
contained the target) which captured participants attention, rather than the 
inhibition of the old previewed items. Thus, the search benefit was not due to 
any interesting form of inhibition, rather attention was merely more strongly 
guided to the information that abruptly onset at a later time. However, evidence 
from a dot probe study by Watson and Humphreys (2000) demonstrated that 
when previewed distractors were probed, response times were significantly 
longer compared to when non-previewed items were probed, suggesting that 
participants were actively inhibiting those previewed items. Moreover, this only 
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occurred when suppressing the item was advantageous; although their 
manipulation to reduce advantaged did change the task demands from 
involving visual search to only responding to probe trials. Thus, when 
considering these findings compared to the work of Donk and Theeuwes (2001), 
it seems that it could still be the case that the abrupt onset is might be driving 
the benefits shown in visual marking.  
 
While much of the work on visual marking suggests that participants are 
inhibiting the location of the previewed items, recent work has also 
demonstrated that the features of those previewed items can be actively 
inhibited. For example, a number of studies by Braithwaite and Humphreys 
(Braithwaite & Humphreys, 2003; Braithwaite & Humphreys, 2007a; Braithwaite 
& Humphreys, 2007b; Braithwaite, Humphreys, & Hodsoll, 2003, 2004; 
Braithwaite, Humphreys, & Hulleman, 2005) have demonstrated that if the 
previewed items share a similar feature (e.g., all previewed distractors are red), 
that feature will be actively suppressed when the participant searches the full 
visual search display.  
 
Taken together, the visual marking literature suggests that prior knowledge 
about to-be-ignored distractors can lead to more efficient search. However, is 
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the benefit from visual marking derived from a combination of location and 
feature information, or can there be a search benefit from knowing just the 
distractor location or the distractor feature information? Understanding the 
specificity of the required prior knowledge about distractor information would 
further elucidate the mechanisms that permit to-be-ignored information to aid in 
visual search.  
 
When inhibiting distractors helps: Locations 
There is evidence that when observers are provided information about where 
the location of a distractor will be, this can make subsequent search for a target 
more efficient. One clear example of this is a recent study by Ruff and Driver 
(2006). In their study, they had observers perform a speeded discrimination task. 
Specifically, on all trials they presented a cue, prior to the search display, in the 
form of a centralized arrow that pointed to the left or right which indicated the 
location where the target item would appear (it was 100% valid). There were two 
trial types: (1) target alone or (2) target with a distractor presented on the 
opposite side. Both trial conditions were presented randomly intermixed. 
Interestingly, they had two block types made up of these trial conditions: (1) an 
informative cue block and (2) a uninformative block.  In the informative cue 
block, the color of the arrow (either red or green) would let subjects know 
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whether a distractor would be presented. In the uninformative block, the arrow 
didn’t have a color cue and thus, was not predictive of whether a distractor 
would appear. While participants were overall slower when responding to the 
target in the presence of a distraction, the type of block they were in drastically 
changed their performance. Specifically, because the researchers had used the 
same trial types in both block conditions, they could look at the performance 
change as a function of predictive cue information. The authors found that in 
distractor present trials, participants were much faster when they were provided 
cue information from the arrow that a distractor would be present compared to 
trials where they weren’t provided such information. Interestingly, when they 
compared responses on distractor absent trials in both the informative and 
uninformative blocks, they found no reaction time differences. The authors 
concluded that providing participants information about the location of a 
distractor allowed participants to avoid distraction by that item by inhibiting the 
location prior to the presentation of the visual search array.  
 
While it is interesting that knowledge about the location of an upcoming 
distractor can facilitate search times for a target, one critical question is how 
does that knowledge actually speed search times? A study by Van der Stigchel 
and Theeuwes (2006) examined just that by investigating how previous 
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knowledge about a distractor position would influence eye movements to a 
target. In their study, they first presented participants with a central fixation. 
After 600 msecs, they replaced the fixation with two line segments that 
indicated where the target (e.g., a black circle) would be located and where the 
distractor (e.g., a diamond outline) could be. After a variable time period, the 
target would appear and participants were instructed to make an eye movement 
to the target as soon as it onset. Critically, on 80% of trials a distractor would 
appear adjacent to the target.  Results revealed that when participants were 
informed of the distractor location and they were cued to it, they demonstrated 
a strong curvature in their eye movement trajectory to the target that was curved 
away from where the distractor was located. Furthermore, even on trials where a 
physical distractor was not presented (i.e., 20% of trials), because the 
participants were cued to where the distractor could be they still found 
significant curvature away from the cued location when participants made a 
saccade to the target. However, the curvature was diminished compared to 
when a distractor was actually shown. These results suggest that even possibility 
of a potential distractor being presented can influence eye-movements to avoid 
crossing over the distractor location and thus reduce the probability of being 
distracted by that item.  
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Both examples above of the ability to inhibit the location of a distractor rely on 
knowledge of not only the distractor but also where the target will be. One 
interesting question to consider is: does only providing information about a to-
be-ignored distractor enable participants to search for an unpredictable target 
more efficiently? Munneke, Van der Stigchel, and Theeuwes (2008) were 
interested in identifying whether providing participants with an explicit to-be-
ignored location cue would be enough to facilitate search performance for an 
uncued target. In their study, they had participants search for a capital letter “B” 
or “F” in one of four locations (0°, 90°, 180°, 270°). Prior to the search display, a 
precue was presented. On half of the trials, they cued participants to ignore a 
certain location because a distractor would be presented there. On the other 
half of trials, they provided no informative cue. These cues were 100% valid. In 
addition to having the target present in the search display, two of the other 
three locations contained random uppercase or lowercase letters “K” or “X”. 
Critically, to look at congruency effects (similar to a flanker task, see Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) they presented either a congruent or incongruent lowercase “b” 
or “f” in the fourth location. For example, if the target on a given trial was a 
capital “B”, they could present either a congruent lowercase “b” or an 
incongruent lowercase “f”.  On the trials where the to-be-ignored location was 
cued, the distractor that was cued was always this congruent or incongruent 
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item. The results revealed that participants were generally faster on trials where 
a to-be-ignored item was cued compared to the trials where no cue information 
was provided. Importantly, because the authors included the compatibility 
manipulation they could examine whether the faster search times found in the 
to-be-ignored cued trials comes from processing that cued item and rapidly 
suppressing it or whether it comes from participants completely inhibiting the 
item at that location without processing the distractor. If it was the case that 
observers were processing and rejecting the to-be-ignored item, then they 
should be slower on incompatible trials compared to compatible trials in the 
cued condition. This is exactly what they found. Moreover, they also discovered 
that the compatibility effect was much larger in the cue condition compared to 
the uncued condition, which is probably due to the fact that in the cued 
condition participants are always initially attending to the to-be-ignored cued 
distractor. However, in the uncued condition since subjects would have to 
serially search through the 4 items until they land on the capital “B” or “F” it 
could very well be the case that many of the trials they were able to land on the 
target before they landed on the related distractor. Overall, these results 
suggest that to be able to use an explicit to-be-ignored location cue, the to-be-
ignored distractor needs to be selected and then rejected.  
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The results from Munneke et al. (2008) suggest that when provided with a to-be-
ignored location cue, observers need to actively select and reject the to-be-
ignored distractor at that location. However, it could be the case that observers 
are not actively inhibiting that location, rather they are increasing the activation 
to the other 3 possible target locations. To investigate this, Chao (2010) queried 
whether providing three cues to the other possible target locations provided the 
same benefit as instructing participants to ignore one distractor location. Using a 
similar paradigm to Munneke et al. (2008), Chao (2010) found that providing 
location cues for the other three locations that might contain the target 
provided no additional benefit compared to control trials where no valid cue 
was provided. These results suggest that the benefit that arises from providing a 
to-be-ignored distractor cue arises from observers being able to inhibit the item 
at that location. 
When inhibiting distractors helps: Features 
While the evidence for inhibiting features is a bit unclear (further detailed in the 
“When inhibiting distractors ‘hurts’” section below), there are some examples in 
the literature where having advanced knowledge about distractor features can 
aid in more efficient visual search. One example of this is recent work by Graves 
and Egeth (2016). In their paper, they were interested in identifying the 
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conditions in which feature search does or does not allow subjects to avoid 
attentional capture by salient singletons. The work by Graves and Egeth (2016) 
was a continuation of the search mode work of Bacon and Egeth (1994) and 
Leber and Egeth (2006), which proposed that attentional capture by a salient 
singleton (e.g., a red distractor among green items) varied depending on 
whether a subject was in singleton search mode or feature search mode. 
Subjects are usually in “singleton search mode” when they perform a shape 
search task where they are told to search for a singleton (i.e., “oddball”) shape 
(e.g., either a square among circles or a circle among squares). Alternatively, 
subjects are in feature search mode when they are given a specific feature to 
search for (e.g., search for the square among other shapes). Both Bacon and 
Egeth (1994) and Leber and Egeth (2006) found that when a salient color 
singleton was presented in both types of these search displays, only subjects 
who were in singleton search mode had their attention captured by the 
irrelevant color singleton. The subjects who received feature search trials were 
able to ignore the singleton; they showed no additional search time when the 
salient singleton distractor was present compared to when it was absent. Based 
on the findings of Bacon and Egeth (1994) and Leber and Egeth (2006), Graves 
and Egeth (2016) were interested in whether the knowledge about just the 
target in feature search allowed for subjects to successfully avoid attentional 
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capture or if knowledge about the salient distractor feature is critical for 
successful ignoring. In Experiment 1 of their paper they specifically tested this 
by varying the consistency of the salient distractor color (see Figure 1.6). 
Specifically, half of the subjects received typical feature search trials (see “Fixed 
Colors” in Figure 1.6), where in half of the trials all the items are one color (e.g., 
green) and in the other half of trials one of the items is a different color (e.g., 
red). All of the items have unique shapes and the subject’s task is to locate the 
circle and report the orientation of a line segment inside. Critically, the other half 
of subjects received color swapping trials (see bottom of Figure 1.6), where the 
task was essentially the same except that the majority color and the singleton 
color swapped randomly across trials so that on half of the trials where the 
salient singleton was presented it could be a red item among green items or it 
could be a green item among red items. Graves and Egeth (2016) found that in 
the typical feature search trials because observers were able to learn that the 
salient singleton would always be a particular feature (e.g., red) they were able 
to successfully ignore it and showed no attentional capture when the item was 
presented or when it was absent. However, in the color-swapping condition the 
authors found that because the salient singleton was unpredictable subjects 
were unable to ignore it and thus they showed substantial attentional capture 
(i.e., longer search times) when the salient singleton was presented compared to 
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Critically, they were also instructed that if there happened to be an item in the 
visual search that matched the color of the item they had in memory, it would 
always be a distractor. Woodman and Luck (2007) found that when there was an 
item in the visual search that matched the item in memory, the participants were 
able to respond faster on those trials compared to trials where there was no 
item that matched. The authors argue that this allowed for the subjects to avoid 
attending to the item by creating a “template for rejection” based on the 
contents of working memory. However, as I will discuss further below, it could 
have also been the case that observers did in fact attend to the to-be-ignored 
item, they were able to just rapidly reject it which allowed for more efficient 
search times on those trials. Alternatively, it could have been the case that 
because on every trial they provided participants with a working memory item 
that they could possibly ignore in the search, that for trials where there was no 
search distractor that matched the contents of working memory the participants 
would search until they realized that item was not present, thus making those 
trials appear longer. 
 
To further elucidate the role that active ignoring of distractor features can play in 
visual search, Arita et al. (2012) conducted a follow up study looking at how 
explicit ignoring cues would influence search. In their experiments, all trials were 
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similar in their setup (see Figure 1.7). Specifically, they presented participants 
with a colored square cue above fixation prior to the onset of a visual search 
display. There were three cue conditions that were counterbalanced across 
blocks: positive, neutral, and negative. For the positive cue block, participants 
were instructed that the cued color would be the color of the target in the 
upcoming search display. For the negative cued block, they were instructed that 
they should ignore that color because the target would never appear in the 
cued color. Finally, in the neutral cued block the color of the cue never 
appeared in the search display. After the cue presentation, participants were 
shown the visual search display where they were instructed to look for a Landolt 
C which was facing upward or downward. Critically, half of the items in one 
hemifield were one color and half of the items in the other hemifield were 
another color (see Figure 1.7). The results revealed that both the positive cue 
and the negative cue lead to significantly faster search times compared to the 
neutral cue. Additionally, the positive cue lead to faster times compared to the 
negative cue. The authors took these results to suggest that attentional 
templates can be used for both guiding attention to an item but also away from 
an item. However, there is an alternative explanation for their findings (see 
Becker, Hemsteger, and Peltier (2015) and Beck and Hollingworth (2015)). In 
their search displays the cued color always occupied one half of the screen. 
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randomly intermixed the location of all the items so that pa rticipants couldn’t 
group the items by hemifield. Their results revealed that while the positive cue 
still revealed a search benefit compared to the neutral cue, the negative cue 
resulted in similar search times compared to the neutral cue.  Therefore, it 
appears that the search benefit from directly utilizing to-be-ignored feature 
information remains unclear. 
 
When Inhibiting Distractors “hurts” 
The section above detailed some evidence where having prior knowledge about 
to-be-ignored distractors can lead to more efficient search. However, there are a 
number of studies in the inhibition literature that demonstrate the cost of trying 
to utilize prior knowledge about distractors. Below is a brief review of the 
literature that claims that utilizing specific to-be-ignored information is costly 
and inefficient. 
 
When inhibiting distractors hurts: Objects 
The findings of Friedman-Hill and Wolfe (1995) are in direct contrast with some 
of the results detailed above (Arita et al., 2012; Woodman & Luck, 2007) that 
suggest that prior knowledge about to-be-ignored features can aid in more 
efficient visual search. Specifically, Friedman-Hill and Wolfe (1995) demonstrated 
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that an attentional template of to-be-ignored information is not possible in 
conjunction search. To accomplish this, in one of their experiments they 
presented observers with a conjunction search task where they needed to find 
an oddly oriented line. Across four trial types they provided participants with 
advance knowledge about the color of the target, but not orientation 
information. In their critical inhibitory condition, they told subjects that the color 
of the target would not be a certain color (e.g., green). The display contained 
items that were red, green, yellow, and blue. The oddly oriented line would 
appear in one of the colors that was not the to-be-ignored color. The authors 
found that even though they gave participants valid information about what the 
target would not look like, this condition showed considerably slower search 
slopes compared to conditions where they provided the color of the target and 
a pop out orientation search condition.   
 
The work of Friedman-Hill and Wolfe (1995) was not the first example of the cost 
of inhibitory attentional strategies. About a decade earlier, work by Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) demonstrated similar effects, but in the 
domain of thought suppression. The initial motivation for the work by Wegner et 
al. (1987) goes back more than a hundred years to the writings of  Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky. In Dostoyevsky’s Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, he writes 
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about a memory from his childhood where he challenged his brother to: “try to 
pose for yourself this task: not to think of a polar bear, and you will see that the 
cursed thing will come to mind every minute.”  While the thought experiment is 
interesting, and you can try it for yourself now, Wegner et al. (1987) were 
interested in whether actively inhibiting any thought was just as hard as not 
thinking about a white bear. To provide empirical evidence on this topic, they 
had 34 participants perform a stream of consciousness task with two conditions: 
(1) a suppression condition and (2) an expression condition. In the suppression 
condition, they were instructed to verbalize anything that comes to mind, but to 
“try not to think of a white bear.” In the expression condition, they were told to 
verbalize anything that comes to mind but to try to think of a white bear.  All of 
the participant’s verbalizations were recorded individually and they were all told 
to ring a bell anytime they thought about a white bear in either task. They 
randomized the order of conditions across participants, such that half received 
the suppression condition first and the other half received the expression 
condition. The results revealed that unsurprisingly people in the expression 
condition rang the bell considerably more than people in the suppression 
condition. However, people in the suppression condition still produced a large 
number of bell rings. Furthermore, the critical test is to look at the interaction of 
the two conditions and whether there was an order effect. They found that 
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participants who first received the suppression condition demonstrated 
significantly more bell rings in their following expression condition, compared to 
those who received the expression condition first. These results suggest that the 
mere act of trying to ignore a thought, makes that thought more readily 
available when trying to recall it. Taken together, these results hint at the notion 
that when we try to actively ignore something, we can’t help but obsess over it 
in our minds. 
 
When inhibiting distractors hurts: Locations 
The research detailed in the section above provides some evidence that having 
prior knowledge about to-be-ignored items can lead to major distracting effects. 
In contrast, other prior work (Munneke et al., 2008; Ruff & Driver, 2006; Van der 
Stigchel & Theeuwes, 2006) would suggest that prior knowledge about the 
location of an upcoming distractor can help search. However, there are some 
examples in the literature where prior knowledge about a to-be-ignored 
distractor location can, in fact, hurt search performance. Building on the 
previous findings of Wegner et al. (1987), Tsal and Makovski (2006) were 
interested in understanding the interaction of the white bear effect and the 
stages of distractor processing. Specifically, subjects are eventually able to 
respond to the target stimulus in these experiments, so the distractor must have 
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eventually been inhibited? But did that occur? Are they simply unattended, are 
they ignored from the start, or are they attended prior to being ignored, which is 
what the white bear effect would suggest. On each trial of their experiment they 
presented a centrally fixated target with diagonal flanker distractors on each 
side. On a given trial, the distractor flankers could appear in two configurations: 
(1) one in the top left and one in the bottom right or (2) one in the top right and 
one in the bottom left. To give participants knowledge about a to-be-ignored 
distractor, they had fixed and random blocks. In the fixed blocks, the position 
where the distractors would appear remained consistent throughout the block 
(e.g., for all trials the distractors were in the top left and bottom right). In the 
random blocks the positions changed from trial to trial. Therefore, in the fixed 
blocks participants knew what locations they should ignore and where they 
should attend (i.e., the center stimulus). Critically, on some trials they presented 
two dots: one on an expected distractor location and one on an expected 
empty location (e.g., if a expected distractor location was the diagonal upper 
left, there would be a dot there and a dot horizontal from it in the expected 
empty location in the diagonal upper right). Participants were told to report 
which dot they perceived first (e.g., left or right).  The authors found that when 
they probed the location of an expected distractor location, observers perceived 
the dot expected distractor location occurred before the dot in the expected 
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empty location. These results suggest that the participant’s attention was at the 
to-be-ignored location prior to attending to the target; which is what would be 
predicted by the white bear effect. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
participants were encouraged to ignore the flankers because they are 
distracting, Tsal and Makovski (2006) found that participants actively attended to 
those to-be-ignored locations.  
 
When inhibiting distractors hurts: Features 
Not only is there evidence suggesting conflicting findings of the cost and 
benefits of utilizing to-be-ignored location information, but there are similarly 
conflicting findings in work on ignoring to-be-ignored distractor features. 
Specifically, Moher and Egeth (2012) were interested in investigating whether 
the benefit of having advance knowledge about a to-be-ignored distractor 
location found in Munneke et al. (2008) would similarly work if participants had 
advanced knowledge about to-be-ignored distractor features. To investigate this 
question, they used a similar paradigm to Munneke et al. (2008). Specifically, in 
one of their experiments they had two kinds of trials: ignore trials and neutral 
trials. For ignore trials they presented participants with an explicit word cue 
(e.g., “Ignore Red”) that indicated the color of an upcoming to-be-ignored 
distractor. This to-be-ignored feature cue changed randomly from trial to trial, 
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such that on one trial you might be told to ignore red and the next trial you 
might be told to ignore blue. On neutral trials, they presented a neutral word 
cue (i.e., “Neutral”). The cues were always 100% valid. Following the 
presentation of the cue, the search display was shown. In their search displays 
they presented letters at four locations. The target could either be a capital 
letter “B” or “F”. Additionally, one of the distractor letters was always either a 
congruent or incongruent lowercase letter (e.g., if the target was a “B”, then a 
congruent distractor would be a “b” and an incongruent distractor would be a 
“f”). On ignore trials this critical distractor was always the color of the to-be-
ignored feature, while on neutral trials the color of this distractor was randomly 
chosen. Finally, the other two distractors in each display were randomly chosen 
as either a lowercase or uppercase “K” and “X”. The results of Moher and Egeth 
(2012) were surprising, despite using a very similar paradigm to Munneke et al. 
(2008), they found the opposite finding: providing participants with explicit to-
be-ignored feature information considerably slowed their search, compared to 
being given no information at all. They go on to demonstrate through additional 
experiments that it appears that when subjects are given prior knowledge about 
a to-be-ignored feature, they first attend to that to-be-ignored distractor, inhibit 
it, and then proceed to look for the target. This initial attention to that to-be-
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ignored item, and subsequent rejection, seems to be increasing the “cost” of 
inhibition.  
 
The Current Study: Goals 
In our daily lives, both visual and memory search play a critical role. From finding 
where our next meeting is, to trying to remember the name of that website a 
friend told you about, we are constantly searching for a particular item or items. 
Scaling this up, search plays a critical role in many high-stress professions such 
as airport baggage screening and medical image screening. These searches 
often involve identifying important information from memory (e.g., what does a 
cancerous nodule look like) and using that memory as an attentional search 
template. Understanding the role that experience/prior knowledge plays in both 
high- and low-level cognition is critical to understanding the human attentional 
system and how to improve general search performance.  
 
Much of psychological research on visual search, and more specifically the 
attentional mechanisms involved in visual search, has focused on how individuals 
find a target item amongst the clutter of non-target items. However, when our 
goal is to search for a specific item (e.g., that notebook where we wrote down a 
Nobel-prize worthy idea), we are also cognizant of what not to look for (e.g., 
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non-notebook features). The goal of the present research is to understand the 
role that inhibitory mechanisms play in attention. More specifically, while there is 
work investigating when inhibitory processes might be involved in search (e.g., 
Moher & Egeth, 2012; Moher et al., 2014), there is much less work investigating 
how prior knowledge, or learning, interacts with these inhibitory mechanisms.  
 
In the present work, we aimed to understand both the cognitive and neural 
underpinnings of learning to ignore. Previous research has demonstrated that 
the consistency of mapping of stimuli onto responses can influence search (e.g., 
Leber & Egeth, 2006; Graves & Egeth, 2016; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Vatterott & Vecera, 2012;  Zehetleitner, Goschy, & Müller, 2012), therefore 
investigating the critical role that learning plays in inhibitory processes seems an 
especially promising avenue for investigation. Specifically, we were interested in 
two distinct types of inhibitory processes that are involved in visual search: (1) 
the use of explicit to-be-ignored information to guide attention away from non-
target information and (2) the role of inhibitory processes in early feature-based 
attention. 
 
In Chapter 2, we investigated the role that learning plays in visual search when 
explicit to-be-ignored information about distractor features is provided. Previous 
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work from Munneke et al. (2008) demonstrated a large benefit in search times 
when participants were provided with an explicit to-be-ignored location cue. 
However, when participants were given an explicit to-be-ignored feature cue 
(Moher & Egeth, 2012), past work demonstrated that this information actually 
hurt rather than helped search times. The current work examined whether 
having a to-be-ignored feature cue is always costly, or whether learning to 
ignore consistent to-be-ignored information can eventually speed search.  
 
In Chapter 3, we investigated the role of inhibitory processes in early feature-
based attention. Specifically, attention can rapidly (within ~100 milliseconds) 
influence how incoming visual information is processed. Information about task-
relevant features plays a critical role in this modulation and it has been shown 
that inhibition of distractor information, rather than excitation of target 
information, drives early feature-based attention. However, the generality of that 
mechanism has yet to be explored. While past work has demonstrated that 
inhibition of distractor information can drive feature-based attention, those 
experiments utilized stimuli in which there was only a single target feature and a 
single non-target feature. This scenario is far removed from everyday life where 
a target may appear in a heterogeneous background in which more than one 
feature may be irrelevant. Here we move one step closer to everyday life by 
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investigating whether early feature-based attention is facilitated by suppression 
of distractor feature information when multiple (here, two) distractor features are 
simultaneously present. Note: I will refer to this experiment from here out as the 
two simultaneous distractor (TSD) paradigm. 
 
Additionally, in past work and in the TSD paradigm above, it has been 
demonstrated that inhibition of distractor information drives early feature-based 
attention, when participants were provided with consistent to-be-ignored 
feature information and consistent target feature information throughout a given 
participants experience (i.e., the target color was red and to-be-ignored 
distractor features were the colors blue and green for a given participant). The 
an additional new paradigm, I also investigated whether the consistency of this 
information is what facilitated inhibition driving early feature-based information 
(i.e., participants were learning to ignore the consistent to-be-ignored 
information). Critically, we investigate situations where learning to-be-ignored 
information would not be possible by presenting subjects with a consistent 
target feature (e.g., the color red) and multiple distractor features that varied 
from trial to trial (e.g., any of the following colors could be distractor features: 
blue, green, orange, yellow, purple). I examined whether inhibition still drives 
early feature-based attention when observers were faced with such 
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inconsistency. Note: I will refer to this experiment from here out as the multiple 
varying distractor (MVD) paradigm. 
 
 
In Chapter 4, I investigated how attention is shaped by experiences, both lived 
and biologically driven. Our perception of food, for example, is influenced not 
only by our own lived experiences but also by our evolutionary biology. From 
the moment we are born, we have some expert knowledge about food. 
Specifically, inborn preference for palatable energy-dense food is thought to be 
an evolutionary adaptation that is maladaptive in the modern environment of 
plenty and contributes to the current obesity epidemic. On the other hand, 
rewarding local experiences with energy-dense food also seems to stoke our 
desire to identify and consume these items. One way to investigate the interplay 
of these two types of experiences is to understand how food preferences 
influence the control of visual attention. To investigate the role that dietary 
learning plays in distraction by energy-dense foods, I developed a novel 
distraction paradigm which borrowed elements from Forster & Lavie, (2011).  We 
use that paradigm across several experiments to investigate the cognitive 
underpinnings of distraction by energy-dense foods.  
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In Chapter 5, I investigated one of the electroencephalographic markers (i.e., 
the N2pc) that is utilized in many attention experiments and attempt to 
demonstrate that it has been misrepresented. Specifically, in recent years there 
have been numerous studies that use event-related potentials (ERPs) to 
understand the structure of specific attentional events that are difficult to probe 
with only behavioral techniques. The N2pc is one ERP component that has 
become a common measure for cognitive neuroscientists to establish attentional 
selection in a variety of experiments. Since the classic study of Woodman and 
Luck (1999), this component is typically considered to represent the neural 
marker for shifts of spatial attention across space. However, in this chapter I 
demonstrate that that the N2pc cannot reflect just an initial shift of attention, but 
in fact it reflects (1) post-selection processing well beyond the initial shift of 
attention or (2) post-selection processing plus the initial shift of attention. I 
discuss how these findings are supported by other neurological evidence and 
how a reframing of the N2pc as a marker of post-selection processing fits within 
the ERP framework of other attentional components (e.g., the Pd). 
 
In Chapter 6 (General Discussion), I summarize my results drawing key findings 
and similarities across several experiments. Furthermore, I address how these 
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findings fit within the larger framework of attention. I do this by describing how 
my findings could inform current models of attention (e.g., Biased Competition, 
Guided Search). Finally, I end the chapter with a few concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2: The Costs and Benefits of Learning to Ignore 
 
Chapter 2: Synopsis of Completed Experiments  
When we search a visual scene, we generally have information about what we 
are aiming to find and this aids in our ability to quickly identify the target of our 
search. For example, when a radiologist searches for a tumor, they have 
knowledge about what the tumor should and should not look like, or where it 
could and could not appear. However, does having information about what to 
not look for, or ignore, provide any benefit in search? Previous work 
demonstrates that when participants were given an explicit to-be-ignored 
feature cue (Moher & Egeth, 2012), this information actually hurt rather than 
helped search times. The current experiments examined whether having a to-
be-ignored feature cue is always costly, or whether learning to ignore consistent 
to-be-ignored information can eventually speed search. I report a novel finding 
that allowing observers to learn to ignore non-target feature information hastens 
visual search for a target item. The experiments in this part of the chapter have 
been published in Psychological Science (Cunningham & Egeth, 2016).  
 
 
 
    
	 73 
Title: Taming the White Bear: Initial Costs and Eventual Benefits of Distractor 
Inhibition 
Accepted at Psychological Science  
 
Abstract 
 
Previous research indicates that prior information about a target feature, such as 
its color, can speed search. Can search also be speeded by knowing what a 
target will not look like? In the two experiments reported here, participants 
searched for target letters. Prior to viewing search displays, participants were 
prompted either with the color in which one or more nontarget letters would 
appear (ignore trials) or with no information about the search display (neutral 
trials). Critically, when participants were given one consistent color to ignore for 
the duration of the experiment, compared with when they were given no 
information, there was a cost in reaction time (RT) early in the experiment. 
However, after extended practice, RTs on ignore trials were significantly faster 
than RTs on neutral trials, which provides a novel demonstration that knowledge 
about nontargets can improve search performance for targets. When the to-be-
ignored color changed from trial to trial, no RT benefit was observed. 
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Introduction 
When people visually search for a target item (e.g., a set of car keys), they are 
often faced with a large amount of clutter (i.e., nontarget items). In the case of 
car keys, the search is fairly easy because people have a representation of what 
the target should look like; therefore, they will search until they find an object 
that matches the target. However, during some visual searches, they might 
instead have information about what the target might not look like. Intuitively, 
knowing what not to look for— what to ignore—should reduce the number of 
items that need to be considered, thus reducing search times. Does knowing 
what feature to ignore prove, in fact, to be a benefit in visual search? 
 
Prior work has suggested the surprising possibility that even when subjects are 
given valid feature information about to-be-ignored items (e.g., color), it actually 
hurts rather than helps their performance (e.g. Moher & Egeth, 2012; Tsal & 
Makovski, 2006). There is a family resemblance between these results and the 
“white bear” effect (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). In an 
experiment by Moher and Egeth (2012), when observers were given nontarget 
feature information (in the form of a pre-trial cue) on a trial-by-trial basis, 
reaction times (RTs) were slower than when they were given no information at 
all. Moher and Egeth suggested that this was because, in their search process, 
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observers first selected the to-be-ignored item and then inhibited it. In a follow-
up experiment, Moher and Egeth (2012) included a probe-dot detection task on 
a subset of trials. They found that when observers were given to-be-ignored 
information, they were faster at detecting a probe dot at the location of the to-
be-ignored distractor when it was presented early in the trial (117 ms) compared 
with later in the trial (167 ms). It seems that observers in Moher and Egeth’s 
experiment selected the to-be-ignored item and subsequently rejected it. Thus, 
observers were unable to preattentively reject to-be-ignored information; that is, 
participants failed to create a “template for rejection” (e.g., Arita, Carlisle, & 
Woodman, 2012; Woodman & Luck, 2007). 
 
In contrast to the foregoing, Moher, Lakshmanan, Egeth, and Ewen (2014) 
demonstrated that when target and distractor information were held constant 
for the duration of the experiment, observers appeared to attenuate processing 
of distractor features rather than boost processing of target features. This work 
suggests that a template for rejection can be created when dealing with to-be-
ignored information. However, it is not yet clear what drives the creation of such 
a template. A possible explanation for these conflicting results may be that 
successful ignoring of task-irrelevant distractor information is something that 
needs to be learned. 
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We consider here the possibility that creation of a template for rejection is 
facilitated by extended experience with a consistently ignored feature. This 
possibility is supported by the difference in methods of two previous studies 
(i.e., Moher & Egeth, 2012; Moher et al., 2014) and the striking difference in 
their outcomes. In the first study (Moher & Egeth, 2012), the to-be-ignored 
feature changed on a trial-by-trial basis, whereas in the second study (Moher et 
al., 2014), the to-be-ignored feature remained fixed for an entire experimental 
session. There were, of course, other differences between these studies, but the 
difference in consistency of mapping of stimuli onto responses seems an 
especially promising avenue for investigation in light of previous work on the 
topic (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Vatterott & Vecera, 2012; Zehetleitner, 
Goschy, & Müller, 2012). 
 
To examine this possibility, we conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, 
participants completed a visual search task in which they could learn about one 
particular distractor feature. At the start of each trial, participants were provided 
with either a cue that provided no information about the upcoming stimulus 
display (neutral cue) or a cue that instructed them which color in the following 
stimulus display to ignore (ignore cue). The ignore cue was always valid, that is, 
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it always referred to a presented distractor. If participants can learn to effectively 
ignore consistent to-be-ignored features, then over the course of the 
experiment, we expected them to produce faster RTs on ignore trials than on 
neutral trials. In Experiment 2, we used the same paradigm as in Experiment 1, 
but with a larger stimulus array, to minimize the possibility that participants 
might learn to attend to the other colors rather than try to ignore the to-be-
ignored color. Additionally, we were interested in whether participants could 
learn to ignore the to-be-ignored feature across many items (6 out of 12 items). 
The paradigms used in both of these studies allowed us to investigate whether 
consistency in the mapping of to-be-ignored information is critical for 
developing a template for rejection. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A group of 26 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students and community 
members (mean age = 20.5 years; 10 male, 16 female) with normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision participated in the experiment. 
We conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007), which showed that given an f of 0.25, 26 participants would be 
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required to have 85% power to detect the effect in our design (Cohen, 1988, 
suggests that an effect size of 0.25 indicates a medium-sized effect). Data 
collection therefore stopped once we reached 26 participants. One subject was 
eliminated because she had an extremely high error rate (32%; the mean error 
rate was 4% for the 25 remaining subjects). The participants received extra 
credit in undergraduate courses or monetary payment as compensation, and all 
gave informed consent. The Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review 
Board approved the protocol.  
 
Stimuli 
 
Experimental sessions were carried out on a Dell Precision T-3400 2.33-GHz 
computer. Stimuli were presented on a Dell 1708 FP monitor. Stimulus 
presentation and data analysis were performed using programs written in 
MATLAB and using the PsychToolbox software (Brainard, 1997). The screen had 
a refresh rate of 60 Hz, and the resolution of the screen was 1,280 × 1,024 
pixels. 
 
Stimuli appeared surrounding a central fixation cross that subtended 0.55° of 
visual angle at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. Stimuli consisted of 
four letters from the English alphabet, which were randomly assigned to appear 
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in one of four locations (surrounding fixation) at 0°, 90°, 180°, and 270° from 
vertical. Each letter subtended a visual angle of 0.86°, and the distance between 
fixation and the closest edge of each letter subtended 4.96° of visual angle. 
On each trial, either a capital “B” or “F” was selected randomly to appear as the 
target letter. Additionally, a lowercase “b” or “f” was selected randomly to 
appear as one of three distractor letters. The distractor letter on each trial was 
either compatible with the target letter, meaning that it shared the target’s 
identity (e.g., “B” was the target and “b” the distractor), or incompatible, 
meaning that it did not share the target’s identity (e.g., “F” was the target and 
“b” the distractor). The compatibility manipulation was included to make our 
paradigm as similar as possible to those used in previous studies. Specifically, 
Moher & Egeth (2012) included it in their design because Munneke, Van der 
Stigchel, & Theeuwes (2008), who examined the ability to ignore cued spatial 
locations, found an interesting effect of compatibility that was dependent on 
whether they cued a distractor location. However, Chao (2010) used a similar 
paradigm and found no significant interaction with cue type and compatibility, 
and Moher and Egeth (2012) also found that interaction to be not significant. 
Those failures to replicate Munneke et al.’s results notwithstanding, we included 
this manipulation to investigate whether learning to ignore a consistently to-be-
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Design and Procedure 
 
At the beginning of each trial, a cue was presented for 1,000 ms in white letters 
above the fixation cross (see Fig. 2.1). This cue indicated the trial type. On 
ignore trials, the name of the color to be ignored was stated in the cue (e.g., 
“Ignore Red”); on neutral trials, the cue just said “Neutral.” These cues 
subtended 0.57° of visual angle vertically and between 2.86° and 5.92° of visual 
angle horizontally, and they were always valid. Unlike in previous studies, the 
color to be ignored remained the same for the entire duration of the 
experiment. The specific color to be ignored was randomly assigned for each 
participant. On ignore trials, the letter appearing in the to-be-ignored color was 
always a distractor. Neutral cues gave the participants no information about the 
color of the target or nontarget items on the upcoming trial. Because only four 
colors were used in the experiment, the to-be-ignored color could appear on 
neutral trials. 
After the cue was presented, the fixation cross remained in the center of the 
screen for 1,000 ms. Then the four letters appeared on the screen and remained 
until participants responded. The participants were told to indicate whether a 
capital “B” or “F” was present by pressing the “z” key or “/” key, respectively. 
They were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Following 
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their response, there was an intertrial interval consisting of a 500-ms blank black 
screen. No feedback was provided. Participants completed 720 trials total; 50% 
of the trials were ignore trials, and 50% were neutral trials, randomly intermixed. 
Experimental sessions lasted 60 to 75 min.  
Results 
 
Following the procedure of Moher and Egeth (2012), we removed RTs that were 
faster than 100 ms and more than 3.5 standard deviations above or below the 
mean. The latter criterion was based on a modified recursive trimming 
procedure developed by Selst and Jolicoeur (1994). This resulted in the 
elimination of 1% of all trials. Additionally, we removed trials with errors from the 
analysis, which accounted for about 4% of all trials. Mean RTs for all included 
trials are given in Table 1.1. To analyze the effect of practice (or experience), we 
grouped the trials into four 180-trial blocks.  
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by Moher and Egeth (2012) and Chao (2010). Therefore, in our further analyses, 
we collapsed across compatible trials and incompatible trials.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Reaction times (in msec) with standard deviations in parentheses for Experiment 1 by 
block 
 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Ignore 1131 (274) 981(194) 963 (204) 928 (224) 
Neutral 1091 (235) 993 (188) 979 (204) 970 (252) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the mean difference in RT on ignore trials and neutral trials for 
all participants across all four blocks. We performed a 2 (trial type) × 4 (block) 
repeated-measures ANOVA on RTs. We found no main effect of trial type, F(1, 
24) = 0.746, p = .396. However, we found a significant main effect of block, F(3, 
72) = 9.871, p < .01, ηp2 = .3; RTs decreased over the course of the experiment. 
Critically, we also found a significant interaction between trial type and block, 
F(3, 72) = 5.668, p < .01, ηp2= 0.2. Additional contrasts revealed that this 
interaction was largely driven by the differences between trial type in Block 1 
and trial type in Block 4, p < .001, which accounted for approximately 95% of 
the effect. Finally, analyses of simple main effects revealed that RTs for the 
ignore cue were significantly slower than RTs for the neutral cue in Block 1, p < 
    
	 85 
.05, and RTs for the ignore cue were significantly faster than RTs for the neutral 
cue in Block 4, p < .05. 
 
The results suggest that when participants ignored the nontarget information, 
there was a cost in the beginning (Block 1), which is similar to what Moher and 
Egeth (2012) found. However, as participants learned about the (consistently 
mapped) to-be-ignored information, they efficiently ignored the nontarget 
information, which resulted in a benefit in RT (Block 4). 
 
We conducted a further analysis restricted to neutral trials. Given our 
experimental design, two types of neutral trials were presented. Specifically, 
because neutral trials used the same four colors (i.e., red, green, blue, yellow) 
that were used in ignore trials, each neutral trial contained a letter in the color 
that a participant was learning to ignore. Thus, there were two different types of 
neutral trial: The target was either (a) the color the participant was learning to 
ignore or (b) some other color. If participants were learning something about the 
to-be-ignored color and that this color should not contain the target, then this 
should have resulted in an RT profile that roughly paralleled the profile observed 
between neutral and ignore trials. 
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To investigate this possibility, we performed a 2 (neutral-trial type) × 4 (block) 
repeated-measures ANOVA on RTs (Fig. 2.3). We found no main effect of 
neutral-trial type, F(1, 24) = 0.06, p = .809. However, we did find a significant 
main effect of block, F(3, 72) = 3.91, p < .05, ηp2 = .14; RTs decreased over the 
course of the experiment. Critically, there was a significant interaction between 
neutral-trial type and block, F(3, 72) = 6.16, p < .002, ηp2 = .2. In Block 1, 
participants were faster when the target on a neutral trial was in the to-be-
ignored color. This suggests that at this point, participants were selecting the 
feature they were starting to learn to ignore on ignore trials, as suggested by the 
probe-dot-detection results in Moher and Egeth (2012). However, over time 
(Blocks 2 and 3), this pattern reversed: Participants were slower to select the 
target on neutral trials when it was the to-be-ignored color on ignore trials. 
Additionally, in Blocks 2 and 3, RTs on neutral trials were faster when the target 
was in another color; this suggests that participants were efficiently inhibiting the 
to-be-ignored color. However, in Block 4, there was no RT difference between 
the neutral-trial types. It is difficult to know whether this effect was a real 
reduction in the interference or a reflection of noise in the data; further 
experiments will be needed to untangle these possibilities. Finally, dropping 
neutral trials on which the target was the color the participants were learning to 
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targets on ignore trials could be one of three colors, while targets on neutral 
trials could be one of four colors. Thus, the number of possible target 
repetitions was higher for ignore trials. To explore the effect of this imbalance of 
probabilities, we conducted an additional analysis in which we removed all 
target-repetition trials. A 2 (trial type) × 4 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed that even when we discounted the possibility that target repetitions 
facilitated the benefits shown on ignore trials, the results were the same. 
Specifically, we found no main effect of trial type, F(1, 24) = 0.512, p = .481. We 
found a significant main effect of block, F(3, 72) = 9.311, p < .001, ηp2 = .28; RTs 
decreased over the course of the experiment. Finally, there was still a significant 
interaction between trial type and block, F(3, 72) = 5.974, p < .01, ηp2 = .2. 
Therefore, it seems the benefit of learning to ignore a particular color was not 
facilitated by more target-repetition trials in the ignore condition than in the 
neutral condition. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1reveals a surprising result: Inhibiting non-target-feature information 
can be costly or beneficial depending on how much the participant has learned 
about the to-be-ignored feature. Furthermore, the cost in RT for ignore trials 
compared with neutral trials suggests that participants were unable to use a 
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template for rejection early in practice to facilitate efficient feature inhibition. 
However, after a few hundred trials of learning to ignore the to-be-ignored 
feature, participants showed a benefit (i.e., faster RTs). This demonstrates that 
while participants cannot create a template for rejection immediately, they can 
after learning to ignore a particular to-be-ignored feature. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that when participants learned to inhibit to-
be-ignored feature information, they searched more efficiently, compared with 
when they were provided with no information. However, some critical questions 
remain. First, how general are the results from Experiment 1? Specifically, will 
similar results be obtained under different experimental conditions? Second, do 
participants learn to ignore the to-be-ignored feature or are they merely 
learning to attend to the other possible target colors? Finally, do the same 
effects demonstrated in Experiment 1remain when interference on neutral trials 
is removed (i.e., if the to-be-ignored color never shows up on neutral trials)? 
 
To address these questions, we conducted two follow-up experiments. In 
Experiment 2a, participants were provided with a to-be-ignored color cue on 
ignore trials, but, unlike in Experiment 1, the to-be-ignored information changed 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
A group of 52 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students and community 
members (mean age = 22.9 years; 10 male, 42 female) with normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision participated in the experiments 
(26 participants were assigned to each experiment). A power calculation similar 
to the one used in Experiment 1led us to stop data collection once we reached 
26 participants. The participants received extra credit in undergraduate courses 
or monetary payment as compensation and gave informed consent. The Johns 
Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board approved the protocol. 
 
Stimuli, design, and procedure 
 
Except as noted, the stimuli, design, and procedure were the same as in 
Experiment 1. The key difference was the number of stimuli and their 
arrangement in the search displays (see Fig. 2.4). Stimuli consisted of 12 capital 
letters from the English alphabet displayed around a central fixation cross. Each 
letter was randomly assigned to appear in 1 of 12 locations, and the 12 letters 
were equally spaced on the circumference of an imaginary circle. The distance 
between fixation and the closest edge of each letter subtended 5.5° of visual 
angle. As in Experiment 1, either a “B” or an “F” was selected randomly as the 
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target letter on every trial. Additionally, 11 other uppercase letters were 
selected as the nontarget items. Nontarget letters were chosen from the other 
24 letters from the English alphabet. Eight colors were used: red, blue, green, 
yellow, pink, purple, orange, and aqua. 
 
On neutral trials, six letters were selected randomly to appear in the same color 
(we refer to this as the majority color). The other six letters each appeared in a 
different color, which was selected randomly without replacement. The spatial 
location of all colored letters was randomly selected so that stimuli would not be 
grouped by color. On neutral trials for both Experiments 2a and 2b, the target 
letter could appear randomly either in the majority color or as any of the other 
colors. Thus, a color cue was not informative on neutral trials. 
On ignore trials, the to-be-ignored color was always the majority color. 
Additionally, the target was never in the to-be-ignored color; rather, it was 
always one of the heterogeneously colored letters (see Fig. 2.4). Therefore, 
participants could benefit from the to-be-ignored information by knowing that 
the target was not the to-be-ignored color, thus they could attempt to ignore 6 
out of 12 items. Critically, in Experiment 2a, the to-be-ignored color varied from 
trial to trial; thus, the participant could not learn anything consistent about the 
to-be-ignored information. However, in Experiment 2b, the to-be-ignored 
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information was held constant for the entire experiment (e.g., a participant could 
ignore red on all ignore trials). The specific to-be-ignored color was randomly 
assigned for each participant. As on neutral trials, the spatial location of all 
colored letters was randomly selected so that stimuli would not be grouped by 
color. Participants completed 720 trials total, 50% of the trials were ignore trials 
and 50% neutral trials, randomly intermixed. Experimental sessions lasted 60 to 
75 min 
 
Results 
 
For Experiments 2a and 2b, we removed responses that were faster than 100 ms 
and more than 3.5 standard deviations above or below the mean. This resulted 
in the elimination of 1% of all trials for each experiment. Additionally, we 
removed all trials with errors from the analysis, which accounted for 
approximately 3% of all trials for each experiment. Finally, to analyze the effect 
of condition across the duration of the experiments, we divided the trials into 
ten 72-trial blocks. Mean RTs for all included trials are given in Table 2.2. 
 
For both experiments, we calculated a mean difference score by subtracting the 
RT on neutral trials from the RT on ignore trials (see Fig. 2.5). This was done for 
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each participant for each block. Although we present a difference score in 
Figure 2.5 for clarity, all analyses were conducted on raw RTs. 
  
 
 We first ran a 2 (trial type) × 10 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA for 
Experiment 2a. We found no significant effect of trial type, F(1, 25) = 0.006, p = 
.939, and no significant interaction of trial type and block, F(9, 225) = 1.555, p = 
.13. Therefore, it does not appear that participants acquired a template for 
rejection, contrary to the findings of Arita et al. (2012). However, as Beck and 
Hollingworth (2015) point out, the inhibitory benefit found by Arita et al. (2012) 
was very likely supported by the fact that participants could rely on a simple 
spatial template. This was because all of the to-be-ignored items in their study 
were grouped in one hemifield, while the other items were located in the 
opposite hemifield. Therefore, it seems that when to-be-ignored information is 
variable (and stimuli are not grouped by color), participants have a difficult time 
developing a beneficial template for rejection.  
 
In contrast, in Experiment 2b, we found a significant benefit of learning about 
the to-be-ignored color, similar to the findings in Experiment 1. While there was 
a significantly greater RT cost in Block 1 on ignore trials than on neutral trials, 
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participants were able to learn to successfully ignore the to-be-ignored color, 
which resulted in a greater RT benefit on ignore trials than on neutral trials in 
Blocks 2 through 10 (see Fig. 2.5). A 2 × 10 repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of trial type, F(1, 25) = 36.821, p < .001, ηp2 = .6, 
and a significant interaction of trial type and block, F(9, 225) = 3.235, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .12. Furthermore, we conducted a 2 (experiment) × 2 (trial type) × 10 
(block) three-way ANOVA, in which we found that the interaction in Experiment 
2b was significantly different from the interaction in Experiment 2a, F(9, 450) = 
2.106, p < .05, ηp2 = .04. 
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Experiment 2b (in which participants learned a to-be-ignored color), there were 
a similar number of target-repetition trials in ignore trials and neutral trials 
(average of 14% of trials across all participants) because of the large number of 
colors available in both tasks. However, we still examined whether the benefit of 
learning to ignore was facilitated by target repetitions. Specifically, we 
conducted a 2 (trial type) × 10 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA in which we 
removed all target-repetition trials for Experiment 2b (in which participants 
received consistent to-be-ignored cues). This analysis revealed that, again, even 
when we removed the possibility that target repetitions were facilitating the 
benefit shown on ignore trials, the same results were seen. Specifically, we 
found a main effect of trial type, F(1, 25) = 44.645, p < .01, ηp2 = .641. We also 
found a significant main effect of block, F(9, 225) = 5.819, p < .01, ηp2 = .189; 
RTs decreased over the course of the experiment. Finally, we found that there 
was still a significant interaction between trial type and block, F(9, 225) = 2.621, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .1. Therefore, it seems that the learning-to-ignore benefit was not 
facilitated by target repetitions, which mirrors the results of Experiment 1. 
 
We also found an interesting interaction between target repetitions (target 
repetition vs. no target repetition) and trial type (ignore vs. neutral). Target 
repetitions speeded search for neutral trials—RT was longer on trials without 
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target repetition (M = 1,770 ms) than on trials with target repetition (M = 1,738 
ms). However, the opposite was true for ignore trials—RT was shorter on trials 
without target repetition (M = 1,642 ms) than on trials with target repetition (M 
= 1,696 ms). We ran a 2 (target repetition) × 2 (trial type) repeated-measures 
ANOVA and found a significant main effect of trial type, F(1, 25) = 13.2, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .35, but no significant effect of target repetition, F(1, 25) = 0.617, p = 
.440. We found a significant interaction between trial type and target repetition, 
F(1, 25) = 6.753, p < .05, ηp2 = .213. These results suggest that while target 
repetitions benefitted participants on neutral trials (as is normally the case), they 
actually hindered participants on ignore trials. Perhaps because participants 
were learning to ignore a specific feature, anything conflicting with that 
information in visual working memory resulted in interference. Therefore, not 
only did target repetitions not facilitate the learning-to-ignore RT benefit that we 
demonstrated, but also they seemed to interfere with search on those trials. 
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Table 2.2 Reaction times (in msec) with standard deviations for Experiment 2 by block 
 Experiment 2a:  
Varied to-be-ignored cues 
Experiment 2b:  
Consistent to-be-ignored 
cues 
 Ignore Neutral Ignore Neutral 
Block 1 1971 (457) 1965 (529) 1989 (451) 1927 (434) 
Block 2 1813 (491) 1869 (541) 1723 (346) 1909 (437) 
Block 3 1761 (532) 1819 (507) 1632 (419) 1733 (486) 
Block 4 1748 (577) 1793 (595) 1623 (555) 1727 (476) 
Block 5 1736 (427) 1708 (457) 1552 (358) 1688 (432) 
Block 6 1737 (438) 1724 (450) 1577 (356) 1716 (512) 
Block 7 1723 (443) 1627 (361) 1596 (403) 1683 (349) 
Block 8 1678 (475) 1705 (435) 1670 (694) 1801 (681) 
Block 9 1649 (528) 1651 (490) 1595 (464) 1741 (484) 
Block 10 1659 (563) 1626 (538) 1573 (426) 1748 (518) 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated and extended the results of 
Experiment 1by demonstrating with rather different displays that participants 
can learn to ignore specified feature information. Additionally, in Experiment 2b, 
the RT benefit on ignore trials appeared more quickly than in Experiment 1. 
Because the displays in Experiments 1 and 2b were not identical, we cannot 
make strong statements about the learning rates in both experiments. 
Nevertheless, it does seem notable that evidence of a significant ignoring 
benefit was evident after just 72 trials in Experiment 2b, while in Experiment 
1such a benefit was not evident until near the end of the session, even though 
many more colors were used in Experiment 2b (eight) than in Experiment 1(four). 
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Additionally, Arita et al. (2012) found that the benefit of top-down cues was 
much greater for larger visual-set sizes than for smaller visual-set sizes. For the 
current experiments, participants in Experiment 1could ignore 1 out of 4 items 
initially, while participants in Experiment 2 could ignore 6 out of 12 items 
initially. Therefore, the rapid emergence of the ignoring benefit in Experiment 
2b is likely a function of the number of items that participants could ignore. 
 
If participants were learning to attend to the other colors rather than learning to 
inhibit the to-be-ignored color, then learning should have been more difficult in 
Experiment 2b. Chao (2010), using similar displays to those we used in 
Experiment 1, explicitly compared a condition in which one location was cued to 
be ignored with a condition in which the other three locations were cued to be 
attended. When three possible locations were precued, participants could not 
use this information to improve target detection.  Allen and Humphreys (2007) 
found similar results using a preview search task, in which a number of 
distractors is presented before the onset of the rest of the search display. Finally, 
in our Experiment 2b, eight colors were used, which is well beyond the capacity 
of visual working memory (e.g. Cowan, 2010).   
 
General Discussion 
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The current study provides a novel demonstration that knowledge about 
nontargets can improve search performance. Across two experiments, we 
presented evidence that learning to ignore to-be-ignored information can result 
in a benefit that is modulated by participants’ time spent learning about the to-
be ignored feature. Additionally, the present study goes beyond previous 
research by demonstrating that the benefits of learning to ignore consistent 
distractor information are not only influenced by time spent learning, but also 
they are affected by the utility of that information. In Experiment 1after a few 
hundred trials, participants clearly showed an RT benefit. We compared the time 
course of learning in Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, where participants could 
ignore multiple items in the display rather than just one item, and found that the 
benefit of learning to ignore emerged after only 72 trials. Results from 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that, within the same task, participants benefited 
only from to-be-ignored cues when those cues were consistent, which allowed 
participants to learn to ignore them. Overall, the current study presents new 
evidence detailing the circumstances in which negative cuing of distractors can 
facilitate the speed of visual search. 
 
The current results are supported by a number of previous studies 
demonstrating the benefit of attentional sets that develop with sufficient 
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learning (Cosman & Vecera, 2014; Gal et al., 2009; Geng, 2014; Moher, 
Lakshmanan, Egeth, & Ewen, 2014; Zehetleitner, Goschy, & Müller, 2012). On 
the face of it, it might look like the present design—with its explicit verbal 
instructions—resulted in explicit learning of an attentional set. However, it is 
difficult to argue that no form of implicit learning occurred. Previous research 
has shown that observers are very sensitive to statistical regularities in visual 
search displays (e.g., Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). It would be 
interesting in further research to compare the efficacy of explicit and implicit 
learning in the acquisition of an attentional set to ignore a specific feature. 
 
The present experiments demonstrate circumstances in which the benefit of 
distractor inhibition arises from consistent learning; however, the specific 
attentional mechanisms that support such behavior have yet to be determined. 
Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes (2010) demonstrated in a series of attentional-
capture experiments that top-down goals (e.g., “find the square”) do not result 
in the filtering out of irrelevant salient objects. Rather, they demonstrated that 
participants will still select salient irrelevant stimuli, but they will subsequently 
rapidly disengage from those stimuli that do not match the top-down goal (e.g., 
a bright red triangle). It seems possible that participants in the present study 
utilized a similar mechanism.  
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Although the rapid-disengagement hypothesis is not universally accepted (e.g., 
Chen & Mordkoff, 2007; Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Folk & Remington, 2006; 
McDonald, Green, Jannati, & DiLollo 2013), it should be noted that the context 
for all of these critiques is attentional capture by salient singletons. In the 
present study (as in Moher & Egeth, 2012), there were no salient singletons; that 
is, all items were equally salient. It is possible that some form of rapid 
disengagement is operative in such circumstances. If rapid disengagement is not 
responsible, what other kind of mechanism might account for the observed 
change in performance? Some investigators have argued that active suppression 
can prevent the allocation of attention to known distractors (e.g., Sawaki, Geng, 
& Luck, 2012).  Distinguishing the role of active suppression and rapid 
disengagement in the circumstances of the present experiments will require 
additional empirical efforts. 
 
It seems that learning plays a major role in whether feature inhibition results in a 
cost or a benefit. The ability to hone selection mechanisms to efficiently choose 
information to attend and information to ignore is critical for understanding how 
observers strategically search within visual environments. 
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Chapter 3: Inhibition Drives Feature-based Attention 
 
Chapter 3: Synopsis of Completed Experiments 
When a target feature is in competition with a distractor feature, inhibition of the 
distractor, rather than activation of the target, is what biases early feature-based 
attention (Moher, Lakshmanan, Egeth, & Ewen, 2014). Critically, in previous 
studies only a single target feature was in competition with a single distractor 
feature. What happens when a target feature is in competition with multiple 
distractor features? In the completed experiments below, we demonstrate that 
even in the face of multiple distractor features, inhibition of distractors, rather 
than activation of the target, drives early feature-based attention. Additionally, 
we are interested in understanding whether it is a generalizable phenomon that 
inhibition drives early feature-based attention. Specifically, it still remains to be 
seen if target and distractor feature consistency is what facilitates inhibition 
driving feature-based attention. For example, in the previous work (Moher et al., 
2014) and in the current findings below (i.e., two distractor work), both the 
target and distractor information remained consistent throughout the task. This 
allowed for the possibility that observers could learn to ignore the non-target 
information. Therefore, learning could be a key component in whether the 
attentional system utilizes inhibitory processes in early feature-based attention. 
    
	 106 
To test this, we used a similar paradigm as detailed in the completed 
experiments, but changed a couple critical components. The most critical 
change we made is that we made the target feature consistent throughout the 
task, but varied the to-be-ignored distractor feature from trial to trial. By 
changing the distractor feature from trial to trial, we create a situation where if 
the attentional system can use excitation of target features to drive early feature-
based attention (which has yet to be seen in either Moher et al. (2014) or in the 
work detailed below), then by making the distractor information highly 
inconsistent, we should create the ideal situation for excitation of target features 
to occur. However, if we still find that the neural data from participants suggests 
that inhibition is driving early feature-based attention, then this would be a 
strong case for the generalizability of this phenomenon.   
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Title: Attention is driven by inhibition: Suppression of multiple distractor features 
facilitates target selection 
Under Review at Visual Cognition 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Due to the limited information processing capacity of the human visual system, it 
is critical to selectively respond to those stimuli that are the most relevant to our 
current goals. Inhibition of non-target information has been shown to play a role 
when selecting target feature information, however the generality of that 
mechanism has yet to be explored. While past work has demonstrated that 
inhibition of distractor information can drive feature-based attention, those 
experiments utilized stimuli in which there was only a single target feature and a 
single non-target feature. This scenario is far removed from everyday life where 
a target may appear in a heterogeneous background in which more than one 
feature may be irrelevant. Here we investigated whether early feature-based 
attention is facilitated by suppression of distractor feature information when 
multiple (here, two) distractor features are present. Presenting multiple distractor 
features along with a single target feature may push the attentional system into 
a state where inhibiting two distractor features is more costly than activating a 
single target feature. Contrary to this expectation, we found that even when 
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observers are presented with multiple distractor features in the presences of a 
single target feature, inhibition of the distractor features is what drives feature-
based attention. This work provides new evidence in support of current models 
of visual attention, which will need to reconsider the major role that inhibition 
plays in selection. 
 
Introduction  
 
The visual system is limited in its capacity for higher-order processing. 
Therefore, making appropriate responses to external stimuli depends on the 
selection of visual inputs that are relevant to our current goals. This kind of 
selection process (sometimes referred to as top-down attention), can occur on 
the basis of several stimulus attributes including location (Posner, 1980; 
Serences, Yantis, Culberson, & Awh, 2004; Shomstein & Gottlieb, 2016), color 
(Egeth et al., 1984; Saenz, Buraĉas, & Boynton, 2003), orientation (Liu, Larsson, 
& Carrasco, 2007), and direction of motion (Saenz et al., 2003). Using event-
related potential (ERP) recordings, it has been shown that processing of task-
relevant features throughout the visual field can be influenced by current goals 
as early as 100 ms following stimulus presentation (Zhang & Luck, 2009).  
 Attentional selection based on a property such as color is usually 
described in terms of the activation of task-relevant features (Wolfe, 1994a), 
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which may be accomplished by an increase in the gain of neurons tuned to 
features of the target (Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; Saenz, Buracas, & 
Boynton, 2002). However, recent research has shown that inhibition of non-
target information can also play a role in target feature selection (Andersen & 
Müller, 2010; Braithwaite & Humphreys, 2003; Cunningham & Egeth, 2016; 
Lleras, Kawahara, Wan, & Ariga, 2008; Moher et al., 2014; Stormer & Alvarez, 
2014; Woodman & Luck, 2007).  There is evidence that features can be de-
prioritized in several different paradigms including visual marking (Braithwaite & 
Humphreys, 2003) and the distractor preview effect (Lleras et al., 2008),  
However, while electrophysiological data indicate that location-based inhibition 
can occur during early stages of visual processing (about 100 ms post-following 
stimulus presentation (Luck & Hillyard, 1994a; Luck et al., 1994)), evidence of 
feature-based inhibition has typically been found only at later stages of 
processing (starting  approximately 200-300 ms after stimulus presentation; 
(Andersen & Müller, 2010; Shin, Wan, Fabiani, Gratton, & Lleras, 2008; Stormer 
& Alvarez, 2014)). 
 The possible existence of early feature-based inhibition was 
demonstrated (Moher et al., 2014) by adapting a previously used (Zhang & Luck, 
2009) ERP design. Observers viewed a continuous stream of two spatially 
interleaved sets of dots in one visual hemifield while maintaining central fixation.  
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Observers were instructed to indicate whenever the target-colored dots were 
simultaneously dimmed for 500 ms, but to ignore occasions when it was the 
distractor-colored dots that dimmed.  During each trial, task-irrelevant 
homogeneously colored sets of dots (probes) were occasionally presented in the 
opposite hemifield. Within each trial, each set of probe dots was randomly 
selected to be composed of dots matching either the target color from the task-
relevant side, the distractor color from the task-relevant side, or a neutral color 
that never appeared on the task-relevant side (the latter served as the baseline 
condition). 
 Changes in the amplitude of the P1 response to these probe stimuli were 
examined to clarify the effects of feature-based attention on early visual 
processing. The P1 is an ERP component that reflects an early sweep of visual 
processing (approximately 100 ms after stimulus presentation) whose amplitude 
can be affected by changes in neuronal activity in extrastriate cortex (Mangun, 
Buonocore, Girelli, & Jha, 1998; Woldorff et al., 1997) that may reflect top-down 
attentional control settings (Hillyard & Münte, 1984). The P1 is typically 
interpreted to reflect a feedforward wave of sensory processing (Hillyard, Vogel, 
& Luck, 1998; Luck & Kappenman, 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2009); but see Foxe and 
Simpson (2002), for an alternative interpretation.  
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 Given that enhancement and inhibition are both plausibly related to 
attentional selection, one might expect to find evidence of both.  However, 
keeping in mind that feature-based inhibition only occurred later in processing 
(around 300 ms post-stimulus) in previous studies (Andersen & Müller, 2010; 
Shin et al., 2008; Stormer & Alvarez, 2014), it is also plausible to think that no 
inhibition at all would be observed in the early P1 component. Interestingly, the 
effect that was observed in Moher et al. (2014) appears to consist of pure 
inhibition: the target and the neutral ERPs were essentially identical in P1 
amplitude, while the distractor P1 was substantially reduced. A behavioral 
follow-up revealed that this was indeed due to inhibition of distractor features 
(Moher et al., 2014).  
 Thus, when one target feature (e.g., red) and one distractor feature (e.g., 
blue) are in competition in a display, inhibition of the distractor feature 
information, rather than the activation of the target feature, is what drives early 
feature-based attention. In the world outside the laboratory a critical target 
feature is typically visible in a scene with many competing nontarget features. 
Therefore, the neural and cognitive processes involved in more complex 
situations when there is one target, but more than one distractor feature remain 
unclear. In these situations, when the human visual system is faced with a 
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computationally more complex problem, will inhibition still drive feature-based 
attention in the face of multiple distractors?  
 
Experiment 3 
In the present study, we used electrophysiological recordings to directly 
test whether or not inhibition of distractor features drives selection in situations 
where there are multiple distractor stimuli. We presented observers with a visual 
monitoring task while recording neural activity with electroencephalography 
(EEG). Observers were instructed to fixate at the center of the screen while 
being presented with a continuous stream of three spatially interleaved sets of 
dots (one target color and two distractor colors) in one hemifield (see Figure 
3.1). Every 100 msec, half of the dots would randomly relocate, giving the array 
of dots a scintillating, motion-like appearance. Randomly throughout the trial, 
the entire set of target-colored dots would undergo a brief luminance 
decrement (500 ms). Observers were instructed to respond when the target-
colored dots dimmed. Additionally, each set of distractor-colored dots 
independently dimmed in the same way. Observers were instructed to not 
respond when distractor dots dimmed. In the opposite hemifield, probes were 
randomly presented throughout the trial. The probes could be the target color, 
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either of the distractor colors, or a neutral color (i.e., a fourth color, never 
present in the task-relevant hemifield). Critically, while the probes were 
irrelevant to the subject’s task, they elicited a P1 response in the EEG. By 
measuring P1 amplitudes to unattended probes, we were able to assess whether 
there were differential effects of feature-based attention to these probes.  
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
A group of 24 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students and community 
members with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color 
vision participated in sessions lasting approximately 90 min. The participants 
received monetary payment as compensation and gave informed consent. The 
protocol was approved by the Johns Hopkins Medicine Institutional Review 
Board.  
Equipment 
EEG recording and EEG data analysis methods were largely adapted from 
(Moher et al., 2014). Stimulus presentation was conducted using MATLAB 
(Mathworks) and PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997). Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
data were recorded at 47 sites covering the whole scalp with approximately 
uniform density using an elastic electrode cap— Waveguard cap (Advanced 
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Neuro Technology, or ANT, The Netherlands) with 128-channel Duke layout 
(equidistant electrode placement)—referenced to the average of all channels 
during recording. Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ. All EEG channels 
were recorded continuously in direct-current mode at a sampling rate of 512 Hz 
from a 128-channel, high-impedance ANT Waveguard amplifier with active 
cable-shielding technology and an antialiasing low-pass filter with a 138 Hz 
cutoff.  
 
Procedure and design 
Prior to the onset of a trial, an arrow appeared which cued observers to the 
relevant “attended” side (the attended side was randomized by trial). At the 
beginning of the experiment, observers were told to attend to a specific target 
color and to respond any time that color (e.g., red) underwent a luminance 
change (i.e., dimmed).  Observers responded by pressing the trigger on a 
gamepad. They were also instructed not to respond when the distractor dots 
(e.g., blue and green) underwent luminance changes. There were 4 colors used 
in the experiment: red, blue, green, and yellow. The roles of specific colors (i.e., 
as target, distractors, or neutral) were counterbalanced across participants. Each 
color appeared at a luminance of 8.1 cd/m2. On the task-relevant side, the 
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luminance of all of the dots of one color was occasionally reduced to 3.2 cd/m2. 
The fourth color was assigned to be a “neutral” color, and only appeared as a 
probe on the task-irrelevant side. During the 15 second trial, half of all dots on 
the attended side were randomly relocated every 100 ms within an imaginary 
circle, giving the dots a motion-like appearance. Throughout the trial, the set of 
target dots and the two sets of distractor dots would randomly, and 
independently, undergo brief (500 ms) luminance decrements before returning 
to their original luminance. During a given trial, these luminance changes 
occurred between 2 and 5 times each for the target colored dots and the 
distractor colored dots. Finally, on the “unattended” side, probe dots were 
presented for 100ms at interstimulus intervals (i.e., between luminance changes 
of the target dots and distractor dots) that varied randomly from 217 to 700 ms. 
Observers were instructed to ignore the unattended side and not respond to the 
probe dots. Observers completed 128 trials total.   
 
EEG Data Analysis 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) data were recorded at 47 sites and referenced to 
the average of all channels during recording. EEG epochs were synchronized 
with the onset of probe dot presentation and analyzed using Advanced Neuro 
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Technologies’s (The Netherlands) asa-lab software. Vertical electrooculograms 
were recorded from frontal channels LL1 and RR1, whose locations were 
designed specifically to capture eye blinks. (See electrode diagram in (Moher et 
al., 2014)). Horizontal electrooculograms were recorded from channels LE1 and 
RE1. Eye blink correction was performed using a principal component analysis 
method (Ille, Berg, & Scherg, 2002). After eye blink correction, EEG was visually 
inspected on a trial-by-trial basis to look for any horizontal eye movements. Any 
trials contaminated with horizontal eye movements were eliminated from 
averaging. In addition, trials contaminated with excessive muscle artifacts, 
artifacts due to movements, or trials in which amplifier blocking occurred were 
also eliminated. An off-line bandpass filter (Butterworth filter, low cut-off 
frequency = 0.2 Hz, high cutoff frequency = 35 Hz, and linear roll-off = 24 
dB/octave) was applied to all channels. ERPs were averaged off-line from 100 ms 
before to 600 ms after probe stimulus onset. Data were analyzed from six 
spatially contiguous electrodes in each hemisphere (LA5, LB4, LC6, LE3, LL10, 
LL13; RA5, RB4, RC6, RE3, RR10, and RR13), similar to (Moher et al., 2014). 
Within each subject, electrodes were included in the individual’s average based 
on the presence of a discernible P1 pattern. These channels were selected in a 
blind fashion, where the true experimental conditions were not considered (no 
labels were present for these waveforms during selection). Finally, ERP 
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waveforms obtained from the selected electrodes were grand averaged using 
EEGLAB, a MATLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-
Calderon & Luck, 2014). Mean P1 amplitude (Moher et al., 2014) was calculated 
for each participant as the mean amplitude from the point in time when the 
voltage reached 50% of peak amplitude to 50 ms after that point. Peak P1 
amplitude was calculated as the highest amplitude within the time window of 
90ms to 140ms.  
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peak P1 amplitude, F(2, 46) = 5.601, p = .011, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
There was no effect of hemifield or interaction between hemifield and probe 
type (ps > .5). We found the same results when measuring mean P1 amplitudes, 
rather than peak amplitude, F(2, 46) = 10.096, p = .001, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the P1 amplitudes associated with 
the presentation of target and neutral colored probes did not differ from one 
another, p > 0.05. However, P1 amplitudes associated with distractor probes 
were significantly different from target and neutral probes, ps < 0.05. These 
results suggest that neural activity associated with target probes was no 
different than neutral probes, which were never presented on the attended side 
of the behavioral task. Rather, P1 amplitudes to distractor probes, as seen in 
Figure 3.2, were significantly reduced compared to target and neutral probes. 
These results suggest that in more complex environments where activating a 
single target feature might seem more advantageous, the human visual system 
attempts to inhibit multiple distractor features to facilitate the selection of a 
target feature. 
Our results suggest that on average participants were able to suppress both of 
the distractor colored probes, which resulted in the lower average distractor P1 
compared to the target and neutral colored probes. It is an interesting question 
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to consider whether this mean difference indicates that subjects can suppress 
both distractor colors simultaneously, or whether the mean difference indicates 
suppression of just one, while the other undergoes little or no suppression. 
Unfortunately, the design of the present experiment does not lend itself to an 
analysis that can address whether there are indeed differential amounts of 
suppression for individual distractors, rather we can only address whether there 
was suppression for the average of the two distractors. 
There are some superficially appealing post hoc analyses that might be 
considered. For example, we can try to explore the magnitude of the difference 
between the P1 values for the two distractors colors assigned to each subject.  If 
the difference is very small, this would support the idea that subjects can 
suppress both distractors simultaneously.  And indeed, inspection of individual 
ERP plots suggests that some subjects show just such a pattern, whereas others 
do not. However, trying to analyze the results quantitatively is not really possible 
given the design of the experiment.  For example, suppose we take for each 
subject the difference between the higher and lower of the P1 values associated 
with the two distractors assigned to him or her, and see if that difference is 
significantly different from zero. But if we consistently subtract lesser from 
greater each difference score will be positive and thus the mean effect will be 
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Experiment 4 
 
Previous research has shown that learned attentional sets can have long-lasting 
biases, even when the task demands change (Graves & Egeth, 2016; Leber & 
Egeth, 2006; Leber, Kawahara, & Gabari, 2009; Moher et al., 2014; Zehetleitner, 
Goschy, & Müller, 2012). Much of this previous research relied on experimental 
setups that involved a “transfer task” after a period of training or experience 
with a “training task”. Specifically, the goal of the transfer task is to probe any 
lingering attentional biases to previously learned information, even though that 
information is totally irrelevant in the new task (and generally is randomly 
presented/manipulated). Interestingly, there should be no differences in 
responses to different elements in the transfer task if no learning occurred in the 
training task. In contrast, if there do appear to be differences in the transfer task, 
they can therefore be attributed to the prior learning from the training task (e.g., 
Moher et al. 2014). In Experiment 4 we sought to obtain converging behavioral 
evidence for the inhibitory effect found in Experiment 3 by using a two-phase 
transfer design. In the first phase we presented participants with the same task 
from Experiment 3, henceforth referred to as the “training task,” and in the 
second phase presented them with a transfer task (see Figure 3.3A). In the 
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transfer task, observers were presented with two random shapes displayed on 
the left and right side of a fixation cross. One of the shapes contained a tilted 
line and one contained a vertical line. Observers were asked to report the 
orientation of the tilted line (i.e., left or right) using the arrow keys. They were 
told that the color and shape were irrelevant and to remain fixated for each trial. 
Every color and target/distractor combination occurred (e.g. red could be the 
color of the target (tilted line) on one trial and be the color of the foil (vertical 
line) on another trial).  
Methods 
Participants 
 
A new group of 32 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students and 
community members with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
normal color vision participated in experimental sessions. The participants 
received extra credit in undergraduate courses and gave informed consent. The 
Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board approved the protocol. 
Procedure and design 
All participants were given a training and a transfer task. The training task was 
the same as the task in Experiment 3 with the exception that subjects were not 
outfitted for EEG.  In the transfer task five colors were used: the four from 
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Experiment 3 (red, blue, green, yellow) and purple. The roles of the original four 
colors were counterbalanced across subjects as in Experiment 3. In addition, 
purple was used as a novel color and appeared only in the transfer task. The 
transfer task displays(see Figure 3.3a) consisted of two different geometric 
shapes presented one on each side of fixation. The experiment contained 4 
geometric line shapes that were enclosed in a square. For each trial, two 
different shapes were randomly chosen such that the same shape never 
appeared on both sides. One of the shapes contained a tilted line and one 
contained a vertical line. The assignment to shape and side were random on 
each trial. Across all trials every color and target/distractor combination occurred 
in a fully randomized fashion (e.g. red could be the color of the target (tilted 
line) on one trial and be the color of the foil (vertical line) on another trial). 
Stimulus displays were presented until response. The shapes subtended a visual 
angle of approximately 5.2° by 5.2°. They were presented 6.5° from the center 
of the fixation cross. Between the stimulus displays of successive trials, a black 
screen with a fixation cross appeared in the center for 1000 msecs. Reaction 
times and error rates were measured. There were 300 trials. 
 
Results and discussion 
Overall, the statistical analyses indicated that there were no statistical 
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differences in the second half of the 300-trial transfer task, which is similar to 
previous findings (Moher et al., 2014).  However, there was strong evidence of 
immediate transfer in the first half of the transfer task. The logic of the 
experiment can best be appreciated with reference to Figure 3.3.  Consider, as 
an example. the case where in the training phase the target was red, the 
distractors were blue and green, the neutral color was yellow and a novel color, 
not used in the training phase, was purple (Figure 3.3B). Assuming transfer of 
training, if it were the case that observers were activating the (previous) target 
color (here red), rather than inhibiting distractor colors, then there should be no 
difference in performance regardless of whether the foil line in the transfer task 
is the previously used distractor color, previously used neutral color, or novel 
color, since observers would simply activate the target color in all of those 
instances. Alternatively, if observers had suppressed distractor features rather 
than activated target features in the training task, then reaction times should be 
faster in the transfer task when the foil line is in a color that was previously used 
as a distractor (here green) in the training task, compared to when the previously 
neutral (yellow) or novel color (purple) contains the foil line. Speaking 
colloquially, green (or blue) foil lines should be easy to ignore.  The mean RTs 
shown in Figure 3.3b show just this latter pattern of results. For Figure 3.3b, 
there was a significant interaction of Block (i.e., first half vs. second half of the 
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experiment) and the color of the foil shape (i.e., previous Distractor color, 
previous Neutral color, or Novel color) F(2, 62)=6.615, p=.003, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected. Specifically, we found that when the previous Distractor Color 
(i.e., the green/blue bar in Figure 3.3b) contained the foil item, those trials were 
significantly faster than when either the previous Neutral color or the Novel color 
contained the foil item (ps < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons). Additionally, as mentioned above, the second half of the transfer 
task had no significant differences (ps> 0.05). 
  
Additionally, as shown in Figure 3.3C, we find corroborating evidence that 
observers are not activating target features. We examined RTs for trials in which 
the target line was in one of the previous distractor colors (here green).  We 
compared reaction times for when the item containing the foil line was either the 
previous target color (red), the previous neutral color (e.g., yellow), or the novel 
color (e.g., purple). If it were the case that observers were prioritizing target 
features, then trials where the target color was present (red bar in Figure 3.3C) 
should yield slower RTs (i.e., participants would be initially attracted to the red 
distractor, which was previously the target, and have to disengage from it) 
compared to trials with the previous neutral color (yellow bar Figure 3.3C) or the 
novel color (purple bar Figure 3.3c). We found no significant differences when 
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comparing any of these trial types (ps > 0.05), suggesting that prior service as a 
target feature during the training session neither helped nor hindered 
performance in the transfer task.  
 
We also examined whether search for a target tilted line in either the (1) 
previous Neutral color or (2) the Novel color would differ depending on what 
colors were assigned to the foil line (i.e., previous Distractor colors, previous 
Target color, Novel color or previous Neutral color respectively). While for the 
comparisons involving the target line colored in the Novel color there was a 
significant effect of Block (p < 0.05) indicating a linear trend toward faster 
responses generally in the second half of the experiment, there were no other 
significant differences.    
 
Taken together, these data and the data from Experiment 3 provide some 
converging evidence that the feature-based attentional set learned from the 
training task was defined by inhibition of the multiple distractor features (on 
average). Importantly, the findings from Experiment 4 indicate that this 
inhibitory effect might also be context dependent. Consider first the results 
depicted in Figure 3.3B. The significant effect shown there might indicate that 
blue and green distractors were inhibited in general. However, if this were the 
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case we might expect a similar speeding of reaction time if the tilted line target 
was presented in a neutral color (here, yellow), and the foil (vertical) non-target 
was presented in blue or green. But the analysis presented in the preceding 
paragraph indicates that this was not the case. That is, it appears that during the 
training phase subjects learned to suppress green and blue dots only in the 
context of red dots, suggesting a learned response to a kind of specific mapping 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
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inhibition, even in the face of multiple distractors. While previous research has 
suggested that inhibition could have a role in early feature-based attention 
(Andersen & Müller, 2010; Moher et al., 2014; Zhang & Luck, 2009), observers in 
those studies were only presented with situations with one target feature and 
one distractor feature. It could be the case that when there are multiple 
distractors present, excitation of the target feature takes over. However, the 
current results suggest something quite different. Specifically, it seems that even 
when the distractor-target feature relationship is unequal (2 distractors vs. 1 
target), processes involved in early feature-based attention, on average, still rely 
on inhibition. These results support an attentional framework in which feature-
based attention could be mainly driven by inhibition of competing information.  
 
It is not clear why, in some circumstances, the attentional system inhibits 
distractor features rather than activating a single target feature. One reason this 
could be the case is that inhibition, compared to excitation, has been suggested 
to be more metabolically efficient (Buzsaki, Kaila, & Raichle, 2007; Waldvogel et 
al., 2000). Another possibility is that computations similar to those involved in 
center-surround suppression in the spatial domain may be used in non-spatial 
feature spaces such as color (Chen & Tsotsos, 2010).  A center-surround 
architecture amounts to attending to a restricted region in a multidimensional 
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space.  If a center-surround architecture is in play, a multidimensional volume of 
other colors surrounding that restricted central area will be inhibited, thus 
directly accounting for the ability to inhibit multiple distractor colors as 
demonstrated in the present experiment.   Center-surround mechanisms 
typically have a delimited region of suppression.  Stimuli close in either real 
(Anton-Erxleben, Stephan, & Treue, 2009; Hopf et al., 2006; Mounts, 2000; 
Muller & Kleinschmidt, 2004), perceptual (Chen & Tsotsos, 2010), or conceptual 
(Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dagenbach & Kubat-Silman, 2003; Stone & Valentine, 
2007) space to the target are inhibited more than stimuli further from the 
target.  There is some evidence of just such a non-monotonic effect of 
perceptual similarity in the color domain in a study that measured steady-state 
visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs; (Stormer & Alvarez, 2014)). However, it is not 
clear whether the critical distances obtained in that study are applicable in the 
present paradigm. Note that the center-surround-like results imply that both 
inhibition and excitation were observed in that study. These results are not 
incompatible with the present study or (Moher et al., 2014), as SSVEPs might 
reflect both early and late processes (i.e., activity was averaged from 400 ms to 
2,500ms after stimulus onset). More detailed investigation is called for. 
 
Linear separability of target color information from distractor color information is 
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an interesting consideration for future work. Specifically, it has been shown that 
visual search can be influenced by the relationship in color space of a target 
color to distractor colors (Bauer, Jolicoeur, & Cowan, 1996; Bauer, Jolicoeur, & 
Cowan, 1998; Stroud, Menneer, Cave, & Donnelly, 2012). Additionally, recent 
work by Won & Geng (in review) suggests that while observers can inhibit 
multiple specific distractor features, this kind of inhibition also has some board 
tuning that allows for other similar features to be easily inhibited. In the present 
task, colors were chosen subjectively to represent clearly perceptually distinct 
color categories. All four of the colors used in the dots task of Experiment 3 
were linearly separable from one another (i.e., all four were on a convex 
hull).  Such a set of colors may have increased the likelihood that we were able 
to show that on average the two distractors could be inhibited.  Further research 
should explore whether this outcome is limited to the case of linear 
separability.  Previous work also suggests that it would be fruitful to explore 
more generally the roles of target-distractor similarity and distractor-distractor 
similarity in multi-feature inhibition (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989)   
Our findings have implications for understanding the nature of visual attention, 
as well as professional search (e.g., radiology and airport baggage screening). 
Specifically, when there is high competition between multiple signals, it seems 
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that inhibition of multiple sources of distractor information, rather than excitation 
of target information, is a major driver of feature-based attention. Current 
models of visual attention will need to consider the critical role that inhibition 
plays in selection. For example, the Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994a; Wolfe 
et al., 1989)  suggests that top-down “commands” are applied to lower level 
feature maps to activate locations that contain relevant attributes. Wolfe 
describes a parallel process that assigns weights to features related to targets 
and distractors. Our findings could provide neural evidence of this parallel stage 
of processing and demonstrate that it could be the case that inhibition, rather 
than excitation, is how these weights are applied. Specifically, it seems that to 
disentangle target features from distractor features, inhibitory weights are 
applied to those features associated with distractors. These inhibitory weights by 
their very nature create dissimilarity between target-related features and 
distractor-related features, leaving targets with higher activation. This 
information is then sent on to an “Activation Map” where feature weights are 
integrated into topographic maps where attention is attracted to areas with the 
most activation. However, it is also important to note that while these findings 
might contribute to our knowledge about current attentional models, many of 
the models are built on findings from experiments that involve traditional visual 
search paradigms rather than sustained attention tasks like in the current study 
    
	 134 
and in Zhang and Luck (2009) and Moher et al. (2014). Therefore, it could be the 
case that the nature of attention to target information in a visual search task 
(where there is generally distractor uncertainty) is quite different compared to 
attention to target information in a sustained attention task (where there is 
considerable certainty in the distractor information). Finally, these results could 
also be informative, in a similar way, to the dimension-weighing account (Found 
& Muller, 1996), as it relies on many of the same assumptions as Guided Search 
(Wolfe, 1994a). 
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Chapter 3: Follow-up Experiment 5 
In the work described above, we examined whether inhibition still drives early-
feature-based attention in situations that are somewhat more similar to the real 
world. Specifically, we tested how the attentional system responds when 
observers are given a situation where they need to attend to a single target 
feature, but inhibit multiple (i.e., two) distractor features. Our results suggest 
that the attentional system still depends on the inhibition of multiple distractor 
features to be able to attend to target feature information. However, it remains 
to be seen if inhibition in early-feature-based attention is what drives target 
selection in all situations. For example, in the previous work (Moher et al., 2014) 
and in the current findings above, both the target and distractor information 
remained consistent throughout the task. This allowed for the possibility that 
observers could learn to ignore the non-target information. Therefore, learning 
could be a key component in whether the attentional system utilizes inhibitory 
processes in early feature-based attention. To test this, I utilized our two 
simultaneous distractor (TSD) paradigm detailed above but changed some of 
the critical components. First, in this version the setup was similar to Moher et al. 
(2014), where we had two colors presented in each display: one target and one 
distractor. Second, we made it so that each participant was assigned one 
consistent target feature throughout the task, but the distractor feature changed 
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from trial to trial (e.g., the subject would attend to red, but on trial one the 
distractor color is blue and on trial two the distractor color is green). Thus, this 
paradigm will be referred to as the multiple varying distractor (MVD) paradigm. 
Finally, we added several colors to the experiment (7 total), so that there were 
plenty of distractor features to randomly choose from; this reduces the ability to 
learn a “set” of distractor features to ignore. By inconsistently changing the 
distractor feature from trial to trial, we attempt to create a situation where, if the 
attentional system can use excitation to target features to drive early feature-
based attention (which has yet to be seen in either Moher et al. (2014) or in the 
TSD paradigm detailed above), then we should be able to detect it. However, if 
we still find that the neural data from participants suggests that inhibition is 
driving early feature-based attention, then this should be a strong case for the 
generalizability of this phenomenon.   
 
Methods 
Participants 
A group of 42 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students with normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision participated in sessions 
lasting approximately 90 min. In previous work, 21-24 subjects have typically 
been used for these studies (e.g., Moher et al., 2014). However, due to the 
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number of colors we wanted to use and to correctly balance all conditions, we 
needed a minimum of 42 subjects. The participants received course credit as 
compensation. Research was performed in accordance with the Johns Hopkins 
Homewood Institutional Review Board. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants in all experiments.  
 
Design and Procedure 
A sustained attention task (similar to Experiment 3 above) was administered to 
participants while EEG was recorded. Prior to the onset of a trial, an arrow 
appeared which cued observers to the relevant “attended” side (the attended 
side was randomized by trial). At the beginning of the experiment, observers 
were told to attend to a specific target color and to respond any time that color 
(e.g., red) underwent a luminance change (i.e., dimmed).  Observers responded 
by pressing the trigger on a gamepad. They were also instructed not to respond 
when the distractor dots (e.g., either blue, green, aqua, purple, or orange) 
underwent luminance changes. There were 7 colors used in the experiment: red, 
blue, green, aqua, purple, orange, and yellow. The seventh color was assigned 
to be a “neutral” color, and only appeared as a probe on the task-irrelevant 
side. The roles of specific colors (i.e., as target, one of five distractors, or neutral) 
were counterbalanced across participants. All colors were isoluminant. During 
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the 15 second trial, half of all dots on the attended side were randomly 
relocated every 100 ms within an imaginary circle, giving the dots a motion-like 
appearance. Throughout the trial, the set of target dots and the set of distractor 
dots would randomly, and independently, undergo brief (500 ms) luminance 
decrements before returning to their original luminance. (Recall, that there is just 
one distractor color on each trial.) During a given trial, these luminance changes 
occurred between 2 and 5 times each for the target colored dots and the 
distractor colored dots. Finally, on the “unattended” side, probe dots were 
presented for 100ms at interstimulus intervals (i.e., between luminance changes 
of the target dots and distractor dots) that varied randomly from 217 to 700 ms. 
Observers were instructed to ignore the unattended side and not respond to the 
probe dots. Each cloud of probe dots was homogenous in color. Probe dot 
clouds could appeared in any of the seven possible colors in randomized order. 
Observers completed 125 trials total.   
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experimental sessions were performed in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and 
electrically shielded experimental booth. Stimuli were shown using an Epson 
PowerLite Home Cinema 3000 projector. Stimuli were back projected through a 
hole outside the room onto a 76 cm x 76 cm projector screen inside the room. 
The pixel screen resolution was set to 1024 x 768, which resulted in a projected 
screen size of approximately 36 cm by 27 cm. Stimulus presentation, timing, and 
response recording were controlled by a Dell PC running under Windows, using 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) for Matlab (Mathworks, Inc).  The screen was set 
at an approximate viewing distance of 70 cm from the seated participant.  
  
EEG data were sampled at 500 Hz. Data were online referenced to Cz and later 
were offline referenced to the average of all channels. Eye movements were 
measured through the two frontal eye channels (FP1 and FP2). All offline EEG 
and ERP data analyses were conducted through EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 
2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) toolboxes for Matlab. Timing 
of the stimulus presentation and event codes were corrected using a 
photodiode. Continuous EEG data were first filtered offline with a band pass of 
0.01–80 Hz. Trials with eye movements, eye blinks, or excessive muscle 
movements were excluded from the analysis. Epochs began 100 milliseconds 
before the probe stimulus presentation and ended 600 milliseconds after the 
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beginning of the presentation. Artifact free ERPs were time-locked to the 
presentation of the probe stimulus display.  
  
Data were analyzed from four spatially contiguous electrodes in each 
hemisphere (P3, P4, P7, and P8), which overlapped with the channels used on a 
different EEG system and montage in previous work (Moher et al., 2014). All 
analyses were performed on an average of the contralateral activity to probes in 
all 4 channels.  We examined two attentional ERP components: the P100 and 
the P200. We also examined an additional sustained positive component from 
300-600 milliseconds. This late sustained positive component overlaps with 
many other memory-like components. For example, it overlaps in electrode 
placement and time signature with the contralateral delay activity (CDA) (Vogel, 
McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005), the sustained posterior contralateral 
negativity (SPCN) (Fahrenfort, Grubert, Olivers, & Eimer, 2017), the late positive 
component (LPC) (Curran & Cleary, 2003), along with the more the recent 
positive contralateral delay activity CDAp (Feldmann-Wüstefeld & Vogel, 2018). 
In lieu of creating an additional naming scheme for this ERP component, we will 
refer to this component by its descriptive nature as the late sustained 
contralateral positivity. Due to the nature of the probe stimuli in this task, we 
only analyzed neural responses that were contralateral to the probe displays 
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(similar to the work above and previous work by Moher et al., 2014). This is 
because the ipsilateral side would pick up a mix of complicated signal from the 
attended/relevant side. Therefore, the cleanest signal for our design is to only 
consider neural responses contralateral to the probe display. To measure the 
P100 for each condition, we took a mean amplitude over the 40-150 
milliseconds time window after the probe was presented. For the P200 we 
examined from 200-240 millisecond and for the late sustained contralateral 
positivity we examined from 300-600 milliseconds. We included the late 
sustained contralateral positivity in the analysis because we were interested in 
whether the dynamic nature of the changing distractor stimuli would result in 
sustained activity after each probe. The presence of such activity, particularly 
differential activity for proposedly “inhibited” distractors, would suggest that 
observers create an inhibitory attentional set a given trial period (since trials 
were long, ~15 seconds). Finally, we also included the P200 in the analysis, since 
it has been previously suggested to reflect selection through distractor feature 
suppression (Philips & Takeda, 2009). 
 
Behavioral Results 
Behavioral results revealed that the average accuracy for the detection of target 
luminance changes was 70% and the false alarm rate (i.e., incorrect responses to 
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distractor colored dots dimming) was 12%. This resulted in a d prime (d’) of 1.81. 
In addition to measuring overall d’ performance, we also found an interesting 
effect of repeated distractor colored probes, in the uncued field, on task 
performance. We examined whether having been recently exposed to either 1, 
2, or 3 repetitions of different distractor colored probes on the unattended side 
(i.e., any of the five possible distractor colors assigned to a given participant), 
prior to making a response, would influence behavioral performance. To be 
clear, the brief dimming of the cloud distractor dots on the attended side may 
be preceded by numerous events. For example, these events might include: the 
dimming of the cloud of target dots, the presentation of a probe dot cloud in a 
distractor color on the unattended side, or the presentation of a probe cloud in 
either the neutral or target color on the unattended side. We looked at the three 
events preceding the dimming of the distractor dots on the attended side and 
found that overall performance (i.e., d primes) increased as a function of the 
number of distractor probes that were presented in the preceding three events 
prior to a response. Specifically, we demonstrate that if an observer was 
presented with three distractor probes prior to any given response (i.e., a target 
dimming, which would result in a button press or a distractor dimming, which 
would result in withholding a response unless they false alarmed) they 
performed significantly better compared to when only one distractor probe or 
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two distractor probes were presented. To evaluate this, we performed a 
repeated measures ANOVA on the number of distractor probes presented prior 
to a response. We found a significant effect on behavioral performance of the 
number of probes presented prior to a response, F(2, 82) = 20.43, p < 0.001, 
partial eta = 0.333. A significant linear effect was found, where performance (i.e., 
d’) increased as a function of the number of distractor probes that were 
presented (p < 0 .001). Paired t-tests revealed all three probe conditions were 
significantly different from one another (ps < 0.05), with performance increasing 
as a function of the number of distractor probes that were presented (1 
distractor probe d’=1.72, 2 distractor probes d’=1.82, 3 distractor probes 
d’=2.07). 
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Geisser corrected. There was a significant main effect of hemifield, 
F(1,41)=10.14, p = 0.003, ηP2 = 0.2 but no interaction between hemifield and 
probe type (p = 0.85). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean P100 
amplitudes associated with the presentation of target and neutral colored 
probes did not differ from one another, p = 0.71. However, mean P100 
amplitudes associated with distractor probes were significantly different from 
target (p = 0.035) and neutral probes (p = 0.047). 
 
P200 
We also analyzed P200 neural responses to probes. P200 amplitudes associated 
with the presentation of probe displays differed as a function of the type of 
probe display (e.g., target color, distractor colors, or neutral color). ERP results 
revealed a main effect of probe type on mean P200 amplitudes, F(2, 82) = 3.50, 
p = .046, ηP2 = 0.08, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. There was a no significant 
main effect of hemifield and no interaction between hemifield and probe type 
(ps > 0.11). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean P200 amplitudes 
associated with the presentation of target and neutral colored probes did not 
differ from one another, p = 0.84. However, mean P200 amplitudes associated 
with distractor probes were significantly different from target (p = 0.043) and 
neutral probes (p = 0.004). 
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Late Sustained Contralateral Positivity 
Finally, we analyzed the Late Sustained Contralateral Positivity in neural 
responses to probes. The Late Sustained Contralateral Positivity amplitudes 
associated with the presentation of probe displays again differed as a function of 
the type of probe display (e.g., target color, distractor colors, or neutral color). 
ERP results revealed a main effect of probe type on mean Late Sustained 
Contralateral Positivity amplitudes, F(2, 82) = 5.27, p = .012, ηP2 = 0.11, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. There was a no significant main effect of 
hemifield and no interaction between hemifield and probe type (ps > 0.54). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean Late Sustained Contralateral 
Positivity amplitudes associated with the presentation of target and neutral 
colored probes did not differ from one another, p = 0.58. However, mean Late 
Sustained Contralateral Positivity amplitudes associated with distractor probes 
were significantly different from target (p = 0.01) and neutral probes (p = 0.001). 
 
Discussion 
We set out to better understand the role that distractor inhibition plays in early 
feature-based attention. Moher et al. (2014) found that distractor feature 
information, not target feature information, drives early feature-based attention. 
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However, in their experiments they had a single consistent target feature and a 
single consistent distractor feature. Therefore, it may be the case that when 
these types of features are held constant, the inhibition of distractor features is 
utilized over enhancement of target features. Our goal for this study was to 
create a situation that would bias the utility of early target feature information, in 
hopes of creating a situation where target feature enhancement would be most 
likely. To do this, we created a situation where target feature information was 
consistent by having participants only attend to a single target color throughout 
the whole experiment. In contrast, distractor feature information in our 
experiment was inconsistent due to the fact that we had five possible distractor 
colors. We increased the inconsistency of this information by randomly varying 
the to-be-ignored distractor feature from trial-to-trial. Therefore, if it is the case 
that target feature enhancement can drive early feature information, we have 
given it every opportunity to do so.  
 
Across three ERP components related to attention and memory, we found 
differences in neural activity related to the presentation of uncued/unattended 
probe dot clouds. Surprisingly, we found that even though the target color 
feature remained constant throughout a given participant’s experience, probes 
in this color were treated the same, neurally, as probes that never even 
    
	 149 
appeared in the actively attended task. Additionally, not only did we find that 
the target features were not enhanced beyond that of a neutral feature that was 
never part of the to-be-attended task, but also to our surprise we found that the 
dynamic changing distractor features, on average, resulted in very different 
neural signatures compared to the target and neutral features. Specifically, we 
found that there was increased P100 and P200 activity for distractor colored 
probes, compared to neutral probes and target probes, which didn’t different 
from one another. Additionally, we found a differential Late Sustained 
Contralateral Positivity to distractor colored probes compared to both target 
probes and neutral probes. These results taken together suggest that differential 
cognitive processes are occurring for distractor features compared to target 
features. Moreover, since neutral colored probes were never part of the actual 
attended task, it seems that target feature probes are not treated any different 
than a color that was never directly interacted with. Taken together, and 
borrowing the logic from Moher et al. (2014), it seems that distractor features 
are critical in facilitating early feature-based attention.  
 
Previous work on the P100 (Moher et al., 2014; Zhang and Luck, 2009) has 
demonstrated that it is sensitive to early feature-based attention. Additionally, 
other work has demonstrated the P200 component is related to early sensory 
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gating that discards irrelevant information to aid attentional processing (Lijffijt et 
al., 2009). While both of these components and their proposed functions 
support the previous conclusions by Moher et al. (2014) and the present 
conclusions that distractor information, rather than target information, facilitated 
early visual attention in our task, the question remains: why do we see a memory 
component in the present results when the previous work from Moher et al. 
(2014) and the two distractor ERP experiment (above) did not find such a 
difference? One possibility is that because all of the previous work on this topic, 
including Zhang and Luck (2009), utilized a specific consistent attentional 
mapping for the roles of which color was the target and which were distractors 
(for a given participant), there would be minimal need to store these features in 
working memory. Since the present task had different distractor colors from trial 
to trial, it could be the case that this memory component is indicative of an 
inhibitory strategy of keeping these to-be-ignored distractor colors in working 
memory perhaps for the purpose of preparing for rapid disengagement from the 
distractors that are vying for attention (Moher & Egeth, 2012). Previous work has 
shown that the CDA (Vogel et al., 2005) and the SPCN (Zhang, Zhou, & Martens, 
2009) can both be sensitive to items that are currently being ignored. 
Furthermore, our behavioral data analysis on the false alarm rate increasing as a 
function of distractor probes suggests that the more distractor probes that were 
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presented prior to a distractor dot cloud dimming on the attended side, the 
easier it is to ignore (and withhold a response to) the distractor dot clouds 
dimmings. If the Late Sustained Contralateral Positivity that we see is related to 
the distractor features being stored in working memory, as seems to be the case 
from our ERP results, then this could account for why we seen a reduction in 
false alarm rate as the number of prior distractor probe presentations: because 
the sustained memory signal from those probes allow for easier inhibition.  
 
Finally, why do we see a positive increase in the P100 for the distractor probes 
compared to the target and neutral probes, which is the opposite directional 
difference that was found in both previous studies? The difference seems to be 
related to the current task demands, which are very different from the previous 
work. In all previous work on this paradigm, the relationship between the target 
and distractor information remained constant for a given participant. 
Furthermore, we showed in our transfer task above (i.e., the behavioral follow-up 
to the EEG/ERP TSD paradigm experiment) that the inhibition seems to be 
possible only in relation to the target feature. In the current task, since the 
distractor information is inconsistent (i.e., each participant had five possible 
distractor colors), but the target information remains consistent throughout the 
experience (i.e., only one possible target color was used per participant), this 
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change in the relationship between target and distractor weighting could be the 
reason we see a change in directionality. As with most (arguably, if not all) 
attentional ERP studies, it is hard to determine whether a directionality 
difference meaningfully represents excitation or inhibition from the ERPs alone. 
Rather, the important conclusion from this work, again, seems to be related to 
the categorical role that those features played in the task: that the distractor 
information seems to be playing a more critical role to the present attentional 
processes, compared to the target information which was treated statistically 
identically to the neutral information (which never showed up in the task at all).   
 
Overall, our findings seem to demonstrate that even when distractor information 
is highly irregular, random, and is larger in quantity (i.e., more distractor colors 
than target colors), we don’t see any evidence of target enhancement. Rather, if 
anything, we find evidence pointed at the contrary: that distractor feature 
information facilitates early feature-based attention even when it is 
unpredictable and highly irregular. Thus, it seems that these findings provide 
additional evidence to the power of inhibition in early feature-based attention.  
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Chapter 4: Learned Dietary Goals Influence Distraction by Energy-dense Foods 
 
Chapter 4: Synopsis of Completed Experiments 
Recent work in the field of attention has shown an increased interest in goal-
driven attention. Specifically, as mentioned before there is a longstanding 
theoretical dichotomy between top-down attention and bottom-up attention (for 
review see Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Kim & Cave, 1999; Wolfe, 1994), the 
former being influenced by the current goals of the participant and the latter 
being influenced by the physical traits of the visual stimulus, Awh, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes (2012) argue for an alternative framework, goal-driven attention. 
Specifically, they suggest that the old dichotomy fails to account for selection 
biases that cannot be explained by current goals or the characteristics in a visual 
scene. To better understand the dimensions of goal-driven attention, we must 
understand how goals, specifically goals that are learned over a lifetime, 
influence how humans select information in the visual world.  
 
Much of the research investigating goal-driven attention utilizes goals 
developed through artificial training (e.g. red stimuli are worth $1.00). However, 
human lives are full of goals with a timeframe ranging from milliseconds to eons 
(i.e., evolutionary biases). Therefore, there appears to be a large gap in the 
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literature on whether the nature of a goal (e.g., its point in the timeline) 
influences attentional deployment in different ways and whether the 
mechanisms that support these natural, long-term, goal states function in 
different ways. What kind of natural goals, that are learned over a life time, 
might strongly influence attention? 
 
High-fat foods are some of the most desirable foods due to their high 
palatability (Drewnowski, 1997). Previous work from the nutrition literature has 
found that images of energy-dense foods are highly attentionally demanding 
(Graham, Hoover, Ceballos, & Komogortsev, 2011; Werthmann et al., 2011). 
Additionally, results suggest that these attention effects are stronger for obese 
individuals with higher BMI (Castellanos et al., 2009). While these studies 
typically use paradigms that ask observers to attend to a centralized image on 
the screen, there is a lack of understanding of how energy-dense foods capture 
our attention when they are not the current goal in a task. Specifically, are 
energy-dense foods distracting in our daily life and, if so, how do learned goals 
related to eating energy-dense foods influence attentional prioritization? 
 
The information that we attend to has a large impact on what we will learn from 
the world around us. Specifically, information that we learn, about foods in our 
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environment impacts our food choices and dietary intake, which in turn affects 
nutritional and health outcomes. Understanding the relationship between 
attention and food is especially important in light of the increasing rates of over-
weight and obesity at all age levels in the US (Ogden et al., 2014). Addressing 
the neural and cognitive mechanisms of dietary behavior could also inform 
weight management interventions.  
 
To investigate the role that dietary learning plays in distraction by energy-dense 
foods, I developed a novel distraction paradigm which borrowed elements from 
Forster & Lavie, (2011).  In Experiment 6, we demonstrate that even when 
distractors are entirely irrelevant, participants were significantly more distracted 
by energy dense foods, compared to non-food objects and even low-fat foods. 
Additionally, in Experiment 7, we show the lability of these goal-states by having 
a separate set of participants consume a small amount of calorie-dense food 
prior to the task. The amount of distraction by the energy dense food images in 
this case was significantly reduced and no different than distraction by images of 
low-fat foods and images of non-food objects. In Experiment 8, we replicate the 
original findings but also examine whether the ingestion of energy-dense foods 
reduces attentional capture by all salient “interesting” stimuli. Our results 
demonstrate that the reduction in attentional capture after consuming calorie-
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dense food is stimulus specific (i.e., only influences capture by energy-dense 
foods). The basis of this part of the chapter was recently accepted for 
publication in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 
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Title: The capture of attention by entirely irrelevant pictures of calorie-dense 
foods 
Published in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review  
Abstract 
Inborn preference for palatable energy-dense food is thought to be an 
evolutionary adaptation. One way this preference manifests itself is through the 
control of visual attention. In the present study, we investigated how attentional 
capture is influenced by changes in naturally occurring goal-states, in this case 
desire for energy-dense (typically high fat and/or high sugar) foods. We 
demonstrate that even when distractors are entirely irrelevant, participants were 
significantly more distracted by energy-dense foods, compared to non-food 
objects and even low-energy foods. Additionally, we show the lability of these 
goal-states by having a separate set of participants consume a small amount of 
calorie-dense food prior to the task. The amount of distraction by the energy-
dense food images in this case was significantly reduced and no different than 
distraction by images of low-energy foods and images of non-food objects. 
While naturally occurring goal-states can be difficult to ignore; they are also 
highly flexible. 
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Introduction 
Dietary behavior in humans is complex and controlled by a variety of factors 
(Drewnowski, 1997a, 1997b). More than two-thirds of adults in the United States 
are overweight or obese (Ogden, Carroll, Kit, & Flegal, 2014). A much smaller 
number suffer from binge-eating disorder, bulimia nervosa, or anorexia nervosa 
and are severely emaciated (Hoek, 2006). A growing body of research on these 
issues considers the role of cognition in understanding eating (e.g., Hall, 2016; 
Shafran, Lee, Cooper, Palmer, & Fairburn, 2007).  One focus of such research is 
the attentional bias we have for energy-dense, typically high-fat and/or high-
sugar, food.   
 
Using variations of some standard cognitive tasks such as the dot probe task and 
various eye-tracking paradigms, previous research has shown an attentional bias 
for food over non-food objects, and, further, a bias for energy-dense food over 
food with little energy value (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998; Van Dillen, 
Papies, & Hofmann, 2013; Werthmann et al., 2011). For example, Mogg et al. 
(1998) used a dot probe task to demonstrate that people have an attentional 
bias for food words compared to non-food words. In their task, they presented 
subjects with two words, one above a fixation cross and one below. In one case, 
one of the words was a food related work (e.g., sandwich) paired with a neutral, 
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unrelated non-food word (e.g., chair), in another case they presented a transport 
related word (e.g., airplane) and an unrelated neutral word. They presented the 
word pairs for a brief period of time, followed by a dot probe that appeared in 
the place of one of the words. The subjects were told to respond as quickly as 
possible to the location of the dot probe. They found that when subjects were 
hungry, they responded faster to dot probes that were in the same previous 
position as food words compared to dot probes in the same previous position as 
non-food words.  
Recently, other researchers have used distraction paradigms as a way to better 
understand how food stimuli might distract us in the presence of other tasks. 
Critically, these studies are attempting to determine if food-related stimuli are 
more able to interfere with performance on an ongoing task than are non-food 
stimuli. Distraction paradigms test the ability of a subject to remain on task in 
the face of interference, that is, they involve executive control. The goal of that 
work has been to better understand the link between certain cognitive abilities 
and predilections and dietary outcomes (e.g., high BMI).  
 
Lessons about distraction from the attentional capture literature 
Some ideas relevant to the design of distraction experiments can be gleaned 
from the literature on attentional capture.  Psychologists have been interested in 
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how attention is controlled for well over a century (e.g., James, 1890/1950). 
Early research was concerned with how internal factors such as expectation and 
intention controlled where attention was directed. Recently, external factors, 
such as stimulus salience or the suddenness of onset of a stimulus, have been 
the subject of intensive investigation. These two lines of research are now 
described as pertaining to “goal-directed” and “stimulus-driven” attention. 
Research on stimulus-driven attention suggests that attention may be captured 
by particular external stimuli, and that this capture may be unintentional and 
directly contrary to the subject’s intentions (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Graves & 
Egeth, 2016; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Theeuwes, 1994, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 
1984). 
 
A major debate in the field of attention is concerned with the “automaticity” of 
attentional capture. An early critical example was provided by Folk et al. (1992). 
At the time conducted their experiments it had been well-established that a 
suddenly onset stimulus could attract attention, as could a salient singleton (e.g., 
the only red in a field of green elements) (Theeuwes, 1990; Yantis & Jonides, 
1984). Folk et al. (1992) were interested in whether attentional capture was 
modulated by the feature similarity between the salient distractor (the captor) 
and the target item. Their studies used a variant of the spatial cuing paradigm. 
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In their first experiment, abrupt-onset cues produced a validity effect for sudden 
onset targets. That is, reaction time was faster when the target appeared in the 
same location that the cue had just appeared in than when it appeared in a 
different location. However, sudden onset cues had no such effect when the 
target was based on a color discontinuity. In their second experiment the cue 
was a color discontinuity (a red stimulus presented among several white stimuli). 
In this case the cue produced a validity effect for color-defined targets but not 
for abrupt-onset targets. Note that the cues in their experiments were 
statistically non-predictive of the location of the target or the correct response. 
For this reason, it seems reasonable to think of them as irrelevant distractors. 
(We keep the Folk et al [1992] terminology of “cue” here, to avoid confusion for 
readers familiar with their research.) 
 
The double dissociation in the results of Folk et al. (1992) has been described as 
an example of contingent capture: attention is oriented toward (and perhaps 
captured by) non-predictive cues/distractors only when those cues/distractors 
are defined by features that match the defining features of the target. What this 
and subsequent studies made clear was that in order to determine whether 
capture by distractors is independent of attentional control settings, it is 
necessary to eliminate features from the potential distractor display that match 
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the defining features of the target (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk et al., 1992; Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1993). 
 
Forster and Lavie (2008) made a serious effort to determine if attentional capture 
could be observed when target-defining features were eliminated from potential 
distractors. In their study, subjects were presented with visual search displays 
near the center of a monitor. On each trial, they had to indicate whether an N or 
an X was present in a background of several other letters.  Subjects were 
requested to focus attention on this task. It was already known that letters 
presented in the periphery (and thus, due to their location, were task irrelevant) 
would interfere with task performance (e.g., Lavie, 1995). But letters are of the 
same category as targets and thus arguably, not totally irrelevant (see Lleras, 
Buetti, & Mordkoff, 2013 for an insightful discussion of this issue.) Therefore, 
Forster and Lavie (2008) presented on some trials a picture of an irrelevant 
cartoon character in the periphery. This stimulus slowed performance on the 
search task in a variety of conditions across three experiments. This result was 
taken to support the idea that attention could be captured by entirely irrelevant 
distractors.  
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Forster and Lavie (2008) had eliminated several target-defining features from 
their stimuli (e.g., the target was central, the distractor was peripheral; the target 
was alphanumeric, the distractor was pictorial). However, Gibson and Kelsey 
(1998) have demonstrated that subjects also monitor displays for features other 
than just local, target-specific features. In particular, subjects may be set to 
detect features that signal the onset of the task-relevant target display as a 
whole. For the Forster and Lavie (2008) experiment, this means that the fact that 
the search display and the distractor both onset at the same time stands in the 
way of considering the distractor being totally irrelevant to the task. To 
circumvent this problem, Forster and Lavie (2011) modified the procedure of 
their earlier paper. The central task involved successive judgments about a 
central matrix of letters and digits that remained static and visible for several 
seconds. During this time, dynamic (i.e., suddenly onset) peripheral distractor 
pictures were shown. They still interfered with performance, thus establishing 
that totally irrelevant distractors can capture attention, even when their onset is 
differentiated from that of the relevant stimuli. 
 
Bridging the gap: combining attentional capture paradigms with studies on food 
distraction 
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The experiments described above point to critical methodological concerns that 
need to be addressed when we try to determine whether some stimulus class is 
acting as a distractor or is more distracting than some other stimulus class.  It 
would appear that existing studies of distraction by food-related stimuli have not 
fully addressed these concerns. As an example, consider an adaptation of a 
method previously used to examine the distracting power of emotional stimuli, 
the attentional blink paradigm (e.g., Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005; Most, 
Smith, Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 2007; Most & Wang, 2011; Smith, Most, Newsome, 
& Zald, 2006). Specifically, in studies using the attentional blink paradigm in 
which the potentially interfering stimuli included pictures of food, accuracy of 
detection of the target picture was lower when the distractor stimulus was food 
than when it was a neutral stimulus (Neimeijer, de Jong, & Roefs, 2013; Piech, 
Pastorino, & Zald, 2010). Further, the magnitude of the effect depended on the 
subject’s state of hunger (Piech et al., 2010). Although their results are both 
interesting and plausible, these studies use methods that create a task situation 
where the distracting stimuli share critical features with the target stimuli, and 
thus are relevant to the current goals of the participant. 
 
Putting this more generally, in the attentional blink paradigm all stimuli 
(including the targets and distractors) are typically of the same type (e.g., 
    
	 165 
colored pictures), characterized by sudden onsets, and share the same spatial 
location. It may not be possible to remove all such shared features (all stimuli, 
for example, are being shown in a laboratory), but one can at least try to 
maximize the distinctiveness of targets and distractors. To provide a strong test, 
experimenters should make the irrelevant stimuli as unrelated to the task as 
possible. 
 
Our goal for the present experiments is two-fold. First, by adapting the previous 
paradigm from Forster and Lavie (2011), we presented participants with a novel 
task where the food images were truly irrelevant to the task at hand. Second, by 
varying the nutritional content of these irrelevant distractors we could address a 
gap in the literature that has failed to investigate whether all food that is 
irrelevant to the current task captures attention, or only foods that are the most 
desirable (again, something that would increase our understanding of food 
behavior in the real world).   
 
To accomplish this, we assessed differences in the distracting power of images 
of energy-dense foods (e.g., high fat, high calorie), low-energy foods, and 
ordinary objects (see Figure 4.1) by adapting a variant of the task used by 
Forster and Lavie (2011). Specifically, subjects were shown a set of four 
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alphanumeric characters that they were to classify, one at a time, as digits or 
letters by pressing one of two response keys. At some time during the execution 
of this task, on a subset of the trials, a picture was shown; the picture was 
irrelevant to the classification task and no response of any kind was required to 
it.  Note three key features of the task. First, by their natures the pictures and 
the alphanumeric characters were distinct, both semantically and perceptually.  
Second, they appeared in distinctive locations; the characters were central and 
the pictures peripheral. Third, the picture was not presented until the subject 
had already responded to the first of the characters. At that moment the 
suddenly-onset picture had dynamic properties, while the array of alphanumeric 
characters was static (Folk et al., 1993; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998). It has been 
shown that even when these three features are in place pictorial stimuli can 
capture attention (Forster & Lavie, 2011). The question we ask in Experiment 6 is 
whether the magnitude of attentional capture varies with the energy value of the 
stimuli depicted in the pictures.  Finding that it does so vary, in Experiment 7 we 
explored the lability of the real-world goals that drive attentional capture and 
their dynamic relationship with attentional capture by giving subjects a small 
amount of energy-dense food to eat before they perform the experimental task. 
In Experiment 8, we aimed to replicate the key findings from Experiments 6 and 
7, thus half of the subjects got a small amount of energy-dense food before the 
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We ran 18 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate students and community 
members (mean age = 19.4 years; 7 male, 11 female) with normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision. We based our sample size on 
two criteria: (1) previous literature and (2) a power analysis. Previous work 
investigating attention and bias toward food images has used groups of 18 
subjects to look at effects similar to ours (Castellanos et al., 2009). In addition, 
we conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) which revealed 
that given an effect size of ηp2 = .14, based on what related studies have 
previously found (e.g., (Veenstra, de Jong, Koster, & Roefs, 2010) , at least 18 
participants would be required to have 95% power to detect the effect in our 
design. Research was performed with the approval of and in accordance with 
the Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants in all experiments. 
 
Apparatus 
Experimental sessions were carried out on a Dell Precision T-3400 2.33-GHz 
computer. Stimuli were presented on a Dell 1708 FP monitor. Stimulus 
presentation was performed using programs written in MATLAB and using the 
PsychToolbox software (Brainard, 1997). The screen had a refresh rate of 60 Hz, 
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and the resolution of the screen was 1,280 × 1,024 pixels. Participants sat at a 
viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. 
 
 
Stimuli 
Each trial contained a matrix of 4 symbols surrounding a central fixation cross. 
The fixation cross subtended 0.5° of visual angle vertically and horizontally. Each 
of the four symbols was positioned in one of 4 quadrants around the fixation 
cross (see Fig. 4.1). The distance from fixation to the nearest part of a symbol 
was 2.2° of visual angle. Symbols subtended 0.5° by 0.8°. Finally, on a subset of 
trials distractor images would appear randomly above or below the central 
matrix for a brief time (125 milliseconds). These images subtended 5° to 9° 
horizontally and 6° to 9° vertically (with at least 1.5° between the distractor 
image and the nearest symbol).  
 
Design and Procedure 
On each of the 600 trials participants were presented with a centralized 
discrimination task, adapted from Forster and Lavie (2011). Each of the four 
items in the matrices shown in Fig. 4.1 are equally likely to be a letter or a 
number (chosen from 1-9 or X, R, T, J, L, P, N, F, B).  Participants were shown 
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one matrix at a time and were instructed to report, in ordinary reading order, 
whether each symbol in the matrix is a letter or a number, responding as quickly 
as possible while also trying to be accurate. When a distractor image was 
presented, it appeared prior to the participants’ response to the second, third, 
or fourth item. Thus the matrix on which the task was being performed was static 
while the distractor image had the dynamic property of sudden onset.  
 
Distractors appeared on a random 50% of trials. For distractor-present trials, a 
third of these trials contained an image of energy-dense food, a third contained 
an image of a low-energy food, and a third contained an image of a non-food 
object. The order of presentation of all images was randomized. Images of food 
and objects were taken from the Food.pics database (Blechert, Meule, Busch, & 
Ohla, 2015). The database provides the macronutrient information for each 
image in the database, as well as physical image characteristics such as color 
composition, contrast, brightness, size, and complexity; this allowed us to 
control for any physical differences between distractor category sets. Images 
that were taken from this database were categorized into energy-dense foods, 
low-energy foods, and non-food objects, which were then compared on each of 
these physical characteristics using t-tests. All t-tests resulted in p-values > 0.05, 
indicating that these image categories did not differ from one another on these 
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physical image characteristics. Altogether there were 100 images of energy-
dense foods, 100 images of low-energy foods, and 176 images of non-food 
objects available for the study. For each participant, we used all 100 images 
from the two food categories and 100 images, randomly selected for each 
subject, from the non-food category.  Thus, for all distractor present trials, a 
novel distractor image was presented (avoiding any effects of familiarity). 
Participants completed 600 trials. Reaction times and accuracy on the task were 
recorded. 
 
 
Data Analysis 
We removed trials where reaction times that were more than 2 standard 
deviations above or below the mean per subject. This accounted for 4% on 
average across all experiments. We also removed trials on which subjects made 
errors on the digit-letter discrimination task; rates of such errors across all 
experiments were 4% on average. We also removed responses to symbols 
(within the four item matrix) where subjects made an error to the symbol 
immediately prior to a response. Due to the type of response in this paradigm, 
participants respond quickly to items within the matrix and if they incorrectly 
responded to an item due to a motor error (e.g., pressed the letter button but 
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they meant to press the number button), this might cause some delay on the 
subsequent button press. If a distractor was presented, this delay would appear 
to take longer due to distractor processing, but in reality, would reflect distractor 
processing plus the cost of processing the previous motor error. Therefore, we 
removed these trials, which accounted for 3% of trials. The first 10 trials of every 
session were considered practice and were removed.  
We created an “attentional capture” score to assess the amount of distraction 
during the task. Specifically, we categorized trials into four types: energy-dense 
food distractor present, low-energy food distractor present, non-food distractor 
present, and distractor absent. We used response times on distractor absent 
trials as a reference point and subtracted those response times from the 
response times for the equivalent lag and position (recall that the distractor was 
never presented prior to the response to the first item, similar to Forster and 
Lavie, 2011) in each of the distractor present conditions. The remaining value is 
the reaction time cost of distraction for each of the distractor image types. 
 
Results 
As shown in Fig. 4.2 (black bars), participants in Experiment 6 were more 
distracted by images of energy-dense foods, than by images of non-food 
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supported by the results of statistical analysis. We first conducted a one-way 
within-subjects ANOVA on the data from Experiment 6. We found a main effect 
of image type, F(2,34) = 6.786, p = 0.003, ηp2 = .29, Geisser–Greenhouse 
corrected for nonsphericity. Additional post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
there was significantly more distraction by images of energy-dense foods 
compared to low-energy foods and non-food objects (ps < 0.05, Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons)1. Distraction by images of low-energy food 
and images of non-food objects did not differ (p > 0.05). 
 
It is reassuring that the Food.pics database included physical characteristics for 
the images we used and that we were able to ascertain that there were no 
significant differences in color composition, contrast, brightness, size, or 
complexity among the three categories of stimuli we compared.  However, that 
is not an exhaustive listing of visual features and so there was a lingering 
question about whether the striking difference we found in attentional capture 
scores might not be due to some other perceptual feature and not the 
                                                
1 To ascertain whether all of the classes of stimuli used created positive attentional capture, we 
ran two-tailed, one-sample t-tests on the scores in every condition for Experiments 6, 7, and 8 
against the null hypothesis of zero effect. For Experiment 6 all ps < 0.025, for Experiment 7 all ps 
< 0.015, and for Experiment 8, all ps < 0.01. Thus, these results suggest all classes of stimuli 
caused some degree of attentional capture/disruption. 
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“meaning” of the pictures in terms of the fat content/energy density of the 
depicted stimuli. It struck us that it would be useful to manipulate some factor 
unrelated to the perceptual features of the stimuli that might be expected to 
influence the degree to which the energy-dense stimuli captured attention. 
Therefore, we decided to replicate Experiment 6, but with the addition that all 
subjects would be given a small snack immediately before participating. If it is 
the case that our difference in distraction is due to the hedonic value of energy-
dense foods, we may be able to modulate that by changing the goal state 
related to these items by giving them some energy-dense food prior to the task.  
 
Experiment 7 
Participants 
Similar to Experiment 6, we ran 18 Johns Hopkins University undergraduate 
students and community members (mean age = 19.2 years; 5 male, 13 female) 
with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision. 
Methods 
Experiment 7 was essentially identical to Experiment 6 with the exception that 
the 18 new subjects consumed their choice of two “fun sized” candy bars (each 
bar weighed about 17.3 g). The following candy bar types were used due to 
their high fat content: Snickers, Kit Kat, and Reese’s Peanut Butter cups. The 
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average nutritional contents of two “fun sized” candy bars was 173.3 calories, 
9.1g total fat, and 17.7g sugar. Candy bars were given to participants prior to 
participating in the task while they were filling out forms. Candy bars were 
completely consumed prior to the task.  
 
Results 
As shown in Fig. 4.2 (light gray bars), this separate set of participants in 
Experiment 7 was not more distracted by images of energy-dense foods, than 
by images of non-food objects and low-energy foods. A subsequent one-way 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed no main effect of image type, F(2,34) = 0.062, 
p = 0.908, Geisser–Greenhouse corrected for nonsphericity.  
 
Experiment 7 was run after Experiment 6, and therefore, subjects were not 
assigned randomly to receive a snack or no snack before the test. Nevertheless, 
we were not aware of any obvious reasons why the subjects in the two 
experiments would have differed systematically (e.g., all subjects signed up for 
the studies in our university subject pool), and so we performed an overall 
analysis of variance combining the results of the two experiments. 
 
We conducted a mixed-design two-way ANOVA that included the results of 
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both Exps. 1 and 2. There was a main effect of image type, F(2,68) = 3.414, p = 
0.04, ηp2 = .09, Geisser–Greenhouse corrected for nonsphericity, and, critically, a 
significant interaction between image type and experiment F(2,68) = 4.517, p = 
0.015, ηp2 = .12, Geisser–Greenhouse corrected for nonsphericity. Additional 
post-hoc comparisons on the interaction revealed that consuming the energy-
dense food (Experiment 7) significantly decreased the amount of capture by 
images of energy-dense foods compared to not consuming the energy-dense 
food (Experiment 6). Specifically, we found that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the attentional capture scores for distraction by images 
of energy-dense foods when comparing across experiments (see the “Energy-
dense Food” black and gray bars in Fig. 4.2, p = 0.029, Bonferroni corrected for 
multiple comparisons). This was supported by comparing the three image types 
within each experiment. For Experiment 6 (black bars in Fig. 4.2), there was 
significantly more distraction by images of energy-dense foods compared to 
low-energy foods and non-food objects (ps < 0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons). For Experiment 7 (gray bars), there were no statistically significant 
differences. 
Experiment 8 
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In Experiment 8, we wanted to explore the limits of the effects found in 
Experiments 6 and 7 and replicate the key findings. In particular, we wanted to 
determine whether consuming energy-dense foods decreases attentional capture 
to other attractive stimuli, or whether these effects were specific to food-related 
stimuli. Previous research has demonstrated that emotional faces can capture 
attention (Hodsoll, Viding, & Lavie, 2011; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; 
Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). Therefore, if consuming energy-dense foods 
generally reduces attentional capture by any interesting stimuli, we should see a 
differential effect for distractor images of emotional faces as well as energy-dense 
foods compared to non-food objects. Experiment 8 included distractor images of 
faces depicting fear and disgust which were taken from the Warsaw set of 
emotional facial expression pictures  (Olszanowski et al., 2015). To keep the 
experiment acceptably short, we eliminated the low-energy food stimuli. 
 
Participants 
In Experiment 8 we ran two groups of 32 Johns Hopkins University 
undergraduate students and community members (mean age = 19.5 years; 15 
male, 49 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal 
color vision. Using the results from the mixed analysis in Experiments 6 and 7, a 
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power analysis via G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) revealed that given an effect size 
of ηp2 = .09, a minimum of 28 participants per group would be required to have 
95% power to detect the effect in our design. As before, participants received 
extra credit in undergraduate courses or monetary payment as compensation, 
and all gave informed consent. The Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional 
Review Board approved the protocol. 
 
Methods 
As the combination of Experiments 6 and 7 in a single analysis was not ideal, we 
ran the snack and no-snack conditions as a true experiment with subjects 
randomly assigned to the two conditions. Experiment 8 was similar to both 
Experiments 6 and 7 except the low-energy food image category was replaced 
with images of emotional faces.  Additionally, there were several small changes 
in procedure from the preceding experiments; to enhance distraction, the 
distracting pictures were shown on 33% of the trials instead of 50% and the 
number of trials was reduced to 540.  
Results 
As shown in Fig. 4.3 (black bars), participants in Experiment 8 who did not 
consume the energy-dense food prior to the task were more distracted by 
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images of energy-dense foods, than by images of non-food objects and 
emotional faces. In contrast, when participants consumed the energy-dense 
food prior to the task, as shown further in Fig. 4.3 (gray bars), participants in 
Experiment 8 were not more distracted by images of energy-dense foods, than 
by images of non-food objects and emotional faces. The differences evident in 
Fig. 4.3 are supported by the results of statistical analysis.  We first conducted a 
mixed-design two-way ANOVA. There was a main effect of image type, F(2,124) 
= 3.281, p = 0.043, ηp2 = .05, Geisser–Greenhouse corrected for nonsphericity, 
and, again, a significant interaction between image type and whether or not 
subjects had an energy-dense snack before the test, F(2,124) = 4.143, p = 0.019, 
ηp
2 = .06, Geisser–Greenhouse corrected for nonsphericity. Additional post-hoc 
comparisons on the interaction revealed that consuming the energy-dense food 
(gray bars) significantly decreased the amount of capture by images of energy-
dense foods compared to not consuming the energy-dense food (black bars). 
Specifically, we found that there was a statistically significant difference in the 
attentional capture scores for distraction by images of energy-dense food when 
comparing across the two groups of subjects (see the “Energy-dense Food” 
black and gray bars in Fig. 4.3, p = 0.02, Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons). This was supported by comparing the three image types within 
each group of subjects. For subjects who did not receive an energy-dense snack 
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(black bars in Fig. 4.3), there was significantly more distraction by images of 
energy-dense foods compared to non-food objects and emotional faces (ps < 
0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons). While it was surprising that emotional 
faces were not any more distracting than everyday objects, this may be due to 
the effort that was made to make our pictures entirely irrelevant to the task at 
hand. Finally, for subjects who did get such a snack (gray bars), there were 
no statistically significant differences (ps > 0.05). 
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spatial attention is just one way to account for reaction time costs due to 
distraction. Alternatively, some reaction time differences due to distraction may 
result from “filtering costs,” which do not require a shift of attention to a 
distracting item, but rather, only a delay of the shift of attention to the relevant 
item, i.e., a disruption and delay of attention (e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998). 
One could argue that these disruption costs are not precisely attentional capture 
and that terminology should be reserved for spatially driven attentional effects. 
In any event, determining whether our effect is better described as capture or 
filtering cost is well beyond the scope of this paper (see Folk [2013] for the 
current state of this debate). Rather, the goal for this work has been from the 
beginning to determine whether when these interesting food stimuli are entirely 
irrelevant to the task at hand, they do cause some kind of disruption; whether 
that be spatially driven or some kind of delay and disruption. Importantly, these 
results demonstrate, for the first time, evidence for distraction by foods that 
have a higher energy density, even when they are entirely irrelevant to the 
current task. Critically, they are irrelevant in three distinct ways: (1) their semantic 
content (i.e., the main task involved responding to simple letters, not images), 
(2) their temporal properties (i.e., they showed up after participants had already 
begun responding the static central task), and (3) their spatial location (i.e., they 
never overlapped with any location that contained task relevant information). 
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Further, we demonstrate that even though these images are entirely irrelevant, 
these distraction effects are still sensitive to recent changes in goal-states (i.e., 
only distraction to the images of energy-dense foods were influenced by 
consuming candy). 
 
It seems unlikely that the difference between energy-dense food and our other 
stimuli (food of low caloric density, objects, and faces) is due to bottom-up 
salience.  For one thing, we were able to take advantage of the stimulus 
characterizations provided in the Food.pics database to control for many low 
level differences among distractor categories.  For another, if perceptual 
salience were the key factor in the difference between calorie dense food and 
the other stimuli, it is difficult to see why ingesting a candy bar would eliminate 
that effect. Also, although we have no data on this point, it is worth doing the 
following thought experiment.  Imagine a Kalahari bushman who has not had 
any contact with Western foods.  Is there any reason to think that a picture of a 
pizza would be any more salient than a picture of a baseball, or a picture of a 
candy bar any more salient than a picture of a computer chip? These items are 
unfamiliar and, in the case of the two foods, there has been no opportunity for 
the development of motivational salience through the rewarding experience of 
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eating them (Nijs & Franken, 2012; Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 
2013). 
 
While it seems reasonable to dismiss perceptual salience as a key factor, with 
real world stimuli like foods it is harder to figure out the relative roles of 
intentional top-down processes and reward history.  Indeed, it seems likely that 
both may be operative (Lynn & Shin, 2015; Ristic & Landry, 2015).  In this 
connection it is interesting to contrast the performance of our subjects with 
those in a study in which monetarily rewarded stimuli maintained their ability to 
serve as potent distractors for several months following the cessation of reward 
(Anderson et al., 2013). Why did ingesting a candy bar so quickly eliminate the 
greater attention-capturing power of energy-dense foods? Eating a candy bar 
amounts to just another “trial” in our life-long “training” on the rewarding 
effects of energy-dense food.  Why should it decrease rather than increase 
attentional capture?  The answer, obviously, has to do with motivational state 
(Piech et al., 2010; Robinson & Berridge, 2013). Recent research has shown that 
when an ordinarily rewarding stimulus (chocolate) is devalued, attention was no 
longer oriented toward reward-associated stimuli (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & 
Sander, 2014).  Note, however, that devaluation in that case was accomplished 
by having subjects eat chocolate until they were satiated which, on average, 
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involved ingestion of 62.5 g of chocolate.  This is substantially more the two 
small candy bars our subjects ate (approximately 30g).  
 
More broadly, there is a substantial literature in which subjects are given 
“preloads” of food prior to behavioral testing to assess the effect on attention 
to food-related stimuli or to actual consumption of food (e.g., Herman & Mack, 
1975; Branton et al, 2014). It is especially interesting that some investigations of 
the effects of preloads do not involve the actual consumption of food but are 
essentially cognitive manipulations such as arranging for subjects to see, smell, 
or think about palatable foods (e.g., Rogers & Hill, 1989; Papies, Stroebe, & 
Aarts, 2008; Jansen & van den Hout, 1991; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 
2003).  While the amount of palatable food we gave our subjects is on the low 
side for actual to-be-consumed preloads, it is obviously more than the amount 
given in the studies that used strictly cognitive manipulations.   
 
It seems clear that it would be fruitful in future experiments to systematically 
manipulate motivational state (e.g., hours since eating), size of serving, as well as 
the nature of the “serving” (e.g., normal food, low calorie food, or mere visual or 
olfactory presence of food). Similarly, it would be useful to compare the effects 
of such manipulations on the bias towards foods (e.g., with dot probe or eye-
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tracking studies), the distracting power of food-related stimuli (for example with 
the task presented in this paper), and the actual consumption of food, as these 
may not be controlled by the same mechanisms. Finally, individual differences, 
in particular, the extent to which subjects may be categorized as normal or 
restrained eaters, should be considered, as the effects of preloads have been 
shown to be markedly different for these groups (e.g., Herman & Mack, 1975; 
Rogers & Hill, 1989). 
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Chapter 5: Redefining A Common Neural Marker of Attention 
 
Chapter 5: Synopsis of Completed Experiments 
The use of electroencephalography (EEG) to derive event-related potential (ERP) 
components for specific attentional events has become an increasingly popular 
method for investigating cognitive processes that are difficult to probe with only 
behavioral techniques. The N2pc is one component that has become a common 
measure for cognitive neuroscientists to establish attentional selection in a 
variety of experiments. In fact, many fields beyond psychology and 
neuroscience, such as clinical neuropsychology and medicine more broadly, 
have begun to use this component to better understand attentional processes. 
Since the classic study of Woodman and Luck (1999), this component is typically 
considered to represent the neural marker for shifts of spatial attention across 
space. However, the current findings from our study clearly demonstrate that the 
N2pc cannot reflect just an initial shift of attention, but in fact it reflects (1) only 
post-selection processing well beyond the initial shift of attention or (2) post-
selection processing plus the initial shift of attention. To demonstrate this, we 
conducted two ERP experiments (the second is a replication of the first, with 
additional controls). In our experiments, we had participants complete a visual 
detection task for a target stimulus (the letter E) and they were instructed to only 
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responded if it was present in the display. Critically, some displays only 
contained a similar distractor stimulus (the letter F which is similar to the target 
letter E) and some displays only contained a dissimilar distractor stimulus (the 
letter Q). If the N2pc were to reflect the initial shift of attention to a stimulus 
prior to any processing of that stimulus, then we should see similar N2pc 
waveforms (and amplitudes) for all conditions. However, if the N2pc were to 
reflect post-selection processing, this should result in different N2pc amplitudes 
depending on what stimulus was shown and how similar it is to the target 
stimulus. Importantly, we found that the N2pc showed a graded amplitude that 
decreased as a function of how similar the current stimulus was to the target 
item, where the largest amplitude occurred when the target was presented, 
followed by the similar distractor stimulus, and, lastly, the dissimilar distractor 
stimulus. Rather than representing just a shift of spatial attention, these results 
demonstrate that the N2pc also must reflect some form of post selection 
processing. Importantly, while we can show that there is some post-selection 
processing taking place, with typical N2pc paradigms like these and the nature 
of measuring ERPs we are unable to disentangle whether the N2pc solely 
reflects post-selection processing vs. post-selection processing plus some 
activity from the initial shift of attention. However, our goal for this work was 
only to demonstrate that a reframing of the cognitive processes that were 
    
	 191 
originally attributed to the N2pc (i.e., that it represents an initial shift of 
attention) is necessary.   
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Title: Redefining A Common Neural Marker of Attention 
In review at Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The use of electroencephalography (EEG) to derive event-related potential (ERP) 
components for specific attentional events has become an increasingly popular 
method for investigating cognitive processes that are difficult to probe with only 
behavioral techniques. The N2pc is one component that has become a common 
measure for cognitive neuroscientists to establish attentional selection. In 
general, this ERP component has become synonymous with an initial shift of 
attention. However, the large body of work utilizing the N2pc has yet to 
establish whether, in fact, it reflects the underlying cognitive processes related 
to an initial shift of attention or whether this component actually reflects a whole 
host of additional attentional processes that occur after selection. Here we 
examine the nature of the N2pc component by specifically probing whether the 
N2pc also reflects post-selection processing rather than just an initial shift of 
attention. While recording EEG, we had participants perform a visual detection 
task where we varied the similarity between a target stimulus and other non-
target stimuli. Our results revealed that the N2pc showed a graded amplitude 
that decreased as a function of how similar the current stimulus was to the target 
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item, where the largest amplitude occurred when the target was presented. 
These findings suggest that the N2pc must reflect either only post-selection 
processing occurring after an initial shift of attention, or at the very least the 
initial shift of attention plus post-selection processing. 
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Significance Statement 
To understand the underlying structure of processes involved in human visual 
attention, we need to understand how (1) information is initially selected and (2) 
how that information is subsequently processed. Recently, new advanced in 
electrophysiological measures have lead researchers to depend on a particular 
event-related potential component (i.e., the N2pc) as a neural marker of the 
initial shift of attention to a visual stimulus. While it has been widely accepted 
that this component reflects such properties, it has yet to be directly tested. Our 
findings show that this component cannot solely reflect the initial shift of 
attention, but rather, it reflects subsequent processing after that initial selection.  
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Introduction 
Visual attention is inherently capacity limited. While it may feel like we have 
conscious access to all of this visual input at once, in fact there is actually a 
limited subset of information we can process in a given moment. Among other 
things, this is why it is recommended to not text on a cellphone while driving. 
The primary limiting factor of attentional processing is selection. In order to 
process information, we must first select that visual input and then subsequently 
process it. In fact, it has been shown that in order to bind a group of features 
into an object, for identification, selection is required (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
 
While there has been a long standing debate about the nature of selection since 
William James (James, 1890/1950), more recently some of the debate has 
turned to understanding the neural mechanisms underlying this attentional 
process (Eimer & Kiss, 2010; Theeuwes, 2010).  The use of 
electroencephalography (EEG) to derive event-related potential (ERP) 
components for specific attentional events has become an increasingly popular 
method for investigating attentional processes that are difficult to probe with 
only behavioral techniques. The N2pc is one such component that has become 
a common measure for cognitive neuroscientists to establish attentional 
selection in a variety of experiments (for example see (Eimer, 1996; Luck & 
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Hillyard, 1994b; Mazza, Turatto, & Caramazza, 2009a)). Since the classic study of 
Woodman and Luck (Woodman & Luck, 1999), this component is typically 
considered to represent the neural marker for shifts of spatial attention. 
Moreover, it has been strongly argued that the N2pc not only occurs when there 
is a shift of spatial attention, but specifically it occurs when there is an initial shift 
of attention to a visual stimulus (Eimer & Kiss, 2007; Leblanc, Prime, & Jolicoeur, 
2008; Woodman & Luck, 1999). However, this characterization of the N2pc 
component has recently become the focus of theoretical debate (Eimer & Kiss, 
2010; Theeuwes, 2010). In contrast to the common interpretation that the N2pc 
reflects an initial shift of attention, we hypothesized that the N2pc is actually 
indicative of post-selection processing at the location of a visual stimulus. Here, 
we utilized EEG and behavioral measures (i.e., a visual detection task) across two 
experiments to investigate the nature of this component. Specifically, we 
developed a visual detection task (see Figure 5.1, upper left) that contained a 
to-be-identified object paired with a placeholder item on each trial (note: the to-
be-identified object was lateralized on two-thirds of trials which is the kind of 
display organization that is typically used to measure the N2pc). Participants 
were instructed to search for a target object (i.e., the letter “E”) and to respond 
as quickly as possible if it was presented. Critically, the to-be-identified object 
could be: (1) the target object, (2) a similar distractor (i.e., the letter “F”), or (3) a 
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dissimilar distractor (i.e., the letter “Q”). If it is the case that the N2pc does not 
reflect just an initial shift of attention, but rather reflects either post selection 
processing, or an initial shift plus post selection processing, then we should see 
that the N2pc is sensitive to modulations in the similarity between the current 
attentional template (i.e., what participants were looking for) and the presented 
stimulus.  
 
Results 
In Experiment 9, we presented participants (n=40, 18 male, ages 18-22, mean 
age = 20, one subject was removed due to a technical error) with a visual search 
task where they were instructed to search for the letter “E” (either mirrored or in 
the normal orientation) (see Figure 5.1, upper left). Critically, we had three types 
of trials: trials that contained the target stimuli, trials that contained a similar 
distractor stimuli (either a normal or mirrored “F”), and trials that contained a 
dissimilar distractor stimuli (either a normal or mirrored “Q”). Participants were 
asked to make a speeded response when they detected the letter “E” and to 
withhold a response for any other letter.  
 
Behavioral Results from Experiment 9 
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As shown in Figure 5.1 (lower left), we found that overall participants were very 
good at the task (average percent correct for target present trials was 98%). 
Crucially however, we found evidence that demonstrates that the manipulation 
of distractor similarity worked: correct rejections for similar distractor trials (when 
an “F” was present) were significantly lower, t(38) = 3.42, p < .002, than those 
for dissimilar distractor present trials (when a “Q” was present). Specifically, this 
suggests that participants found it much harder to withhold a response to the 
distractor “F” presentations compared to the distractor “Q”, suggesting that 
participants did in fact perceive the F to be more similar to the E. 
 
EEG Results from Experiment 9 
To investigate the effect of our stimulus condition (i.e., the different letters 
presented) we conducted a repeated measures one-way ANOVA for the mean 
amplitudes in the N2pc time window. As shown in Figure 5.1 (right side), our 
analysis revealed a main effect of stimulus condition, F(2,76) = 18.75, p < 0.001, 
np2= 0.33. Subsequent pairwise comparisons demonstrated that N2pcs to all 
three conditions are different from one another, ps < 0.03 (Bonferroni 
corrected). Importantly, we see in Figure 5.1 that the magnitude of the N2pc is 
in the order that would suggest post-selection processing: the largest N2pc is 
for trials that contain the target, followed by those that contain the similar 
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distractor, and then the lowest magnitude is for the dissimilar distractor. If the 
N2pc were indicative of only an initial shift of attention these N2pc amplitudes 
should all be similar.  
 
In addition to our N2pc findings, we also found a main effect across stimulus 
conditions for the sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) which has 
been suggested to reflect the encoding of stimulus information into visual 
working memory (Fahrenfort et al., 2017). For the SPCN time window we see a 
significant effect of the stimulus condition, F(2,76) = 5.07, p = 0.01, np2= 0.12. 
Critically, pairwise comparisons revealed that the averaged mean amplitude in 
dissimilar distractor Condition was significantly different from target Condition, p 
= .016 (Bonferroni corrected). Additionally, there was a slight trend suggesting 
that the SPCN was different for the dissimilar distractor Condition compared to 
the similar distractor Condition, p = .089 (Bonferroni corrected). This suggests 
that the participants may even have encoded whether these items were or 
weren’t the target (and that the similarity of the “E” vs. “F” conditions made 
that decision difficult).  
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Overall, the results from this initial experiment provide strong evidence 
supporting the notion that the N2pc is a ERP component that does not reflect 
the initial shift of attention to a particular stimulus, but rather it reflects post-
selection processing, or at the very least the combination of the two processes. 
However, since the N2pc is a lateralized component it might be the case that 
since our displays in Experiment 9 used a mid-line placeholder with a single 
lateral stimulus (e.g., (Hickey, Di Lollo, & McDonald, 2009)) this could have 
influenced the N2pc in an unanticipated manner.2 Therefore, to replicate our 
effects from Experiment 9 and to address issues of laterality, we ran an 
additional experiment where the stimulus and the placeholder were always 
lateralized (each randomly placed on the left and right respectively).  
 
Behavioral Results from Experiment 10 
In Experiment 10, we presented participants (n=32, 8 male, ages 18-25, mean 
age = 20) with a similar task to Experiment 9, except both the stimulus and 
placeholder for every trial were lateralized (see Figure 5.2, upper left). As shown 
in Figure 5.2 (lower left), we again found that, overall, participants were very 
good at the task (average percent correct for target present trials was 99%). We 
                                                
2 We would like to thank Martin Eimer for feedback and suggestions on this initial study. 
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again found corroborating evidence that demonstrates that our distractor 
similarity manipulation still worked: correct rejections for similar distractor trials 
(when an “F” was present) were significantly lower, t(31) = 2.91, p < .007, than 
those for dissimilar distractor present trials (when a “Q” was present).  
 
EEG Results from Experiment 10 
To investigate the effect of stimulus condition, we again conducted a repeated 
measures one-way ANOVA for the mean amplitudes in the N2pc time window. 
As shown in Figure 5.2 (right side), our analysis revealed a main effect of 
stimulus condition, F(2,62) = 16.94, p < 0.001, np2= 0.35. Subsequent pairwise 
comparisons again revealed that N2pcs in all three conditions are different from 
one another, ps < 0.03 (Bonferroni corrected). Additionally, we again see that in 
Figure 5.2 that the magnitude of the N2pc is in the order that we predicted: the 
largest N2pc is for trials that contain the target, followed by those that contain 
the similar distractor, and then the lowest magnitude is for the dissimilar 
distractor. Finally, we again found a main effect across stimulus conditions for 
the SPCN time window, F(2,62) = 6.22, p = 0.007, np2= 0.17. Critically, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the averaged mean amplitude in the dissimilar 
distractor condition was significantly different from the target condition, p = 
.034 (Bonferroni corrected). Additionally, the dissimilar distractor condition was 
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of attention,” rather our findings support the notion that the N2pc corresponds 
to deeper, post-selection processing of the already attended stimuli. In our 
experiments, we created a situation where the observer needs to identify a 
laterally presented letter to determine whether they should respond to it (if it 
was a target letter) or whether they should withhold a response (if it was a 
distractor letter). Since observers would need to attend to these items to bind 
the features for identification (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), the initial selection of 
each of the letters should be similar. Rather, if the N2pc reflects changes in post-
selection processing and further post-selection processing is required to 
differentiate a target letter from distractor letters, and a target letter from similar 
distractor letters, then we should see that the N2pc amplitudes are different 
depending on our letter conditions. This is exactly what we found. Critically, 
even if we compare just our two distractor letter conditions (i.e. F vs. Q) where 
no motor response was required, we still see that those conditions differ from 
one another. Therefore, these differences cannot be due to differences in 
response type, rather they have to do with the content of the stimulus and, more 
importantly, the similarity of those distractor letters to the target letter. It is 
important to note that we are not arguing that the N2pc does not reflect any 
selection of the attended item. In fact, there very well could be an underlying 
signal in that time-window that reflects the initial selection of the item, followed 
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by the post-selection processing. The important distinction here is that within 
the N2pc time-window, for a typical N2pc, we are seeing differential activity that 
is more in line with differences in processing. Importantly, while we can show 
that there is some post-selection processing taking place, with typical N2pc 
paradigms like these and the nature of measuring ERPs we are unable to 
disentangle whether the N2pc solely reflects post-selection processing vs. initial 
selection activity + post-selection processing. However, for this study our goal 
was only to demonstrate that a reframing of the cognitive processes that are 
attributed to the N2pc (i.e., an initial shift of attention) is needed.  
 
The relationship between the N2pc and the Pd 
In recent work, many researchers have used the relationship between the N2pc 
and the Pd, a component thought to indicate attentional suppression, to 
investigate the interplay of attending to target information (e.g., N2pc activity) 
while simultaneously ignoring distractor information (e.g., Pd activity) (Sawaki, 
Geng, & Luck, 2012). Much of the literature has shown that the timing window of 
the N2pc and the Pd are relatively close (Kiss, Grubert, Petersen, & Eimer, 2012; 
McDonald, Green, Jannati, & Di Lollo, 2013), and in some cases, the timing 
directly overlaps (Sawaki et al., 2012).  In the present work, should we expect 
suppression (i.e., a Pd) of the stimuli? Moreover, are the differences that we see 
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due to hidden Pd activity driving down the N2pc response?  We believe there is 
no reason to expect suppression in our displays. Specifically, the Pd shows up in 
response to a distractor being suppressed which reduces attentional 
competition (i.e., biased competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995)), thus allowing 
the target to have a more differentiated attentional signal. Across all of our 
displays there is only one letter item to select, and thus little to no competition 
to resolve. Additionally, while there was a placeholder in all of our displays, we 
presented the exact same one across all conditions. Thus, if participants were 
suppressing that item it should be consistent for conditions, which would not 
explain our current findings. Another critique of our claims might be that some 
kind of differential suppression is occurring for the letter item in our displays 
within the same time window as the N2pc and this is actually what is creating 
differentiated N2pcs across our conditions. While this wouldn’t be in line with 
any previous findings on the N2pc, this would also mean that all previous N2pc 
work would be susceptible to this criticism (i.e., even if the waveforms are 
similar, there could be underlying differences). However, this critique would 
actually still support our claim that something besides the initial shift of attention 
is occurring during the N2pc, and that this ERP time-window and component 
actually reflect post-selection processing. However, it is important to note that 
none of our contra-ipsi waveforms show any evidence of a Pd.  
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Neural evidence supporting the N2pc being associated with post-selection 
processing 
Past work in humans using EEG (Luck, Girelli, McDermott, & Ford, 1997) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Hopf et al., 2000) have suggested that activity 
associated with the N2pc has been localized to area V4 and higher ventral visual 
areas. In contrast to these studies, there has also been substantial work 
demonstrating that neural evidence of selection can occur in much earlier visual 
areas, such as V2 and even some hints of activity in V1 (Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, 
& Desimone, 1997). Furthermore, prior work in humans has shown that attention 
can already play a critical role as early as 100 milliseconds (Moher et al., 2014; 
Zhang & Luck, 2009). Specifically, it has been shown that there are differences in 
P100 activity for attended-to and to-be-ignored stimuli. The P100 is an ERP 
component that reflects the early initial wave of feedforward processing 
(Mangun et al., 1998; Woldorff et al., 1997). Thus, one possible ERP component 
that might reflect this initial shift of attention could actually be the P100. While 
the current study does not address this, past work (Moher et al., 2014; Zhang & 
Luck, 2009) does provide evidence that this might be the case.  
 
Conclusion 
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Taken together, the results from these two studies demonstrate that the N2pc 
might not simply reflect a shift of spatial attention, rather the N2pc reflects some 
form of post-selection processing occurring after the initial shift of attention. The 
current findings advance our understanding of the underlying temporal structure 
of attentional processing and, in particular, the neural correlates that we have 
assigned to the processes that make up that structure. However, these current 
results do not diminish the value of the N2pc as a tool for understanding 
attention; instead as a field we need to reexamine the processes that have been 
attributed to this component and understand how those findings might reflect 
post-selection processing of attended stimuli.   
 
Methods 
Experiment 9 
Participants 
Forty participants (18 male, ages 18-22, mean age = 20) took part in EEG 
experimental sessions lasting around 1 hour. Participants were undergraduates 
from Johns Hopkins University who participated in the study for extra credit in 
undergraduate courses. One subject was removed due to a technical error 
during recording. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Research was performed with the approval of and in accordance with the Johns 
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Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board. Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants in all experiments. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The experimental sessions were performed in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and 
electrically shielded experimental booth. Stimuli were shown using an Epson 
PowerLite Home Cinema 3000 projector. Stimuli were back projected through a 
hole outside the room onto a 76 cm x 76 cm projector screen inside the room. 
The pixel screen resolution was set to 1024 x 768, which resulted in a projected 
screen size of approximately 36 cm by 27 cm. Stimulus presentation, timing, and 
response recording were controlled by a Dell PC running under Windows, using 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) for Matlab (Mathworks, Inc).   
 
The screen was set at an approximate viewing distance of 70 cm from the 
seated participant. The fixation cross in our experiments subtended a visual 
angle of approximately 0.65° by 0.65° degrees. All placeholder and letter stimuli 
subtended an approximate visual angle of 1.47° by 0.98°. In Experiment 9, 
stimuli could appear in one of four locations (surrounding fixation) at 0°, 90°, 
180°, and 270° from vertical. The center of the stimulus was approximately 8.6 
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degrees away from the center of fixation. All stimuli were shown in the color red 
(RGB= [255 0 0]) and were presented on a black background (RGB = [0 0 0]). 
 
The beginning of each trial started with a black screen that was shown for 250 
milliseconds. A fixation cross would appear after the 250 milliseconds which was 
then followed by the presentation of a stimulus display. The stimulus display 
onset was randomly jittered to avoid entrainment; therefore, it could appear 
randomly between 200-700 milliseconds after the fixation was presented. All 
stimulus displays consisted of a fixation cross in the center, one letter, and a 
placeholder. The critical letters included normal and mirrored versions of: “E”, 
“F”, or “Q”. In Experiment 9, the placeholder consisted of other randomly 
drawn letters that were overlaid on one another (see Figure 5.1 for an example). 
Subjects were instructed to search a capital letter “E” that was either normal or 
mirrored. If they found the capital “E” in either its normal or mirrored form, they 
were instructed to press a response button on a gamepad as quickly as possible. 
If any other non-target letter was presented (either “F” or “Q” normal or 
mirrored), they were instructed to withhold a response. The stimulus display was 
shown for 1000 milliseconds. Reaction times and accuracy were recorded.  
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There were 300 trials total. Half of the trials had a target “E” present and half 
had a non-target present (“F” or “Q”). In half of all trials the letter was 
presented in the normal orientation and the other half of trials the letter was 
presented as a mirrored image. Position of the placeholder and letter were 
randomly chosen such that roughly two-thirds of trials contained trials where the 
placeholder was on the vertical axis (either the 0° or 180° positions) and the 
letter was presented on the horizontal axis (either the 90° or 270° positions). The 
other one-third of trials contained trials where the letter was on the vertical axis 
(either the 0° or 180° positions) and the placeholder was presented on the 
horizontal axis (either the 90° or 270° positions). These trials were not analyzed 
because, due to the lateralized nature of the N2pc component, we would be 
unable to measure any N2pcs to any of the critical items. They were merely 
included to create variety in the task so that participants did not become 
entrained to our critical trials.  
 
EEG Recording and Data Analysis 
EEG data was recorded using an actiCHamp amplifier (BrainVision) with 32 
Ag/AgCL channels. EEG data were sampled at 500 Hz. Data were online 
referenced to Cz and later were offline referenced to the average of the left and 
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right mastoids. Eye movements were measured through the two frontal eye 
channels (FP1 and FP2).  
 
All EEG and ERP data analyses were conducted through EEGLAB (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) toolboxes for 
Matlab. Timing of the stimulus presentation and event codes were corrected 
using a photodiode.  Trials with eye movements, eye blinks, or excessive muscle 
movements were excluded from the analysis. Epochs began 100 milliseconds 
before the stimulus presentation and ended 500 milliseconds after the 
beginning of the presentation. Artifact free ERPs were time-locked to the 
presentation of the stimulus display. ERPs were digitally low-passed filtered (-
3dB cutoff at 30 Hz) separately for each subject. ERPs were averaged separately 
for each stimulus condition. Since we were interested in the N2pc and it is a 
lateralized component, we only used trials where the placeholder was on the 
vertical meridian and the letter stimulus was presented in one of the two 
horizontal positions. For each condition, we then collapsed across the horizontal 
presentations of the letter stimulus (left or right) and the lateral position of the 
electrodes to allow us to create waveforms that were recorded contralaterally 
and ipsilaterally to the presentation of the letter stimulus. For each participant, 
mean N2pc and SPCN amplitudes were measured at six lateralized posterior 
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electrodes (P3/P4/P7/P8/O1/O2), consistent with existing data on the location of 
these components(Mazza, Turatto, & Caramazza, 2009b). For all experiments, 
the N2pc mean amplitude was measured from 200–250 millisecond post-
stimulus onset (consistent with the typical time window for this component e.g., 
(Brisson, Leblanc, & Jolicœur, 2009)) and the SPCN mean amplitude was 
measured from 400–450 millisecond post-stimulus onset (also consistent with 
the typical time window e.g., (Prime & Jolicoeur, 2010)). 
Experiment 10 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants (8 male, ages 18-25, mean age = 20) took part in EEG 
experimental sessions lasting around 1 hour. Participants were undergraduates 
from Johns Hopkins University who participated in the study for extra credit in 
undergraduate courses. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Research was performed with the approval of and in accordance with the 
Johns Hopkins Homewood Institutional Review Board. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants in all experiments. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
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The setup for Experiment 10 was almost identical to Experiment 9, but with the 
following changes: First, we changed the positioning of all stimuli such that on 
every trial both items were presented horizontally (the 90° and the 270° degree 
positions). The position of the placeholder and the letter (either on the left or 
right side of the screen) was randomly balanced. As stated above, this was due 
to concerns that having uneven visual information on one side of the screen 
would influence the N2pc waveform in undesirable ways. We also changed the 
placeholder so that instead of multiple overlaid letters we now used a “%” 
symbol of the same size. Finally, we also removed the mirrored letters condition 
and showed all letters in their typical orientation.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
Summary 
One of the essential underlying cognitive processes for human behavior is our 
ability to select information in the environment, while also ignoring other 
irrelevant, or even distracting, information. This ebb and flow of inhibition and 
selection is the hallmark of the human attentional system.  When we introspect 
on the human capacity to attend to information, it rarely comes to mind that our 
ability to attend depends in large part on our ability to ignore. The interaction of 
inhibitory and excitatory processes of attention has been a much-debated topic 
in psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. 
 
In my dissertation, I explored several avenues for probing the underlying 
structure of the dark side of attention, i.e., the underlying inhibitory processes 
that take place during the selection of information. First, in Chapter 2 I 
demonstrated that learning can play a critical role in whether to-be-ignored 
information is costly or beneficial. Across three experiments (Experiment 1, 2a, 
and 2b) I demonstrated that having a consistent to-be-ignored feature cue can 
result in a benefit, however this benefit is modulated by participants’ time spent 
learning about the to-be ignored feature, where more learning results in more of 
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a RT benefit for ignoring the to-be-ignored feature. Next, in Chapter 3 I 
demonstrated, across two paradigms, that distractor feature information, rather 
than target feature information, seems to be critical in driving early feature-
based attention. Building on previous work in this domain, I demonstrated with 
ERP and behavioral results that early feature-based attention can be facilitated 
by suppression of distractor feature information, on average, when multiple (i.e., 
two) distractor features are present. Importantly, we found that the context 
dependence of the mapping of the information (i.e., the feature mapping of 
what colors are the target and distractors should be consistent) seems critical to 
successfully suppress multiple distractor features. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated 
that lived and biologically driven experiences can influence our inability to 
inhibit certain stimuli. Using energy-dense food as an example, I showed how 
these totally irrelevant stimuli can grab our attention even in the face of a very 
demanding attentional task. Moreover, I demonstrated that local changes to 
goal-state(s) related to food (i.e., how recently you have eaten a small snack) can 
change whether or not you would be captured by these energy-dense food 
distractors. Finally, in Chapter 5, I explored the underlying structure of one of 
the most common ERP neural markers for attention and distraction (i.e., the 
N2pc). I showed that despite considerable previous work on characterizing the 
nature of this ERP component as a neural marker for the initial shift of attention 
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to a stimulus, it seems that this marker could also be referencing post-selection 
processing, much later than the initial shift.  
 
How do my findings fit within current models of attention? 
Due to the complicated nature of the variety of processes that are attributed to 
attention it has been difficult to come up with a unifying account or single 
computational model to illustrate the mechanisms of attention. However, many 
parts of attention have been described through several successful models (see 
review in Chapter 1). The goal of my work in this dissertation was to build on 
several aspects of the inhibitory mechanisms that support attention in hopes of 
better understanding how much they contribute to overall attentional processes 
in vision. Two modern models of attention that can account for these findings 
are: (1) Guided Search and (2) Biased competition.  
 
Guided Search 
Several of my reported results fit well within the Guided Search model of visual 
search (Wolfe, 1994b; Wolfe, 2001; Wolfe et al., 1989; Wolfe & Gancarz, 1997). 
Moreover, the results on the white bear effect in Chapter 2 pose an interesting 
situation for the Guided Search model. Typically, in Guided Search there is a 
massive parallel stage which accounts for the “bottom-up” saliency differences 
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in the display that would draw attention. Additionally, there is a top-down map 
that accounts for attention toward “target features.” Interestingly, one 
explanation for our white bear effects is that observers first attend to the to-be-
ignored information and then reject it. It seems that when given an explicit to-
be-ignored cue, this becomes the “target” or initial goal output for the first 
instance of guidance in the Guided Search model. However, this leads to a 
couple of interesting questions. First, after the to-be-ignored item is rejected, 
how then is this information held in memory such that attention can move from 
the to-be-ignored information to the target that is present somewhere else in 
the display? Wolfe suggests that while they have shown no evidence of memory 
for “rejected distractors” in their work, other findings have lead them to include 
a weight in their model that allows for some “memory” of rejected distractors. 
However, this weight for rejected distractors is probabilistic such that it could be 
the case that the to-be-ignored item is resampled again if the search were 
complicated enough. Could it be the case that if there were a large enough 
visual set size, an explicit to-be-ignored item could be sampled again? 
Additionally, similar to other results in the literature (Arita et al., 2012; Becker, 
Hemsteger, & Peltier, 2016; Moher & Egeth, 2012), I suggest that observers deal 
with these “white bear effects” by developing a template for rejection. How 
does the Guided Search model account for negative attentional templates? 
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More specifically, where does the act of inhibition of the goal or guided 
information get implemented? It seems that in the most recent iteration of the 
Guided Search model (i.e., 4.0) these results can be explained by the feedback 
stage from the “Decision” (Wolfe, 2001). Specifically, as with other selected 
distractors (i.e., not explicitly cued ones), the to-be-ignored item will be rejected 
and a subsequent search will take place through the remaining items. It seems 
that the difference between a to-be-ignored distractor and any other distractor 
is that attention is guided more strongly to the to-be-ignored distractor by the 
explicit to-be-ignored cue. Overall, it seems that Guided Search can, for the 
most part, account for our learned distractor rejection results from Chapter 2.  
 
In addition to the results from Chapter 2 on the white bear effect, my ERP and 
behavioral results from Chapter 3 on early feature-based attention also present 
some interesting findings that support claims in the “activation maps” portion of 
the Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994a). In Chapter 3, we found a very early 
top-down signal that suppresses distractor color features resulting in a 
difference in the P100 ERP component. In Guided Search (Wolfe, 1996), the 
feature maps that feed into the combined “activation map”, which subsequently 
is where the guidance signal is drawn from, can fully account for my results. 
Specifically, in my TSD paradigm there is a top-down signal to attend to one 
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color (e.g., red) and ignore two other distractor colors (e.g., blue and green). 
This would result in an activation map where the two distractor colors would be 
down-weighted (e.g., resulting in two negative or lower peaks) and the target 
information could either remain neutral (which seems to be the case from our 
ERP results) or it could also benefit from excitation (e.g., higher peaks). Then 
when guidance is drawn from this activation map, the relative difference 
between the distractor colors and target colors would result in an increased 
signal to the target color feature. Moreover, it seems that my results suggest 
that the P100 might be tapping into some form of the relationships in this 
activation map, at least for color features in the TSD paradigm. Furthermore, this 
is also supported by the fact that the P100 is at a much earlier time point than 
typical attentional components (e.g., N2pc/Pd). One interesting point to 
consider is that in my follow-up experiment, i.e., the multiple varying distractor 
(MVD) paradigm, it seems that the directionality of the P100 difference is 
positive compared to the results from the TSD paradigm and previous work by 
Moher et al. (2014). While this presents makes the data a bit more difficult to 
interpret, it seems that the P100 could still be tapping into this activation map, 
rather the directionality of the differences aren’t as important as the differences 
among the categories of features that are present (i.e., neutral, target, and 
distractor colors).  
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Biased Competition 
Some of the results reported here could also pose interesting questions for 
another model of attention: Biased Competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In 
Biased Competition, similar to Guided Search, there is competition between 
Bottom-up and Top-down signals. The “winner” in these situation is then what is 
selected/attended. As mentioned previously, the classic top-down/bottom-up 
dichotomy could easily account for our results related to attentional capture by 
energy dense foods. It seems that Biased Competition is a parsimonious 
computational approach to how this might be implemented. For example, it 
seems that while there might be any number of underlying top-down signals at 
play in a task like this: hunger signals, food signals for driving attention to 
particularly tasty foods, goal signals to finish the task quickly. All of these would 
be in direct competition with one another. The “winner” in these experiments 
seems to be more often than not the abrupt onset of an energy-dense food, 
when other hunger goals are not in the competition. However, once a 
participant has recently consumed a small snack, this appears to down-weight 
any competition from the energy-dense food and competition is resolved in 
favor of the main task. One interesting question to consider is how are all of 
these “goals” represented such that they could be compared to one another? 
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What common bias space must exist to be able to compute the weight of 
hunger verses the power of an abrupt onset? While the questions cannot be 
answered with the current results presented here, the Biased Competition 
model does create a simple yet effective framework for thinking about the 
complicated structure of all the sources of competition in our distraction work on 
energy-dense foods.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Overall, my work on the inhibitory mechanisms of attention has further illustrated 
the critical role that ignoring plays in attentional processes. Much of this work 
adds to the current conversations and frameworks within the attention literature 
by highlighting the importance, and necessity, in understanding the inhibitory 
mechanisms of attention. Across several paradigms I have shown how ignoring 
not only can play a critical role in attentional processing but in many cases, 
processes related to inhibition are often handled prior to any processes related 
to target excitation. Thus, one could argue that in some circumstances that 
inhibition drives the initial wave of attention. Continuing to explore and delve 
into the inhibitory processes of attention seems crucial for developing a unifying 
framework/model for understanding visual attention in humans.  
  
    
	 223 
References 
 
Allen, H., & Humphreys, G. (2007). A psychophysical investigation into the 
preview benefit in visual search. Vision research, 47(6), 735-745.  
Allman, J., Miezin, F., & McGuinness, E. (1985). Stimulus specific responses from 
beyond the classical receptive field: neurophysiological mechanisms for 
local-global comparisons in visual neurons. Annual review of 
neuroscience, 8(1), 407-430.  
Andersen, S., & Müller, M. (2010). Behavioral performance follows the time 
course of neural facilitation and suppression during cued shifts of feature-
selective attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
107(31), 13878-13882.  
Anderson, B. (2011). There is no such thing as attention. Frontiers in psychology, 
2, 246.  
Anderson, B. A. (2015). Value-Driven Attentional Capture is Modulated by 
Spatial Context. Vis cogn, 23(1-2), 67-81. doi: 
10.1080/13506285.2014.956851 
    
	 224 
Anderson, B. A. (2016a). The attention habit: how reward learning shapes 
attentional selection. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1369(1), 24-39. doi: 
10.1111/nyas.12957 
Anderson, B. A. (2016b). Social reward shapes attentional biases. Cogn 
Neurosci, 7(1-4), 30-36. doi: 10.1080/17588928.2015.1047823 
Anderson, B. A., Kuwabara, H., Wong, D. F., Gean, E. G., Rahmim, A., Brasic, J. 
R., . . . Yantis, S. (2016). The Role of Dopamine in Value-Based Attentional 
Orienting. Curr Biol, 26(4), 550-555. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.062 
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011). Value-driven attentional 
capture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(25), 
10367-10371.  
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2013). Reward predictions bias 
attentional selection. Front Hum Neurosci, 7, 262. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00262 
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2014). Value-driven attentional 
priority signals in human basal ganglia and visual cortex. Brain Res, 1587, 
88-96. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2014.08.062 
    
	 225 
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2012). Value-driven attentional and oculomotor 
capture during goal-directed, unconstrained viewing. Atten Percept 
Psychophys, 74(8), 1644-1653. doi: 10.3758/s13414-012-0348-2 
Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2013). Persistence of value-driven attentional 
capture. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 39(1), 6-9. doi: 
10.1037/a0030860 
Anton-Erxleben, K., Stephan, V. M., & Treue, S. (2009). Attention reshapes 
center-surround receptive field structure in macaque cortical area MT. 
Cereb Cortex, 19(10), 2466-2478. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhp002 
Arita, J. T., Carlisle, N. B., & Woodman, G. F. (2012). Templates for rejection: 
configuring attention to ignore task-irrelevant features. Journal of 
experimental psychology: human perception and performance, 38(3), 
580.  
Awh, E., Belopolsky, A. V., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). Top-down versus bottom-up 
attentional control: a failed theoretical dichotomy. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(8), 
437-443. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010 
Bacon, W. F., & Egeth, H. E. (1994). Overriding stimulus-driven attentional 
capture. Perception & psychophysics, 55(5), 485-496.  
    
	 226 
Bauer, B., Jolicoeur, P., & Cowan, W. B. (1996). Visual search for colour targets 
that are or are not linearly separable from distractors. Vision Res, 36(10), 
1439-1465.  
Bauer, B., Jolicoeur, P., & Cowan, W. B. (1998). The linear separability effect in 
color visual search: Ruling out the additive color hypothesis. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 60(6), 1083-1093.  
Beck, V. M., & Hollingworth, A. (2015). Evidence for negative feature guidance 
in visual search is explained by spatial recoding. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 41(5), 1190.  
Becker, M. W., Hemsteger, S., & Peltier, C. (2015). No templates for rejection: A 
failure to configure attention to ignore task-irrelevant features. Visual 
Cognition, 23(9-10), 1150-1167.  
Becker, M. W., Hemsteger, S., & Peltier, C. (2016). No templates for rejection: a 
failure to configure attention to ignore task-irrelevant features. Visual 
Cognition, 1-18.  
Belopolsky, A. V., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2010). What is top-down about 
contingent capture? Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72(2), 326-
341.  
    
	 227 
Benoni, H. (2018). Top-Down Prioritization of Salient Items May Produce the So-
Called Stimulus-Driven Capture. Frontiers in psychology, 9, 218.  
Biederman, I., Mezzanotte, R. J., & Rabinowitz, J. C. (1982). Scene perception: 
Detecting and judging objects undergoing relational violations. Cognitive 
psychology, 14(2), 143-177.  
Blechert, J., Meule, A., Busch, N. A., & Ohla, K. (2015). Food-pics: an image 
database for experimental research on eating and appetite. Food 
cravings, 40.  
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 433-
436. doi: 10.1163/156856897x00357 
Braithwaite, J. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (2003). Inhibition and anticipation in 
visual search: evidence from effects of color foreknowledge on preview 
search. Percept Psychophys, 65(2), 213-237.  
Braithwaite, J. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (2007a). Filtering items of mass 
distraction: Top-down biases against distractors are necessary for the 
feature-based carry-over to occur. Vision research, 47(12), 1570-1583.  
Braithwaite, J. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (2007b). Filtering items of mass 
distraction: top-down biases against distractors are necessary for the 
    
	 228 
feature-based carry-over to occur. Vision Res, 47(12), 1570-1583. doi: 
10.1016/j.visres.2007.02.019 
Braithwaite, J. J., Humphreys, G. W., & Hodsoll, J. (2003). Color grouping in 
space and time: evidence from negative color-based carryover effects in 
preview search. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 29(4), 758-778.  
Braithwaite, J. J., Humphreys, G. W., & Hodsoll, J. (2004). Effects of colour on 
preview search: anticipatory and inhibitory biases for colour. Spat Vis, 
17(4-5), 389-415.  
Braithwaite, J. J., Humphreys, G. W., & Hulleman, J. (2005). Color-based 
grouping and inhibition in visual search: evidence from a probe detection 
analysis of preview search. Percept Psychophys, 67(1), 81-101.  
Branton, A., Akhavan, T., Gladanac, B., Pollard, D., Welch, J., Rossiter, M., & 
Bellissimo, N. (2014). Pre-meal video game playing and a glucose preload 
suppress food intake in normal weight boys. Appetite, 83, 256-262.  
Brisson, B., Leblanc, É., & Jolicœur, P. (2009). Contingent capture of visual-
spatial attention depends on capacity-limited central mechanisms: 
Evidence from human electrophysiology and the psychological refractory 
period. Biological Psychology, 80(2), 218-225.  
    
	 229 
Broadbent, D. E. (1952). Listening to one of two synchronous messages. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 44(1), 51.  
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and communication: Elsevier. 
Bundesen, C. (1990). A theory of visual attention. Psychological review, 97(4), 
523.  
Bundesen, C. (1998). A computational theory of visual attention. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 
353(1373), 1271-1281.  
Bundesen, C., Habekost, T., & Kyllingsbæk, S. (2005). A neural theory of visual 
attention: bridging cognition and neurophysiology. Psychological review, 
112(2), 291.  
Bundesen, C., Habekost, T., & Kyllingsbæk, S. (2011). A neural theory of visual 
attention and short-term memory (NTVA). Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1446-
1457.  
Buzsaki, G., Kaila, K., & Raichle, M. (2007). Inhibition and brain work. Neuron, 
56(5), 771-783. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.11.008 
    
	 230 
Carlisle, N. B., Arita, J. T., Pardo, D., & Woodman, G. F. (2011). Attentional 
templates in visual working memory. J Neurosci, 31(25), 9315-9322. doi: 
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1097-11.2011 
Carr, T. H., & Dagenbach, D. (1990). Semantic priming and repetition priming 
from masked words: evidence for a center-surround attentional 
mechanism in perceptual recognition. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, 
16(2), 341-350.  
Castellanos, E. H., Charboneau, E., Dietrich, M. S., Park, S., Bradley, B. P., 
Mogg, K., & Cowan, R. L. (2009). Obese adults have visual attention bias 
for food cue images: evidence for altered reward system function. 
International Journal of Obesity, 33(9), 1063-1073.  
Chao, H.-F. (2010). Top-down attentional control for distractor locations: The 
benefit of precuing distractor locations on target localization and 
discrimination. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 36(2), 303.  
Chen, P., & Mordkoff, J. T. (2007). Contingent capture at a very short SOA: 
Evidence against rapid disengagement. Visual Cognition, 15(6), 637-646.  
    
	 231 
Chen, X., & Tsotsos, J. K. (2010). Attentive Surround Suppression in the Feature 
Dimension, (Tech. Rep. No.CSE-2010-2001), Toronto, Canada: York 
University, Department of Computer Science and Engineering.  
Cherry, E. C. (1953). Some experiments on the recognition of speech, with one 
and with two ears. The Journal of the acoustical society of America, 25(5), 
975-979.  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences Laurence 
Erlbaum. Hillsdale, NJ.  
Cowan, N. (2010). The magical mystery four: How is working memory capacity 
limited, and why? Current directions in psychological science, 19(1), 51-
57.  
Cunningham, C. A., & Egeth, H. E. (2016). Taming the White Bear: Initial Costs 
and Eventual Benefits of Distractor Inhibition. Psychol Sci, 27(4), 476-485. 
doi: 10.1177/0956797615626564 
Curran, T., & Cleary, A. M. (2003). Using ERPs to dissociate recollection from 
familiarity in picture recognition. Cognitive Brain Research, 15(2), 191-
205.  
    
	 232 
Dagenbach, D., & Kubat-Silman, A. K. (2003). The principle of inhibition 
Principles of Learning and Memory (pp. 207-221): Springer. 
Delorme, A., & Makeig, S. (2004). EEGLAB: an open source toolbox for analysis 
of single-trial EEG dynamics including independent component analysis. 
J Neurosci Methods, 134(1), 9-21. doi: 10.1016/j.jneumeth.2003.10.009 
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual 
attention. Annu Rev Neurosci, 18, 193-222. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.001205 
Deutsch, J. A., & Deutsch, D. (1963). Attention: Some theoretical considerations. 
Psychological review, 70(1), 80.  
Donk, M., & Theeuwes, J. (2001). Visual marking beside the mark: Prioritizing 
selection by abrupt onsets. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 63(5), 
891-900.  
Drewnowski, A. (1997a). Taste preferences and food intake. Annual review of 
nutrition, 17(1), 237-253.  
Drewnowski, A. (1997b). Why do we like fat? Journal of the American Dietetic 
Association, 97(7), S58-S62.  
    
	 233 
Duncan, J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1989). Visual search and stimulus similarity. 
Psychol Rev, 96(3), 433-458.  
Egeth, H. E. (1966). Parallel versus serial processes in multidimensional stimulus 
discrimination. Perception & Psychophysics, 1(4), 245-252.  
Egeth, H. E., Virzi, R. A., & Garbart, H. (1984). Searching for conjunctively 
defined targets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 10(1), 32.  
Egeth, H. E., & Yantis, S. (1997). Visual attention: Control, representation, and 
time course. Annual review of psychology, 48(1), 269-297.  
Eimer, M. (1996). The N2pc component as an indicator of attentional selectivity. 
Electroencephalography and clinical neurophysiology, 99(3), 225-234.  
Eimer, M., & Kiss, M. (2007). Attentional capture by task-irrelevant fearful faces is 
revealed by the N2pc component. Biological psychology, 74(1), 108-112.  
Eimer, M., & Kiss, M. (2010). The top-down control of visual selection and how it 
is linked to the N2pc component. Acta psychologica, 135(2), 100-102.  
    
	 234 
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the 
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 16(1), 143-149.  
Fahrenfort, J. J., Grubert, A., Olivers, C. N., & Eimer, M. (2017). Multivariate EEG 
analyses support high-resolution tracking of feature-based attentional 
selection. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1886.  
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and 
biomedical sciences. Behavior research methods, 39(2), 175-191.  
Feldmann-Wüstefeld, T., & Vogel, E. K. (2018). Neural Evidence for the 
Contribution of Active Suppression During Working Memory Filtering. 
Cerebral Cortex.  
Fischler, I. (1977). Associative facilitation without expectancy in a lexical decision 
task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 3(1), 18.  
Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not into 
temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 84(2), 296.  
    
	 235 
Folk, C. L. (2013). Dissociating compatibility effects and distractor costs in the 
additional singleton paradigm. Frontiers in psychology, 4.  
Folk, C. L., & Remington, R. (1998). Selectivity in distraction by irrelevant featural 
singletons: evidence for two forms of attentional capture. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance, 24(3), 
847.  
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., & Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary covert 
orienting is contingent on attentional control settings. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance, 18(4), 
1030.  
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., & Johnston, J. C. (1993). Contingent attentional 
capture: A reply to Yantis (1993).  
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2008). Failures to ignore entirely irrelevant distractors: 
the role of load. J Exp Psychol Appl, 14(1), 73-83. doi: 10.1037/1076-
898X.14.1.73 
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2011). Entirely irrelevant distractors can capture and 
captivate attention. Psychon Bull Rev, 18(6), 1064-1070. doi: 
10.3758/s13423-011-0172-z 
    
	 236 
Found, A., & Muller, H. J. (1996). Searching for unknown feature targets on more 
than one dimension: investigating a "dimension-weighting" account. 
Percept Psychophys, 58(1), 88-101.  
Foxe, J. J., & Simpson, G. V. (2002). Flow of activation from V1 to frontal cortex 
in humans. Experimental Brain Research, 142(1), 139-150.  
Friedman-Hill, S., & Wolfe, J. M. (1995). Second-order parallel processing: Visual 
search for the odd item in a subset. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
21(3), 531-551.  
Gal, V., Kozák, L. R., Kóbor, I., Bankó, E. M., Serences, J. T., & Vidnyánszky, Z. 
(2009). Learning to filter out visual distractors. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 29(8), 1723-1731.  
Gibson, B. S., & Kelsey, E. M. (1998). Stimulus-driven attentional capture is 
contingent on attentional set for displaywide visual features. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24(3), 
699.  
Graham, R., Hoover, A., Ceballos, N. A., & Komogortsev, O. (2011). Body mass 
index moderates gaze orienting biases and pupil diameter to high and 
low calorie food images. Appetite, 56(3), 577-586.  
    
	 237 
Graves, T., & Egeth, H. E. (2016). When does feature search fail to protect 
against attentional capture? Visual Cognition, 1-26.  
Gray, J., & Wedderburn, A. (1960). Shorter articles and notes grouping 
strategies with simultaneous stimuli. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 12(3), 180-184.  
Hall, P. A. (2016). Executive-control processes in high-calorie food consumption. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25(2), 91-98.  
Herman, C. P., & Mack, D. (1975). Restrained and unrestrained eating. Journal of 
personality, 43(4), 647-660.  
Hickey, C., Di Lollo, V., & McDonald, J. J. (2009). Electrophysiological indices of 
target and distractor processing in visual search. Journal of cognitive 
neuroscience, 21(4), 760-775.  
Hillyard, S. A., & Münte, T. F. (1984). Selective attention to color and location: 
An analysis with event-related brain potentials. Perception & 
psychophysics, 36(2), 185-198.  
Hillyard, S. A., Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (1998). Sensory gain control 
(amplification) as a mechanism of selective attention: electrophysiological 
    
	 238 
and neuroimaging evidence. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 
353(1373), 1257-1270. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1998.0281 
Hodsoll, S., Viding, E., & Lavie, N. (2011). Attentional capture by irrelevant 
emotional distractor faces. Emotion, 11(2), 346.  
Hoek, H. W. (2006). Incidence, prevalence and mortality of anorexia nervosa and 
other eating disorders. Current opinion in psychiatry, 19(4), 389-394.  
Hoffman, J. E. (1979). A two-stage model of visual search. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 25(4), 319-327.  
Hopf, J.-M., Luck, S. J., Girelli, M., Hagner, T., Mangun, G. R., Scheich, H., & 
Heinze, H.-J. (2000). Neural sources of focused attention in visual search. 
Cerebral Cortex, 10(12), 1233-1241.  
Hopf, J. M., Boehler, C. N., Luck, S. J., Tsotsos, J. K., Heinze, H. J., & 
Schoenfeld, M. A. (2006). Direct neurophysiological evidence for spatial 
suppression surrounding the focus of attention in vision. Proc Natl Acad 
Sci U S A, 103(4), 1053-1058. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0507746103 
Ille, N., Berg, P., & Scherg, M. (2002). Artifact correction of the ongoing EEG 
using spatial filters based on artifact and brain signal topographies. J Clin 
Neurophysiol, 19(2), 113-124.  
    
	 239 
James, W. (1890/1950). The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
Jansen, A., & Van den Hout, M. (1991). On being led into 
temptation:“Counterregulation” of dieters after smelling a “preload”. 
Addictive behaviors, 16(5), 247-253.  
Jonides, J., & Yantis, S. (1988). Uniqueness of abrupt visual onset in capturing 
attention. Perception & Psychophysics, 43(4), 346-354.  
Julesz, B. (1981). Textons, the elements of texture perception, and their 
interactions. Nature, 290(5802), 91-97.  
Kiss, M., Grubert, A., Petersen, A., & Eimer, M. (2012). Attentional capture by 
salient distractors during visual search is determined by temporal task 
demands. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 24(3), 749-759.  
Lamy, D., & Yashar, A. (2008). Intertrial target-feature changes do not lead to 
more distraction by singletons: Target uncertainty does. Vision Research, 
48(10), 1274-1279.  
Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and 
performance, 21(3), 451.  
    
	 240 
Leber, A. B., & Egeth, H. E. (2006). It’s under control: Top-down search 
strategies can override attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 13(1), 132-138.  
Leber, A. B., Kawahara, J.-I., & Gabari, Y. (2009). Long-term abstract learning of 
attentional set. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 35(5), 1385.  
Leblanc, É., Prime, D. J., & Jolicoeur, P. (2008). Tracking the location of 
visuospatial attention in a contingent capture paradigm. Journal of 
cognitive neuroscience, 20(4), 657-671.  
Lijffijt, M., Lane, S. D., Meier, S. L., Boutros, N. N., Burroughs, S., Steinberg, J. 
L., . . . Swann, A. C. (2009). P50, N100, and P200 sensory gating: 
relationships with behavioral inhibition, attention, and working memory. 
Psychophysiology, 46(5), 1059-1068.  
Liu, T., Larsson, J., & Carrasco, M. (2007). Feature-based attention modulates 
orientation-selective responses in human visual cortex. Neuron, 55(2), 
313-323.  
    
	 241 
Lleras, A., Buetti, S., & Mordkoff, J. T. (2013). When do the effects of distractors 
provide a measure of distractibility. The psychology of learning and 
motivation, 59, 261-316.  
Lleras, A., Kawahara, J., Wan, X. I., & Ariga, A. (2008). Intertrial inhibition of 
focused attention in pop-out search. Percept Psychophys, 70(1), 114-131.  
Lopez-Calderon, J., & Luck, S. J. (2014). ERPLAB: an open-source toolbox for 
the analysis of event-related potentials. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 
8, 213.  
Luck, S. J., Chelazzi, L., Hillyard, S. A., & Desimone, R. (1997). Neural 
mechanisms of spatial selective attention in areas V1, V2, and V4 of 
macaque visual cortex. Journal of neurophysiology, 77(1), 24-42.  
Luck, S. J., Girelli, M., McDermott, M. T., & Ford, M. A. (1997). Bridging the gap 
between monkey neurophysiology and human perception: An ambiguity 
resolution theory of visual selective attention. Cognitive psychology, 
33(1), 64-87.  
Luck, S. J., & Hillyard, S. A. (1994a). Electrophysiological correlates of feature 
analysis during visual search. Psychophysiology, 31(3), 291-308.  
    
	 242 
Luck, S. J., & Hillyard, S. A. (1994b). Spatial filtering during visual search: 
evidence from human electrophysiology. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20(5), 1000.  
Luck, S. J., Hillyard, S. A., Mouloua, M., Woldorff, M. G., Clark, V. P., & Hawkins, 
H. L. (1994). Effects of spatial cuing on luminance detectability: 
psychophysical and electrophysiological evidence for early selection. 
Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and 
performance, 20(4), 887.  
Luck, S. J., & Kappenman, E. S. (2012). ERP components and selective attention. 
The Oxford handbook of event-related potential components, 295-328.  
Lynn, J., & Shin, M. (2015). Strategic top-down control versus attentional bias by 
previous reward history. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77(7), 
2207-2216.  
Maljkovic, V., & Nakayama, K. (1994). Priming of pop-out: I. Role of features. 
Memory & cognition, 22(6), 657-672.  
Mangun, G. R., Buonocore, M. H., Girelli, M., & Jha, A. P. (1998). ERP and fMRI 
measures of visual spatial selective attention. Human brain mapping, 6(5-
6), 383-389.  
    
	 243 
Martinez-Trujillo, J. C., & Treue, S. (2004). Feature-based attention increases the 
selectivity of population responses in primate visual cortex. Current 
Biology, 14(9), 744-751.  
Mazza, V., Turatto, M., & Caramazza, A. (2009a). Attention selection, distractor 
suppression and N2pc. cortex, 45(7), 879-890.  
Mazza, V., Turatto, M., & Caramazza, A. (2009b). An electrophysiological 
assessment of distractor suppression in visual search tasks. 
Psychophysiology, 46(4), 771-775.  
McDonald, J. J., Green, J. J., Jannati, A., & Di Lollo, V. (2013). On the 
electrophysiological evidence for the capture of visual attention. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39(3), 
849.  
Miller, E. K., Li, L., & Desimone, R. (1991). A neural mechanism for working and 
recognition memory in inferior temporal cortex. Science, 254(5036), 1377.  
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Hyare, H., & Lee, S. (1998). Selective attention to food-
related stimuli in hunger: are attentional biases specific to emotional and 
psychopathological states, or are they also found in normal drive states? 
Behaviour research and therapy, 36(2), 227-237.  
    
	 244 
Moher, J., & Egeth, H. E. (2012). The ignoring paradox: Cueing distractor 
features leads first to selection, then to inhibition of to-be-ignored items. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(8), 1590-1605.  
Moher, J., Lakshmanan, B. M., Egeth, H. E., & Ewen, J. B. (2014). Inhibition 
drives early feature-based attention. Psychological science, 25(2), 315-
324.  
Moran, J., & Desimone, R. (1985). Selective attention gates visual processing in 
the extrastriate cortex. Front. Cogn. Neurosci, 229, 342-345.  
Most, S. B., Chun, M. M., Widders, D. M., & Zald, D. H. (2005). Attentional 
rubbernecking: Cognitive control and personality in emotion-induced 
blindness. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 12(4), 654-661.  
Most, S. B., Smith, S. D., Cooter, A. B., Levy, B. N., & Zald, D. H. (2007). The 
naked truth: Positive, arousing distractors impair rapid target perception. 
Cognition and emotion, 21(5), 964-981.  
Most, S. B., & Wang, L. (2011). Dissociating spatial attention and awareness in 
emotion-induced blindness. Psychological science, 22(3), 300-305.  
Mounts, J. R. (2000). Attentional capture by abrupt onsets and feature singletons 
produces inhibitory surrounds. Percept Psychophys, 62(7), 1485-1493.  
    
	 245 
Muller, N. G., & Kleinschmidt, A. (2004). The attentional 'spotlight's' penumbra: 
center-surround modulation in striate cortex. Neuroreport, 15(6), 977-
980.  
Munneke, J., Van der Stigchel, S., & Theeuwes, J. (2008). Cueing the location of 
a distractor: An inhibitory mechanism of spatial attention? Acta 
Psychologica, 129(1), 101-107.  
Neimeijer, R. A., de Jong, P. J., & Roefs, A. (2013). Temporal attention for visual 
food stimuli in restrained eaters. Appetite, 64, 5-11.  
Newell, A. (1973). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win: Projective 
comments on the papers of this symposium.  
Nijs, I. M., & Franken, I. H. (2012). Attentional processing of food cues in 
overweight and obese individuals. Current obesity reports, 1(2), 106-113.  
Nothdurft, H.-C. (1993). Saliency effects across dimensions in visual search. 
Vision Research, 33(5), 839-844.  
O’Brien, F., & Cousineau, D. (2014). Representing error bars in within-subject 
designs in typical software packages. The Quantitative Methods for 
Psychology, 58-70.  
    
	 246 
Ogden, C. L., Carroll, M. D., Kit, B. K., & Flegal, K. M. (2014). Prevalence of 
childhood and adult obesity in the United States, 2011-2012. JAMA, 
311(8), 806-814. doi: 10.1001/jama.2014.732 
Olszanowski, M., Pochwatko, G., Kuklinski, K., Scibor-Rylski, M., Lewinski, P., & 
Ohme, R. K. (2015). Warsaw set of emotional facial expression pictures: a 
validation study of facial display photographs. Frontiers in psychology, 5.  
Papies, E. K., Stroebe, W., & Aarts, H. (2008). The allure of forbidden food: On 
the role of attention in self-regulation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44(5), 1283-1292.  
Pashler, H. E. (1998). The psychology of attention.  
Peters, R. W. (1954). Competing messages: The effect of interfering messages 
upon the reception of primary messages: DTIC Document. 
Philips, S., & Takeda, Y. (2009). An EEG/ERP study of efficient versus inefficient 
visual search. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Piech, R. M., Pastorino, M. T., & Zald, D. H. (2010). All I saw was the cake. 
Hunger effects on attentional capture by visual food cues. Appetite, 
54(3), 579-582.  
    
	 247 
Pool, E., Brosch, T., Delplanque, S., & Sander, D. (2014). Where is the 
chocolate? Rapid spatial orienting toward stimuli associated with primary 
rewards. Cognition, 130(3), 348-359.  
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly journal of experimental 
psychology, 32(1), 3-25.  
Prime, D. J., & Jolicoeur, P. (2010). Mental rotation requires visual short-term 
memory: Evidence from human electric cortical activity. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(11), 2437-2446.  
Ristic, J., & Landry, M. (2015). Combining attention: a novel way of 
conceptualizing the links between attention, sensory processing, and 
behavior. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77(1), 36-49.  
Robinson, M. J., & Berridge, K. C. (2013). Instant transformation of learned 
repulsion into motivational “wanting”. Current Biology, 23(4), 282-289.  
Rogers, P. J., & Hill, A. J. (1989). Breakdown of dietary restraint following mere 
exposure to food stimuli: interrelationships between restraint, hunger, 
salivation, and food intake. Addictive behaviors, 14(4), 387-397.  
    
	 248 
Ruff, C. C., & Driver, J. (2006). Attentional preparation for a lateralized visual 
distractor: Behavioral and fMRI evidence. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 18(4), 522-538.  
Saenz, M., Buracas, G. T., & Boynton, G. M. (2002). Global effects of feature-
based attention in human visual cortex. Nature neuroscience, 5(7), 631-
632.  
Saenz, M., Buraĉas, G. T., & Boynton, G. M. (2003). Global feature-based 
attention for motion and color. Vision research, 43(6), 629-637.  
Sawaki, R., Geng, J. J., & Luck, S. J. (2012). A common neural mechanism for 
preventing and terminating the allocation of attention. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 32(31), 10725-10736.  
Schreij, D., Owens, C., & Theeuwes, J. (2008). Abrupt onsets capture attention 
independent of top-down control settings. Perception & Psychophysics, 
70(2), 208-218.  
Selst, M. V., & Jolicoeur, P. (1994). A solution to the effect of sample size on 
outlier elimination. The quarterly journal of experimental psychology, 
47(3), 631-650.  
    
	 249 
Serences, J. T., Yantis, S., Culberson, A., & Awh, E. (2004). Preparatory activity in 
visual cortex indexes distractor suppression during covert spatial 
orienting. Journal of Neurophysiology, 92(6), 3538-3545.  
Sha, L. Z., & Jiang, Y. V. (2016). Components of reward-driven attentional 
capture. [journal article]. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 78(2), 
403-414. doi: 10.3758/s13414-015-1038-7 
Shafran, R., Lee, M., Cooper, Z., Palmer, R. L., & Fairburn, C. G. (2007). 
Attentional bias in eating disorders. International Journal of Eating 
Disorders, 40(4), 369-380.  
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human 
information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a 
general theory. Psychological review, 84(2), 127.  
Shin, E., Wan, X. I., Fabiani, M., Gratton, G., & Lleras, A. (2008). 
Electrophysiological evidence of feature-based inhibition of focused 
attention across consecutive trials. Psychophysiology, 45(5), 804-811. doi: 
10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00679.x 
    
	 250 
Shomstein, S., & Gottlieb, J. (2016). Spatial and non-spatial aspects of visual 
attention: interactive cognitive mechanisms and neural underpinnings. 
Neuropsychologia.  
Smith, S. D., Most, S. B., Newsome, L. A., & Zald, D. H. (2006). An emotion-
induced attentional blink elicited by aversively conditioned stimuli. 
Emotion, 6(3), 523.  
Spieth, W., Curtis, J. F., & Webster, J. C. (1954). Responding to one of two 
simultaneous messages. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America, 26(3), 391-396.  
Stewart, D. (1821). Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1): J. 
Munroe andcompany. 
Stone, A., & Valentine, T. (2007). The categorical structure of knowledge for 
famous people (and a novel application of Centre-Surround theory). 
Cognition, 104(3), 535-564. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.014 
Stormer, V. S., & Alvarez, G. A. (2014). Feature-based attention elicits surround 
suppression in feature space. Curr Biol, 24(17), 1985-1988. doi: 
10.1016/j.cub.2014.07.030 
    
	 251 
Stroud, M. J., Menneer, T., Cave, K. R., & Donnelly, N. (2012). Using the dual-
target cost to explore the nature of search target representations. J Exp 
Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 38(1), 113-122. doi: 10.1037/a0025887 
Theeuwes, J. (1990). Perceptual selectivity is task dependent: Evidence from 
selective search. Acta psychologica, 74(1), 81-99.  
Theeuwes, J. (1994). Stimulus-driven capture and attentional set: selective 
search for color and visual abrupt onsets. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human perception and performance, 20(4), 799.  
Theeuwes, J. (2010). Top–down and bottom–up control of visual selection. Acta 
psychologica, 135(2), 77-99.  
Theeuwes, J., & Van der Burg, E. (2007). The role of spatial and nonspatial 
information in visual selection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 33(6), 1335.  
Theeuwes, J., & Van der Burg, E. (2011). On the limits of top-down control of 
visual selection. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73(7), 2092-
2103.  
Theeuwes, J., & Van der Stigchel, S. (2006). Faces capture attention: Evidence 
from inhibition of return. Visual Cognition, 13(6), 657-665.  
    
	 252 
Titchener, E. B. (1908). Lectures on the elementary psychology of feeling and 
attention: Macmillan. 
Toepel, U., Knebel, J.-F., Hudry, J., le Coutre, J., & Murray, M. M. (2009). The 
brain tracks the energetic value in food images. Neuroimage, 44(3), 967-
974.  
Treisman, A., & Souther, J. (1985). Search asymmetry: a diagnostic for 
preattentive processing of separable features. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 114(3), 285.  
Treisman, A., Sykes, M., & Gelade, G. (1977). Selective attention and stimulus 
integration. Attention and performance VI, 333.  
Treisman, A. M., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature-integration theory of attention. 
Cogn Psychol, 12(1), 97-136. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(80)90005-5 
Tsal, Y., & Makovski, T. (2006). The attentional white bear phenomenon: The 
mandatory allocation of attention to expected distractor locations. 
Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and 
performance, 32(2), 351.  
    
	 253 
Turk-Browne, N. B., Jungé, J. A., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). The automaticity of visual 
statistical learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(4), 
552.  
Van der Stigchel, S., & Theeuwes, J. (2006). Our eyes deviate away from a 
location where a distractor is expected to appear. Experimental Brain 
Research, 169(3), 338.  
Van Dillen, L. F., Papies, E. K., & Hofmann, W. (2013). Turning a blind eye to 
temptation: How cognitive load can facilitate self-regulation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 427.  
Vatterott, D. B., & Vecera, S. P. (2012). Experience-dependent attentional tuning 
of distractor rejection. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 19(5), 871-878.  
Veenstra, E. M., de Jong, P. J., Koster, E. H., & Roefs, A. (2010). Attentional 
avoidance of high-fat food in unsuccessful dieters. Journal of behavior 
therapy and experimental psychiatry, 41(3), 282-288.  
Vogel, E. K., McCollough, A. W., & Machizawa, M. G. (2005). Neural measures 
reveal individual differences in controlling access to working memory. 
Nature, 438(7067), 500.  
Von Helmholtz, H. (1896). Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (Vol. 1): L. Voss. 
    
	 254 
Vuilleumier, P., & Schwartz, S. (2001). Emotional facial expressions capture 
attention. Neurology, 56(2), 153-158.  
Waldvogel, D., van Gelderen, P., Muellbacher, W., Ziemann, U., Immisch, I., & 
Hallett, M. (2000). The relative metabolic demand of inhibition and 
excitation. Nature, 406(6799), 995-998.  
Watson, D. G., & Humphreys, G. W. (1997). Visual marking: prioritizing selection 
for new objects by top-down attentional inhibition of old objects. 
Psychological review, 104(1), 90.  
Watson, D. G., & Humphreys, G. W. (2000). Visual marking: Evidence for 
inhibition using a probe-dot detection paradigm. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 62(3), 471-481.  
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical 
effects of thought suppression. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 53(1), 5.  
Werthmann, J., Roefs, A., Nederkoorn, C., & Jansen, A. (2013). Desire lies in the 
eyes: attention bias for chocolate is related to craving and self-endorsed 
eating permission. Appetite, 70, 81-89.  
    
	 255 
Werthmann, J., Roefs, A., Nederkoorn, C., Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., & Jansen, A. 
(2011). Can (not) take my eyes off it: Attention bias for food in overweight 
participants. Health Psychology, 30(5), 561.  
Woldorff, M., Fox, P., Matzke, M., Lancaster, J., Veeraswamy, S., Zamarripa, F., . 
. . Martin, C. (1997). Retinotopic organization of early visual spatial 
attention effects as revealed by PET and ERPs. Human brain mapping, 
5(4), 280-286.  
Wolfe, J. M. (1994a). Guided search 2.0 a revised model of visual search. 
Psychonomic bulletin & review, 1(2), 202-238.  
Wolfe, J. M. (1994b). Guided Search 2.0 A revised model of visual search. 
Psychon Bull Rev, 1(2), 202-238. doi: 10.3758/BF03200774 
Wolfe, J. M. (1996). Extending guided search: Why guided search needs a 
preattentive “item map.”. Converging operations in the study of visual 
attention, 247-270.  
Wolfe, J. M. (2001). Guided Search 4.0: A guided search model that does not 
require memory for rejected distractors. Journal of Vision, 1(3), 349-349.  
    
	 256 
Wolfe, J. M., Cave, K. R., & Franzel, S. L. (1989). Guided search: an alternative to 
the feature integration model for visual search. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human perception and performance, 15(3), 419.  
Wolfe, J. M., & Gancarz, G. (1997). Guided Search 3.0 Basic and clinical 
applications of vision science (pp. 189-192): Springer. 
Wolfe, J. M., & Horowitz, T. S. (2017). Five factors that guide attention in visual 
search. Nature Human Behaviour, 1, 0058.  
Wolfe, J. M., Reijnen, E., Van Wert, M. J., & Kuzmova, Y. (2009). In visual search, 
guidance by surface type is different than classic guidance. [Research 
Support, N.I.H., Extramural 
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't 
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.]. Vision Research, 49(7), 765-773. doi: 
10.1016/j.visres.2009.02.007 
Wood, N. L., & Cowan, N. (1995). The cocktail party phenomenon revisited: 
attention and memory in the classic selective listening procedure of 
Cherry (1953). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(3), 243.  
Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (1999). Electrophysiological measurement of 
rapid shifts of attention during visual search. Nature, 400(6747), 867-869.  
    
	 257 
Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2007). Do the contents of visual working memory 
automatically influence attentional selection during visual search? Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33(2), 
363.  
Woodman, G. F., Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (2001). Visual search remains 
efficient when visual working memory is full. Psychol Sci, 12(3), 219-224.  
Yantis, S. (2013). Sensation and Perception: Worth Publishers. 
Yantis, S., & Jonides, J. (1984). Abrupt visual onsets and selective attention: 
evidence from visual search. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 10(5), 
601-621.  
Zehetleitner, M., Goschy, H., & Müller, H. J. (2012). Top-down control of 
attention: it's gradual, practice-dependent, and hierarchically organized. 
Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and 
performance, 38(4), 941.  
Zhang, D., Zhou, X., & Martens, S. (2009). The impact of negative attentional set 
upon target processing in RSVP: An ERP study. Neuropsychologia, 47(12), 
2604-2614.  
    
	 258 
Zhang, W., & Luck, S. J. (2009). Feature-based attention modulates feedforward 
visual processing. Nat Neurosci, 12(1), 24-25. doi: 10.1038/nn.2223 
 
  




    
	 263 
Madrid J, Cunningham CA, Robbins A, & Hout MC “Don’t label me!: Search for familiar, 
nameable objects vs. search for unfamiliar, novel objects.” Object Perception, 
Attention, and Memory (OPAM), Chicago, Illinois.  November 2015. 
 
Cunningham CA & Egeth HE. “Loosening the Snare: Top-down goals overcome 
singleton driven attentional capture.” Vision Sciences Society 15th Annual 
Meeting, St. Petersburg, FL. May, 2015. 
 
Cunningham CA & Egeth HE. “When Constant Rejection is a Good Thing: the effects of 
learning on efficient feature inhibition.” Object Perception, Attention, and 
Memory (OPAM), Long Beach, California.  November 2014. 
 
Cunningham CA, Pailian H, & Egeth HE. “Characterizing Representations in Activated 
Long-Term Memory.” Psychonomic Society Annual Meeting, Long Beach, 
California.  November 2014. 
 
Loiotile RE, Cunningham CA, Egeth HE, & Courtney SM. “Behavioral pattern 
separation/completion: A signal detection theory analysis” Society for 
Neuroscience Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., November 2014. 
 
Cunningham CA & Egeth HE. “Learning to Ignore Non-target Features Eventually Leads 
to More Efficient Search.” American Psychological Association Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C. August, 2014. 
 
Cunningham CA & Egeth HE. “Taming the White Bear: Learning Distractor Features 
Begins With a Cost, But Eventually Allows For More Efficient Search.” Vision 
Sciences Society 14th Annual Meeting, St. Petersburg, FL. May, 2014. 
 
Cunningham CA, Yassa MA, & Egeth HE. “Massive memory revisited: estimating object 
details in visual long-term memory.” Object Perception, Attention, and Memory 
(OPAM), Toronto, Ontario.  November 2013. 
 
Cunningham CA, Wolfe JM, & Egeth HE.  “Incidental memory for potential targets vs. 
confirmed distractors” Vision Sciences Society 13th Annual Meeting, Naples, FL.  
May, 2013. 
 
Cunningham CA & Wolfe JM.  “Extending “Hybrid” Visual X Memory Search to Very 
Large Memory Sets and to Category Search.” Psychonomic Society Annual 
Meeting, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  November 2012. 
 
Cunningham CA & Wolfe JM.  “Finding what is new in hybrid visual and memory 
search: a new search asymmetry.” Vision Sciences Society 12th Annual Meeting, 
Naples, FL.  May, 2012. 
 
Drew T, Cunningham CA, & Wolfe JM.  “Why does Computer Aided Detection interfere 
with visual search?.” Medical Image Perception Conference (MIPS), Dublin, 
Ireland.  August 2011. 
 



